Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism and values-based rationality by Farrell, Robert Peter
Feyerabend's Epistemological Anarchism and 
Values-Based Rationality
Robert Peter Farrell 
March 1998
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
of the Australian National University
The content of this thesis is entirely my own work
This thesis is dedicated to my two girls: to Lucinda for emotional support 
throughout, and to Breanna, whose arrival made the writing of this thesis a
unique and rewarding process.
My thanks go to Dr. C.B. Christensen for supervision, disagreements, and 
support in matters non-academic. Thanks are also due to Prof. F. Jackson for
helpful comments on later drafts.
iv
Abstract
The content of this thesis is mainly negative, in that the first four chapters deal 
with rescuing Feyerabend's philosophy from misunderstandings. Specifically, it has been 
said that Feyerabend contends that there is no such thing as rationality: there is only 
power play, prejudice and propaganda. It has also been claimed that Feyerabend's 
support for epistemological anarchism should be interpreted literally: do what you like 
and defend what you like, because no theory is better than any other. As evidence for this 
claim various philosophers have contended that Feyerabend's incommensurability thesis 
implies that no two theories can be compared in any manner whatsoever. It has also been 
contended that Feyerabend's ideas constitute a radical, self-refuting, relativism.
I argue in chapters 1-4 that this interpretation o f Feyerabend is wrong in all four 
claims. In particular, I have argued that Feyerabend is conducting a reductio ad 
absurdum of'Rationalist' philosophies. Once we read Feyerabend with this in mind, 
attributions of irrationality and literal anarchism cannot be supported. Feyerabend's 
incommensurability thesis should also be read with his reductio in mind, with particular 
reference to logicist conceptions o f theoretical comparison. That is, Feyerabend never 
denied that theories could be compared. And though Feyerabend was a relativist in many 
respects, his relativism was not o f the radical, self-refuting, kind. In fact, Feyerabend's 
philosophy was highly realistic in many respects.
In chapters 5-7 I tie together the various strands o f Feyerabend's philosophy to 
produce a positive conception o f rationality. This positive conception of rationality is a 
historical, contextual and dynamic vision, crucially revolving around the ideas of value 
and plurality. In presenting this conception of rationality, the ideas of Kuhn and Dewey, 
with specific reference to values-based rationality, are incorporated into Feyerabend's 
account. This can be seen to be the minimum necessary addition to Feyerabend's ideas, 
producing a detailed and comprehensive heuristic program for the analysis and 
understanding o f rationality.
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1Introduction
The misconstrual of Feyerabend's later philosophy has been ubiquitous. He has 
been attributed as ascribing to complete anarchism, universal relativism, the denial that 
there is anything that could be called rationality or reason and, consequently, the 
contention that the world of knowledge is completely dominated by power, propaganda, 
subjective feelings and prejudice. A lot of the words and terms that I just used are indeed 
used by Feyerabend when describing his own thoughts and writings; so it might seem 
paradoxical to assert, as I will in this thesis, that these terms, taken in their usual sense, 
do not describe Feyerabend's philosophy. The popular image of Feyerabend is a 
completely misleading one. I feel that it is based upon a too fleeting reading and that a 
more thorough reading of his writings produces a very different vision of Feyerabend's 
philosophy. This is not to say that the popular reading of Feyerabend is not 
understandable: his abrasive, irreverent and polemical style of writing in some of his 
works is not what is usually expected from the academic philosopher. All this has not 
encouraged sympathetic readings of Feyerabend. But I would go further and contend 
that philosophers of science do not like to give Feyerabend a sympathetic reading for this 
would deprive them of their most valuable straw-man. Feyerabend's views have become 
a symbolic demon that has to be overcome in a philosopher of science's initiation 
ceremony. It doesn't matter whether Feyerabend actually held the views criticised, if 
Feyerabend hadn't been there to fulfil the role, then a position would have had to have 
been created, with or without a putative spokesperson.
In this thesis I discuss and critically examine Feyerabend's philosophy. More 
specifically, I argue that Feyerabend is presenting a new conception of rationality. This 
conception o f rationality should be seen as contrasting with the standard conception of 
rationality, a position I have labelled 'Rationalism', which is characterised by universality, 
a-temporality, complete objectivity and formal logic. Feyerabend rejects this account, 
instead seeing rationality as being inherently historical and flexible: ascriptions of 
rationality are dependent upon the context under consideration. Much of the
2misunderstandings o f Feyerabend's philosophy can be seen to arise from the perception 
that Feyerabend is attacking rationality absolutely, that he is not suggesting that it is only 
one conception of rationality which is being attacked, but that it is a universal 
condemnation o f the very idea of rationality. Of course I will have to argue that this is 
not the case but I think it can be done. And I think I will be able to show that much of 
the criticism o f Feyerabend can be attributed to the fact that many philosophers simply 
cannot, or could not, conceive o f a different form of rationality other than 'Rationalism'. 
Thus any criticism of rationality, by Feyerabend or anyone, was an absolute criticism.
If I am to say that Feyerabend is in fact a rationalist of some sort, then I must 
produce the version of rationality which Feyerabend would uphold, or should uphold.
This is not an easy task, for Feyerabend's writings have been primarily destructive. But 
contrary to some commentators who have only seen the negative in Feyerabend, a closer 
look reveals that he does provide some suggestions as to what rationality would be in a 
non-absolute sense. These suggestions are somewhat sketchy and vague but do indicate 
the direction in which Feyerabend would see fruitful future research.
According to Feyerabend, the way in which rationality can be assessed in 
different contexts, is achieved with the help of two heuristic principles: tradition and 
plurality. It is my contention that if we examine these two principles and place them in 
the context o f values-based judgements, then we are led to a vision of rationality wherein 
rationality is not something reducible to formal logic and unequivocal, but which still 
preserves rationality as something identifiable and prescriptive.
In chapter 1 I discuss Feyerabend's reductio ad absurdum o f traditional 
interpretations o f science. It is Feyerabend's contention that if we accept traditional 
interpretations o f science, which incorporate 'Rationahst' conceptions of rationality, then 
we must label prominent episodes in the history o f science as irrational. But this does not 
imply that Feyerabend himself believed science to be irrational. Feyerabend's use of 
words such as propaganda, irrational, subjective wishes, and so on, should be understood 
in terms o f his reductio of'Rationalism': as attributes of science only if we accept 
'Rationalism'.
In chapter 2 I examine Feyerabend's putative anarchism. Feyerabend's 'anarchism' 
forms part o f his reductio, that is, a 'Rationalist' must label any episode in science which 
does not conform to their standards of rationality as anarchistic: as not governed by the 
rules of rationality. However, this is not to say that Feyerabend's theory is anarchistic in 
any real sense. Feyerabend's anarchism amounts to the claim that there are no universal, 
atemporal rules of rationality. This type of'anarchism' does not preclude an account of 
rationality which is prescriptive, it simply contends that prescription is itself contextual.
In chapter 3 I respond to the contention that Feyerabend believes scientific 
theories to be incommensurable. According to Feyerabend, certain types o f theories are 
incommensurable when interpreted realistically, and in a manner consonant with 
'Rationalist' standards of theoretical comparison. If we drop 'Rationalism' and its 
associated standards of theoretical comparison, then theories are, in fact, commensurable 
in many ways.
In chapter 4 I discuss the charge of relativism which is often levelled at 
Feyerabend. It cannot be denied that Feyerabend is a relativist, of sorts, but his relativism 
is not o f the holistic self-defeating variety. More importantly, Feyerabend's relativism is 
compatible with a version of realism.
In chapter 5 I discuss the themes that have been emerging in the previous four 
chapters revolving around the ideas of epistemic values and values-based rationality as 
judgement within a particular context. I try to give a more systematic account of 
Feyerabend's thought on these issues, incorporating and contrasting them with the views 
of Kuhn and Laudan.
In Chapters 6 I discuss John Dewey's philosophy o f value and rationality.
Dewey's conception of value and rationality provides a needed superstructure within 
which to place Feyerabend's ideas. With Dewey's conception of high-level, general values 
of inquiry, Feyerabend's sketchy and scattered suggestions concerning an alternative 
conception o f rationality can be placed within a more systematic theoretical context.
In Chapter 7 I bring together the various strands o f Feyerabend's positive 
philosophy and explore some of the ramifications of the alternate vision o f rationality
which thus emerges. I hope to show that Feyerabend's views concerning scientific 
rationality are not limited to science: they point towards a general vision of rationality, 
one which breaks down the traditional distinction between theoretical and practical 
reason, but which can still account for the idiosyncrasies of individual disciplines.
51 Feverabend’s Reductio ad Absurdum of 'Rationalist* Philosophies
1.1 Introduction
Paul Feyerabend begins his notorious book Against Method in the following 
manner:
The following essay is written in the conviction that anarchism, while perhaps 
not the most attractive political philosophy, is certainly excellent medicine for 
epistemology, and for the philosophy o f science.
The reason is not difficult to find.
'History generally, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always 
richer in content, more varied, more many-sided, more lively and subtle than 
even' the best historians and the best methodologist can imagine. History is full of 
'accidents and conjunctures and curious juxtapositions of events' and it 
demonstrates to us the 'complexity of human change and the unpredictable 
character of the ultimate consequences of any given act or decision o f men'. Are 
we really to believe that the naive and simple-minded rules which methodologists 
take as their guide are capable of accounting for such a 'maze of interactions'? 
And is it not clear that successful participation in a process of this kind is 
possible only for the ruthless opportunist who is not tied to any particular 
philosophy and who adopts whatever procedure seems to fit the occasion? (AM, 
1 7 -1 8 .)1
Feyerabend goes on to conclude that "a complex medium containing surprising and 
unforeseen developments demands complex procedures and defies analysis on the basis 
of rules which have been set up in advance and without regard to the ever-changing 
conditions of history". (AM, p. 18)
If  we examine these passages carefully, then we will find contained within them
aspects o f Feyerabend's positive philosophy, and also what Feyerabend finds
objectionable about philosophy and theories of rationality. Firstly, Feyerabend states that
anarchism is 'excellent medicine' for epistemology and philosophy of science:
epistemology and philosophy of science are sick and anarchism will remedy the situation.
This way of expressing his thesis is highly important: once we are well we do not
continue to take medicine. We can also see that a 'healthy' epistemology would be one
which was complex rather than simple, multifarious rather than uniform, contextual
1 The first quote within this passage is a paraphrase of V.I. Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism - An 
Infantile Disorder" in Selected Works, Vol.3 p. 401. The further quotes are from H. Butterfield, The 
Whig Interpretation o f History, p. 66.
rather than independent of context and universal, and responsive to the idiosyncrasies of 
history and particular situations, as opposed to unchangeable and atemporal.
We can see that Feyerabend is not contending that there is no such thing as 
rationality or reason. Rather, Feyerabend is contending that a particular way in which 
rationality has been conceived, a particular theory of rationality, does not fulfil the 
function for which it was designed: the complexity, vagaries and unpredictableness of 
human activity evades explication by way of the theory of rationality which Feyerabend is 
critical of. Consequently, Feyerabend proposes anarchism as the dialectical antithesis of 
the received view, not in order to replace that view, but so as to generate the debate 
which will create a new synthesis more sensitive to context and complexity. Feyerabend 
states that
My intention is not to replace one set of general rules by another such set: my 
intention is, rather, to convince the reader that all methodologies, even the most 
obvious ones, have their limits. The best way to show this is to demonstrate the 
limits and even the irrationality of some rules which she, or he, is likely to regard 
as basic ... Always remember that the demonstration and the rhetoric's used do 
not express any 'deep convictions' of mine. They merely show how easy it is to 
lead people by the nose in a rational way. An anarchist is like an undercover 
agent who plays the game of Reason in order to undercut the authority of 
Reason. (AM, pp. 32-3)2
Prima facie, this seems to be a statement to the effect that the arguments o f AM, at 
least, should be construed as instances of reductio ad absurdum argumentation. In order 
to force the reconceptualisation of rationality, Feyerabend wants to prove that the 
adoption of'Rationalist' theories of rationality lead to consequences which are anathema 
to those very theories: unremitting allegiance to Rationalist' theories should lead to the 
adoption of anarchism. The only objection that can be made is that Feyerabend does not 
explicitly state, 'I am now conducting a reductio o f Rationalist' philosophy', but this 
seems to be a weak objection and, moreover, an objection which cannot be upheld in the 
light o f the fact that Feyerabend explicitly states,
2 Notice the capital R in reason.
7if an argument uses a premise, it does not follow that the author accepts the 
premise, claims to have reasons for it, regards it as plausible. He may deny the 
premise but still use it because his opponent accepts it and, accepting it, can be 
led in a desired direction. If the premise is used to argue for a rule, or a fact, or a 
principle violently opposed by those holding it, then we speak of a reduction ad 
absurdum (in the wider sense.) (SFS, p. 156.)
Feyerabend then goes on to explicitly state that the arguments of AM were indeed meant
to be of the nature of a reductio. (SFS, p. 157.)
It could be replied that Feyerabend only said this after the fact: after the many
criticisms of AM appeared he used the idea of a reductio as a means of avoiding those
criticisms. But this cannot be supported. Even if we ignore the quotation above from AM
there are other passages which support the idea that Feyerabend is conducting a
reductio. For example, Feyerabend replies to criticisms of his earlier papers given by
Machamer, by saying that
Machamer frequently misunderstands my way of arguing. Thus he objects 
to my saying that Kepler's optics is refuted by simple facts, because I have 
also stated that theories cannot be refuted by facts. This were a valid point 
if at the passage in question I had been talking to m yself... But I did not 
talk to myself I addressed people who accept the rule of falsification, and 
for them the example means trouble. Logicians are apt to call this an 
argumentum ad hominem. Quite so: in my essay I am addressing humans 
(AM, pp. 113-14)3
If we accept the idea that Feyerabend is conducting a reductio ad absurdum of 
'Rationalist' philosophy, we are still left with the question, what exactly is Feyerabend 
reducing to absurdity? What premises does Feyerabend use? Consequently, I will now 
present an account o f what Feyerabend takes to be 'Rationalist' philosophy, or 'Reason', 
with a capital T'.
3 The distinction between ad hominem and reductio ad absurdum argumentation, or even between those 
two argument forms and simple modus tollens, is very unclear. In some circles reductio ad absurdum 
argumentation is simply a case of modus tollens; while in other circles the reductio is something more 
complicated than that. Ad hominem argumentation muddys the waters more: it is sometimes used 
exclusively as the description of informal fallacious argument where a persons character is presented as 
a reason to not believe what they say. In its non-fallacious form; where a persons substantive claims are 
shown to result in contradiction, the ad hominem argument becomes identical to what some take as 
reductio argumentation. I will go on to assume that a reductio ad absurdum argument is most nearly 
captured by the idea o f the non-fallacious ad hominem argument. At times I will take it to be in the 
weaker sense of simple modus tollens, but the context should make it apparent which sense is being 
used.
81.2 Feverabend's Conception of 'Rationalist' Philosophy.
It is my contention that what Feyerabend identifies as 'Rationalist' philosophy, 
'Reason', or abstract, universal rationality, is the philosophical theses associated with 
what has come to be called Formalist rationality, or the classical model of rationality. 
Formalist rationality is a general picture o f rationality which has become increasingly 
identified and criticised since the downfall of logical empiricist philosophy .4 This is not to 
contend that it is solely linked to that philosophy: though it did play a role in logical 
empiricism in an especially stark manner, it did not originate with that philosophy. In 
fact, whether supported or denied, it can be seen as having had a long and continuous 
history, setting the boundaries o f philosophical debate from the very beginning o f 
Western philosophical speculation to the present day. It is especially important to note 
that Feyerabend, and others, do not limit the term Rationalists (with a capital 'r') to the 
classical philosophical Rationalists: Descartes, Liebniz, Spinoza. In fact, Feyerabend 
would contend that the classical philosophical Rationalists, together with their traditional 
opponents, the empiricists, hold a common set o f general presuppositions concerning the 
nature of rationality.5
At the heart of this conception of rationality is the contention that to be rational is 
to follow a set of rules in an algorithmic, or procedurally structured manner. Moreover, 
these rules are usually conceived as necessary, universal and atemporal. Hooker 
characterises formalist rationality as
finitely stateable, simple rules, finite sequences of which yield algorithms for the
generation of rational solutions to problems, solutions therefore characterised by
4A good account of formalist rationality can be found in H I. Brown, Rationality, Chs. 1-El. Brown calls 
formalist rationality the classical model of rationality; I would prefer not to use that expression, as it 
may cause contusion with the classical rationalists (Descartes, Liebniz, et a l ). I will also later give 
reasons why the expression 'formalist rationality' does not fully, and thus not adequately, capture what it 
is that Feyerabend is objecting to. Other criticisms can be found in C. A  Hooker, "Between Formalism 
and Anarchism: A Reasonable Middle Way", in G. Munevar (ed) Beyond Reason, pp. 41-107, S. 
Toulmin, Human Understanding, and T. Nickles, "Introductory Essay: Scientific Discovery and the 
Future of Philosophy of Science" and "Can Scientific Constraints be Violated Rationally", both in T. 
Nickles (ed) Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality. Cf also R  Bernstein's account of 'objectivism' 
in his Beyond Objectivism and Relativism.
5 See Feyerabend, "Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism", p. 46. in Feyerabend, Philosophical 
Papers Voll. See also D. Shapere, "Modem Science and the Philosophical Tradition" in D. Shapere, 
Reason and the Search for Knowledge, pp. 408-17. And Brown, Rationality, pp. 40-54.
necessity and hence universality And behind all this we have ... the fundamental 
notion of reason as purely formally characterisable.6
9
Thus, rationality must be rule-bound or algorithmic, so that anyone who understands the 
rules involved can correctly follow them. Judgments o f the rationality of a belief, act, or 
conclusion, consist in ascertaining whether the correct procedure was followed in 
arriving at the belief, act, or conclusion. A conclusion may indeed be rational and/or 
necessary, but if the reasoning which led to that conclusion cannot be given, or the 
reasoning only coincidentally led to that conclusion, then it would be irrationally derived.
Within this general conception of rationality, Feyerabend identifies three theses; 
the adoption of any one o f which is sufficient to label the position as 'Rationalist'. These 
three theses can be labelled the logical thesis, the factual-foundationalist thesis, and the 
methodological thesis. All three theses posit something as universal, necessary, and 
independent of the ongoing activity of knowledge acquisition; thereby supposedly 
assuring the rational acceptability of our changing beliefs.
The first thesis, the logical thesis, is the idea that logic is an essential constituent 
of knowledge and rationality. This is not meant to be taken in the weak sense of saying 
that to be rational, we must at least be logical, or that our knowledge must be logical, in 
the sense that we do not commit ourselves to blatant contradictions. It means, rather, the 
stronger contention that logic is to be the model which, (a) our thinking should conform 
to, and (b) provides the structure of our knowledge. Supporting these ideas is the 
contention that logic is universal and necessary: logic provides us with seemingly 
incontrovertible criterion o f rationality. If we have the requisite logical skills, but persist 
in denying the logical conclusion of an argument, then we have a paradigmatic case of 
unadulterated irrationality. Consequently, the connection between logicality and 
rationality is often expanded and the further implication is made that logic is not only 
necessary for rationality, but, given comprehensive mastery o f logic, also sufficient for 
rationality: to be rational is nothing more than to be logical.
6 Hooker, "Between Formalism and Anarchism", p. 45.
As a model for knowledge, logic provides the idea that knowledge should be as 
equally incontestable as the conclusions of logic. Our knowledge should be formalised 
into axiomatic systems where all particular items of knowledge become logically 
deducible from the axioms of the system. Comparison o f theories should be, as much as 
possible, solely a matter of logical comparison.
As a model for rationality, logic provides the idea that there is one, and only one, 
necessary way o f deciding what is rational. A desirable theory o f rationality is one in 
which the prescriptions of the theory are as unequivocal as the rules of logic. The theory 
itself should be as close as possible to pure logic, that is, as far as possible, it should 
utilise the least number of non-logical terms or concepts.
The pre-eminent position held by logic in philosophical theories should be 
obvious; most major philosophical positions have given logic pride of place. The theories 
that Feyerabend dwells upon, logical empiricism and Popperianism, are no exceptions, 
indeed, it can be argued that they are the most strident theories in their defence of logic. 
Logical empiricism, in its most simplistic form, and as its name indicates, can be 
described as contending that all knowledge is exhaustively accounted for by logic and 
empirical experience. Popper wanted to say that his theory of falsificationism was the 
first 'truly' logical theory of science, being based purely upon deduction and Modus 
Tollens. Popper considered this to be a powerful reason to prefer his theory over others.
The second thesis, the factual-foundationalist thesis, is the idea that there exist 
sources o f factual knowledge which cannot be doubted as to their veracity. It is usually 
claimed that these sources are self-justifying, basic, knowledge claims. They provide the 
foundation from which all claims to truth are to be justified, and/or, the foundations from 
which all claims to truth are to be derived.7 This second thesis is endorsed by much 
traditional philosophy of science: logical empiricism, for example, is a foundationalist 
philosophy. For logical empiricists the raw data o f experience was meant to be the 
indubitable ground upon which all knowledge was to be erected. Any knowledge claims 
which could not be reduced to empirical statements would have to be rejected.
7 See Feyerabend, "Knowledge Without Foundations"
Foundationalism is commonly paired with the logical thesis, for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, as Brown points out, "there would not be much point in claiming that a 
conclusion had been arrived at in a rational manner if we arrived there on the basis o f an 
impeccable algorithm from randomly chosen premises" .8 And secondly, it is of the nature 
of logic that logical arguments are truth preserving, consequently, if we have true 
premises, all logical conclusions and deductions from those premises will also be true. It 
follows, therefore, that if we have an indubitable source of knowledge, then we will be 
assured that our logical operations on those sources will result in equally indubitable 
conclusions and deductions. Foundationalism is not, however, a necessary concomitant 
o f the logical thesis, for example, Popper rejects foundationalism whilst retaining a pre­
eminent position for logic. Popper contends that if we are logical, and follow the correct 
methods, then we will, at least, avoid false beliefs.
The third thesis is the idea that, to be rational, knowledge acquisition must be 
conducted according to the rules and strictures laid down by the independent, 
unchanging, methods of science. Logical empiricists contended that the methods of 
science were inductive in nature, and tried to show that all knowledge was, and could be, 
derived via induction. On the other hand, Popper contended that the method of 
conjectures and refutation is the only way of proceeding rationally: not only as a 
prescriptive account, but also as the way in which rational decisions have, in fact, been 
made over the centuries.9
This conception does not imply that the chosen methods are meant to be 
exceptionless. David Stove, for example, is an inductive fallibilist.10 Also, Newton-Smith 
tries to convince his readers that rationalists have always considered the methods of 
science to be fallible.11 Feyerabend, however, would label both Stove and Newton-Smith 
'Rationalists'. Both Stove and Newton-Smith take methodological fallibilism to be the 
contention that the application of a particular method of science does not invariably lead
8 H.I. Brown, Rationality, p. 38.
9 See, for example, Popper, "Back to the Presocratics", in CR, pp. 136-65.
I® D C. Stove, Popper and After: Four Modem Irrationalists.
W.H. Newton-Smith, The Rationality o f  Science, pp. 134-5.
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scientists to true knowledge. This is not to say that the chosen method is therefore 
circumscribed in its range of valid application. For example, Stove contends that 
induction may not always lead an investigator to true knowledge, induction is therefore 
fallible. Nevertheless, there was no other method, other than induction, which the 
investigator could have rationally followed. For a philosophical position to be 
'Rationalist', it need not posit necessary methods or rules. To be labelled 'Rationalist' the 
set of circumscribed rules or methods must be atemporal and universal: no matter where 
or when you are, if you follow the rational rules, then you are acting rationally. 12
For Feyerabend, as I mentioned above, the adoption o f any one of these three 
theses is sufficient for a position to be labelled 'Rationalist'. However, the kindred nature 
of these theses usually results in more than one thesis being adopted. In fact, it can be 
said that, for Feyerabend, the more theses adopted, the more 'Rationalistic' the position. 
The logical thesis, for example, is not usually accepted without, at least, one of the other 
theses.
Be that as it may, it could be contended that it is the adoption of the third thesis, 
the methodological thesis, which is the most characteristic aspect of'Rationalism'. Thus, 
even though logical empiricism was a position which, ideally, could reduce knowledge to 
logic plus experience, logic itself was not only to play the role of structuring knowledge, 
but it would also take on the role of the method o f investigation. Thus it was hoped that 
the method of induction could be based purely upon deductive logic. And Popper, whilst 
eschewing foundationalism and induction, but retaining deductive logic, found it 
necessary to supplement his deductive model with the methodological prescription of 
content increase for successive scientific theories.
The contention that the methodological thesis is the central thesis, can be 
supported by the idea that the methodological thesis is the only one of the three 
theses which has been adopted singularly. 13 It can be argued that Lakatos's
12 This point will be further discusssed in Section 1.3.
13 Adopted singularly, in the sense that the adoption o f any one, and only one, of the three sub-theses, 
will produce a coherent and viable account o f knowledge acquisition. It is certainly possible that 
someone could be a foundationalist, or support the logical thesis, without ascribing to any other of the 
theses. But, as far as I know, there are no major positions, or philosophers, which ascribe to those ideas.
13
philosophy is one in which the logical and foundationalist theses are not 
supported. Nevertheless, Feyerabend contends that Lakatos is a 'Rationahst':
Lakatos presents a methodological account of the rationality of science where the 
methods proposed are meant to be universally applicable to the entire history of 
science. According to Lakatos, where science progressed rationally, scientists, 
more or less closely, followed the methods as laid down by Lakatos.14
At first glance this conception o f rationality seems to be a highly attractive 
position: if every thing is changing, then it seems that we cannot make defensible 
judgements concerning states o f affairs because the standards by which we judge those 
states o f affairs will be changing as well. We must have something which is not changing 
so as to allow the very possibility of judgment and comparison. On these views, a theory 
of rationality is meant to reveal those canons, standards, or unchanging entities which 
must be present for justified beliefs to be arrived at. But, for Feyerabend, it is just such 
independent, unchanging and universal, entities, processes and standards, which do not 
do justice to the reality of human thought, action and interaction. Moreover, Feyerabend, 
in conducting his reductio of this general conception of rationality, contends that the 
adoption of'Rationalistic' philosophies will lead to consequences that those philosophies 
will find objectionable.
1.3 Feverabend’s Reductio.
That Feyerabend is conducting a reductio ad absurdum of'Rationalist' 
philosophy would appear to be very obvious. However, judging by the reviews o f AM it 
seems that it is not so obvious to many; by far the largest portion of criticisms directed at 
Feyerabend result from an inability to recognise this strategy. One can agree with G. 
Munevar when he says that "It should be an embarrassment to the profession that many
141 don't think we can say that Lakatos personally believed that he had arrived at the absolutely final set 
of methodological prescriptions. It is safe to say that he believed he was on the right track, that the broad 
structure of his theory was correct, but that he was open to development and criticism of his theory. 
Nevertheless, Lakatos believed that there is a single and correct method o f science, which, once 
discovered, will forever be able to explain the history of science.
14
reviewers were completely unable to see the structure o f this simple reductio" 15 But it is 
not only that reviewers o f AM were unable to see this reductio: despite Feyerabend's 
frequent exhortations to see the arguments o f AM in terms o f a reductio, many 
philosophers remain blind to this point. 16 Larry Laudan, for example, has recently written 
a book wherein a chapter on Feyerabend exhibits a complete misunderstanding o f the 
nature o f  Feyerabend's reductio11
After stating that Feyerabend really believes that scientists should he, cheat, 
resort to propaganda, and conduct science in a genuinely anarchistic manner, assertions 
that already show that Laudan has not appreciated Feyerabend's reductio1*, Laudan goes 
on to contend that
When we claim that a certain rule is methodologically sound, we are not 
committed to saying that the ends o f science can be promoted only by following 
the rule in question, nor are we saying that the ends o f science will always be 
furthered by following said rule. Rather, when we endorse a rule, we are 
asserting our belief that following that rule is more likely to realize one's goals 
than violating it will. What makes a rule acceptable as a rule is our belief that it 
represents the best strategy we can imagine for reaching a certain desired end;
G. Munevar, "Science in Feyerabend's Free Society", in Munevar (ed) Beyond Reason, p. 181.
16 See SFS, Section 3 "Conversations with Illiterates", where Feyerabend responds to reviews of AM, 
frequently reiterating his point that AM was intended to be a reductio of 'Rationalist' philosophies. See, 
for example, pp. 142-3, pp. 185-7, p. 210, and especially Section 1 of "Marxist Fairytales From 
Australia" pp. 156-63, where Feyerabend presents his "basic rule": "If an argument uses a premise, it 
does not follow that the author accepts the premise, claims to have reasons for it, regards it as plausible. 
He may deny the premise but still use it because his opponent accepts it and, accepting it, can be led in a 
desired direction. If the premise is used to argue for a rule, or a fact, or a principle violently opposed by 
those holding it, then we speak of a reduction ad absurdum (in the wider sense)" p. 156. Feyerabend 
follows up his basic rule with four corollaries, the first three of which are (i) "If my opponent accepts 
historical facts and interpretations of historical events that can be used against him, then these facts can 
be used against him without any attempt to establish their validity" p. 158. (ii) "In an argument against 
an opponent an author can use assumptions and procedures he has shown to be unacceptable elsewhere 
provided they are accepted by the opponent." p. 158. And (iii) "Having used part of a general view E  to 
produce a result repulsive to those who accept E  one may describe the result in terms of E thus stressing 
its distressing (for the defenders of E) aspects. If the result concerns a situation which the defenders of E 
hold in high regard then we obtain paradoxical-sounding formulations (for the defenders of E, that is)." 
pp. 158-9.
17 L. Laudan, Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method, and Evidence, Ch.5, "For Method: 
Answering the Relativist Critique of Methodology of Kuhn and Feyerabend." A similar 
misunderstanding is evident in an article by J.G. McEvoy, "A 'Revolutionary' Philosophy of Science: 
Feyerabend and the Degeneration of Critical Rationalism into Sceptical Fallibilism", Philosophy o f 
Science, 42, (1975), where McEvoy comes so close to seeing Feyerabend's reductio, but yet fails to carry 
the argument the last steps, thus resulting in a frustratmgly, because so close, one-eyed interpretation of 
Feyerabend.
18 See Section 1.5 for a discussion of Feyerabend's rhetoric in relation to his reductio.
but it need not be, and commonly will not be, either a necessary or a sufficient 
condition for reaching that end.19
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Given this conception of scientific rules, Laudan contends that
The fact (assuming it to be a fact) that a few successful scientists such as 
Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler broke certain familiar rules of scientific 
rationality and nonetheless 'advanced' science in the process does not establish 
that the rules they broke should be regarded as inadequate or inappropriate. It 
may still be reasonable to regard the rules as well established bi-conditionals, 
linking optimal means to desired ends, even if their violation sometimes 'works'.
If  Feyerabend seriously intended to discredit methodology then he should have 
shown, but nowhere does, that most of the instances o f successful science have 
been the result o f scientists violating what we regard as the methodological 
norms of science.20
Laudan concludes by saying that "what is transparently clear is that neither Feyerabend 
nor anyone else has shown that all the extant rules of scientific methodology are 
inadequate, let alone that all possible rules are discredited."21
These arguments o f Laudan's would be cogent z/Feyerabend did not employ his 
arguments in terms of a reductio ad absurdum of 'Rationalist' philosophies. But that is 
the point: once we place Feyerabend's arguments within such an interpretive scheme, the 
protestations of Laudan are seen as having simply missed the point Firstly, given the 
character of formalist rationality: rational rules characterised by universality, necessity 
and atemporality, algorithmically applied, then the presentation of a counter-example, by 
Modus Tollens, would refute such positions. Feyerabend sometimes thought o f his 
reductio in these terms; for example, he states that "in order to  show that 'all ravens are 
black' is upheld by questionable means, it is sufficient to produce one white raven ... one 
may safely ignore the many black ravens which no doubt also exist." (AM, p. 112) 
Leaving aside for the moment the incompleteness of such an approach, the point to be 
highlighted is that in conducting this form of argumentation, as Feyerabend correctly 
stresses, the many positive instances can be ignored: in refuting necessary principles, only 
one counter-example is required. To require o f Feyerabend, as Laudan does, that he go 
through the entire history o f science and show that every possible permutation o f
19 Laudan, Beyond Positivism and Relativism, p. 103.
20 Ibid., p. 104.
21 Ibid., p. 105.
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'Rationalist' philosophies fails more often than it succeeds in explicating the rationality of 
science, shows that Laudan has not understood the structure o f Feyerabend's argument.
If Feyerabend can produce the white ravens required to refute logical empiricism, Popper 
and Lakatos, interpreted as adhering to necessary principles of rationality, then it, at 
least, opens up the possibility that rationality is not exhaustively characterised by 
'Rationalist' philosophical positions.
However, as it stands, this argument is incomplete and the conclusion avoidable. 
For the argument to be convincing it must be contended that the adoption o f a set of 
'Rationalist' theses is both a necessary condition of rationality, and a sufficient condition: 
it must be contended that decisions made in accordance with 'Rationalist' theses, will 
always be rational, without exception. Laudan denies that rational rules must be of a 
necessary and sufficient nature, such that the production o f a counter-instance to a 
rational rule disproves or refutes that rule. For example, it may be contended that in a 
particular situation the utilisation of a set o f 'Rationalist' theses led to what appeared to 
be irrational decisions, but, the objection continues, this can be explained by saying that 
the decision was made without taking into account all relevant information available at 
the time. If all relevant information available had been taken into account, then the 
'Rationahst' theses would have produced the correct, rational decision: 'Rationahst' theses 
are necessary, but not sufficient to ensure correct rational conclusions. Alternatively, we 
may interpret rational rules as does Laudan: as non-necessary procedures beheved to be 
successful more often than not, and therefore considered to be the optimal means of 
ensuring the best results.22
22 Both Laudan and Newton-Smith contend that Feyerabend is arguing against a straw-man. Thus, 
Newton-Smith contends that "Feyerabend's easy defeat of a straw man (the rationalist who believes in 
infallible exceptionless rules) is construed by him as a victory over a real man (the rationahst who 
believes in general guiding fallible principles of comparison) who is in fact enlisted in the battle with the 
straw man!" The Rationality o f  Science, pp. 134-5 .1 find this contention to be disingenuous: one only 
needs to peruse Popper's writings vis a vis the demarcation criterion and the rejection of pseudo-science; 
and many logical empiricists vis a vis their rejection of non-empincal, metaphysical, nonsense, to see 
that necessary conditions of rationality have indeed been proposed quite frequently. Both Laudan and 
Newton-Smith presented their arguments after Feyerabend, one can see that they have adjusted what 
they call rationalism, specifically to avoid the type of arguments Feyerabend presents. But even here, I 
do not think that they have avoided Feyerabend's arguments, as I try to show below.
Again, these types of responses would have been effective against Feyerabend if
he had left his reductio at such a simple level. We may have been inclined to agree, in 
part, with Newton-Smith when he says that "The way in which Feyerabend regards 
putative counter-productive instances to a principle of comparison indicates that he 
erroneously assumes that the rationahst is committed to believing in exceptionless 
algorithmic principles of comparison"23 But Feyerabend did not present his reductio 
solely at such a simplistic level: Feyerabend's project was not limited to finding any old 
counter-example; rather, Feyerabend's strategy was to select episodes in the history of 
science which were presented, by 'Rationalists', as paradigmatic cases of rationality. "My 
aim ... was to show that some very simple and plausible rules and standards which both 
philosophers and scientists regarded as essential parts of rationality were violated in the 
course of episodes ... they regarded as equally essential". (SFS, p. 13 .) Feyerabend's 
argument is as follows:
(1) If we adopt a set o f 'Rationahst' theses, then, ceteris paribus, the 
decisions arrived at via the employment o f those theses will be rational.
(2) Decision 'X1 is accepted by all 'Rationalists' as a paradigmatic case of 
rationality.
therefore,
(3) Decision 'X' should be rationally exphcable according to 'Rationalist' theses.
But;
(4) Decision 'X  is not rationally exphcable according to 'Rationahst' theses
therefore;
(5) 'Rationahst' theses are inadequate to the task o f explicating rational 
decisions.
This argument is much stronger, for it is surely a reasonable requirement o f any theory of 
rationality that paradigmatic episodes be proffered as exemplifying the workings of the 
preferred rational rules. If such paradigmatic episodes do not stand up to scrutiny, then 
we have reason to doubt the efficacy of those rules in question more generally. Laudan,
23 Newton-Smith, The Rationality o f  Science, p. 134.
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for example, even though he contends that rational rules are exceptionable, should 
nevertheless provide paradigmatic examples of rational science explicable in terms of his 
philosophy, moreover, these examples should be episodes which are generally conceived 
of as rational. If we then examined these episodes in the history of science and found 
them to be inexplicable in terms o f Laudan's philosophy, then we would have reason to 
doubt the efficacy o f Laudan's preffered rational rules. Feyerabend concludes that 
'Rationalist' theses, even in situations where the examples are provided by the 
'Rationalists' themselves, and which therefore would seem to have the strongest claim to 
being explicable via 'Rationahst' theses, nevertheless, do not provide rational decisions.
Feyerabend's argument is further enhanced by saying that, not only were prima 
facie , generally agreed upon rational decisions not made according to 'Rationahst' theses, 
but also that the considerations which led to the rational decisions were completely 
inexplicable in terms o f 'Rationahst' theses: the rational decisions were arrived at in a 
manner demonstrably contrary to the whole program o f 'Rationahst' philosophy. 
Moreover, Feyerabend wants to show that strict allegiance to the dictates o f 'Rationahst' 
rules, in these paradigmatic situations, would have retarded the progress o f science, and 
ruled out those very moves deemed to be rational.24
We can see that Laudan does not address these more subtle levels of 
argumentation. Laudan simply relies upon the idea of the more-often-than-not strategy 
for defending rational rules, even in cases such as Galileo. Thus, Laudan has missed the 
point o f Feyerabend's arguments and failed to appreciate the structure o f Feyerabend's 
reductio. Moreover, Laudan's ideas are moving towards a conception of rationality in
24 Feyerabend has a fall back position of even greater unassailability, and he again borrows the 
argumentative form from the 'Rationalists', that is, after discussing Galileo, Feyerabend goes on to say 
that his historical study need not be correct; "If it turns out to be a fairy-tale, then this fairy-tale tells that 
a conflict between reason and the preconditions of progress is possible, it indicates that it might arise 
and it forces us to conclude that our chances to progress may be obstructed by our desire to be rational" 
(AM, p. 156) It may be objected that to show that something is possible has no bearing on whether it 
really is the case or not. I would agree. But the argument from possibility to actuality is a quite 
ubiquitous argumentative form, with a pedigree unequalled in philosophy: something like it can be 
found in Plato and in Descartes. It still survives today amongst some 'Rationahst' inclined philosophers 
and to that extent is used by Feyerabend as part of his reductio. But it is a throw-away argument and 
Feyerabend does not, and should not, put any weight upon it. If Feyerabend can make good his main 
argument, then there is no need of this argument from possibility. If Feyerabend cannot make good his 
main argument, then the argument from possibility will not rescue his position.
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line with what Feyerabend was proposing: if great scientists can produce theories of the 
highest level of rationality, without utilising the optimal rational strategy, then we are led 
to the idea that there are multiple, possibly inconsistent, ways to be rational. What rules 
to apply in a given situation thus becomes a matter of judgment in relation to the specific 
circumstances of the situation requiring rational decision. Rationality becomes more 
complex, more contextual, less standardised and less universal.
We can see from this discussion that Feyerabend believes he has provided 
unquestionable counter-examples to 'Rationalist' theses and that, according to their own 
standards, 'Rationalists' should accept that their rules are inadequate to the task of 
explicating rationality. Of course, Feyerabend has to prove his point through concrete 
examples, consequently, I will now present Feyerabend's case against 'Rationalist' 
philosophies by way of an analysis of Feyerabend's interpretation of Galileo.
1.4 Feyerabend, Galileo and ’Rationalist* Philosophies.
1.4.1 Introduction.
Feyerabend conducts his reductio of'Rationalist' philosophies via an analysis of 
the arguments Galileo employs against the Aristotelian thesis of the stability of the earth. 
Feyerabend chooses Galileo because he believes that this episode in the history of science 
is one which 'Rationalists' must be able to explicate; after all, it is the 'birth of modem 
science'. Consequently, we should be able to see the methods and rationality of science 
inherent in this paradigmatic episode.
Feyerabend has three specific targets: empiricism, Popper and Lakatos. In the 
following I will present Feyerabend's arguments against each of these positions in turn 25
25 These arguments can be found scattered about in AM, chs 6-15. Feyerabend does not address these 
positions consecutively, or independently. I have reconstructed Feyerabend's account so as to give a 
clearer picture of the arguments involved. To anticipate the argument; it will be shown that through the 
analysis of Galileo's arguments, empiricism, and Popper's falsificationism, I believe, fall prey to 
Feyerabend's reductio. The case of Lakatos is more complicated: a reductio of Lakatos, via an analysis 
of Galileo's arguments, does not succeed.
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1.4.2 The Reductio ad Absurdum o f Empiricism.
The empiricism which Feyerabend attacks is a very generic one, but I do not 
think that this mitigates Feyerabend's argument. Any empiricist position which contends 
that sensations are the foundation of knowledge; that all theoretical terms should be 
reducible to observational terms, and that logic is the tool of scientific and philosophical 
analysis, are encompassed within Feyerabend's critique.
Feyerabend contends that the distinction between theory and observation does 
not exist, he states that
we must be clear about the nature o f the total phenomenon ... There are 
not two acts - one, noticing a phenomenon, the other, expressing it with 
the help of the appropriate statement - but only one, viz. saying in a certain 
observational situation, 'the moon is following me', or, 'the stone is falling 
straight down'. We may, o f course, abstractly subdivide this process into 
parts ... But under normal circumstances such a division does not occur; 
describing a familiar situation is, for the speaker, an event in which 
statement and phenomenon are firmly glued together. (AM, p. 72).
That is, though we may be able to abstractly provide some criteria with which to draw a
distinction between sensory impressions and our beliefs or interpretations of those
sensory impressions, this distinction is not absolute, natural or, strictly speaking,
correct.26
This can be construed as an argument against empiricism, that is, inherent and 
integral to empiricism is the theory/observation distinction. In the above quote 
Feyerabend denies that this distinction exists; therefore, Feyerabend is denying the 
veracity of empiricism. But the denial is no more than that: no arguments are brought 
forth to support the contention. At any rate, an empiricist can go on assuming the 
veracity o f the theory/observation distinction until unequivocal contrary evidence is 
produced.
Feyerabend does not go down the path o f trying to refute empiricism from 
without, so to speak, Feyerabend is attempting to refute empiricism from within, via a 
reductio. Consequently, the above quotation should be construed as a signpost indicating
26 Cf AM, p. 168.
Feyerabend's actual philosophical position, before he embarks on his reductio, for the 
sake of which he assumes an empiricist framework. Thus, Feyerabend contends that we 
must
make the ... assumption that the quality and structure of sensations 
(perceptions) or at least the quality and structure of those sensations which 
enter the body of science, is independent of their linguistic expression. I 
am very doubtful about even the approximate validity o f this assumption ...
Yet, I shall for the moment, remain quite consciously within these 
limits.(AM, pp. 72-3)
Feyerabend consciously accepts, for the moment, the empiricist idea that, though we may 
express our knowledge in different linguistic manners, incorporating differing theoretical 
commitments, nevertheless, sensations are the same for everyone and can consequently 
function as a neutral arbiter in case of theoretical disagreement. Feyerabend goes on to 
say that "we can now distinguish between sensations and those 'mental operations which 
follow so closely upon the senses'". (AM, p. 73)27 These operations Feyerabend calls 
'natural interpretations'.
Feyerabend then presents the tower argument against the rotation of the earth. If 
the earth rotated, then a rock dropped from the top of a tower would strike the ground 
away from the base of the tower. This would be so because while the rock was 
descending to the ground the earth and the tower would move away from the rock. But a 
rock dropped from the top of a tower strikes the ground at the base of the tower. 
Therefore, the earth does not rotate.
Feyerabend contends that this argument convinced people of the absurdity of a 
rotating earth because of the seeming unshakeability of the natural interpretation which 
underpinned it. This natural interpretation was derived from the Aristotelian theory of 
perception; a theory o f perception which was through and through empirical in nature, 
and which was intimately interrelated with the entire Aristotelian world-view. In this 
view perception is
a special case of a comprehensive view o f motion that includes locomotion, 
increase and decrease, qualitative alteration, generation and corruption. This
27 The quote is from Bacon, Novum Organum.
comprehensive view defines motion as the transition of a form from an agent to a 
patient which terminates when the patient possesses exactly the same form that 
characterized the agent at the beginning of the interaction. Perception, 
accordingly, is a process in which the form of the object perceived enters the 
percipient as precisely the same form that characterized the object so that the 
percipient, in a sense, assumes the properties of the object. (AM, p. 148 .)
We can see that this view of perception "does not permit any major discrepancies
between observations and the things observed." (AM, p. 148.) According to the
Aristotelian theory of perception, the sensations we have, given that we are normal
observers: "an observer whose senses are in good order and who is not drunk or sleepy,
etc." (AM, p. 149.), give us true and real information about external reality. Given this
conception of perception and motion, it is easy to see how the tower argument could be
considered to be a forceful argument: "the everyday thinking o f the time assumes the
'operative' character o f all motion ... it assumes a naive realism with respect to motion
... apparent motion is identical with real (absolute) motion". (AM, p. 74-5) This natural
interpretation concerning the operative character of motion is, at first glance, quite
plausible. In fact, it seems to be empirically well substantiated: "How could one possibly
be unaware of the swift motion of a large bulk of matter such as the earth is supposed to
be!" (AM, p. 75) How could "there exist large-scale processes which involve vast cosmic
masses and yet leave no trace in our experience." (AM, p. 149.) It is easy to see how this
particular natural interpretation came to be considered natural, or more correctly, how
this natural interpretation was not even considered to be an 'interpretation' at all.
Disregarding objects that are violently moved or animated, our senses inform us that
objects have no motion. Consequently, "From the point of view of 17th-century thought
and language, the [tower] argument is, therefore, impeccable and quite forceful". (AM,
p. 75)
Feyerabend goes on to say that "In considering the [tower] argument, Galileo at 
once admits the correctness of the sensory observation made". (AM, p. 71) In fact, 
Galileo contends that "It is ... better to put aside the appearances, on which we all agree, 
and to use the power o f reason either to confirm its reality or to reveal its fallacy". (AM, 
p. 71) This statement o f Galileo's suggests that there is a distinction between
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appearances, or sensory impressions, and reality: we can be deceived by appearances. 
More strongly, this statement suggests that Galileo subscribes to some sort of 
theory/observation distinction: he implies that a distinction can be made between the 
impressions (observations) which everyone receives, and the various interpretations 
(theories) with which we explain those impressions.28 Feyerabend contends that
Galileo is one of those rare thinkers who neither wants forever to retain 
natural interpretations nor altogether to eliminate them ... He insists upon 
a critical discussion to decide which natural interpretations can be kept 
and which must be replaced ... natural interpretations are necessary. The 
senses alone, without the help of reason, cannot give us a true account of 
nature.(AM, p. 73).
This passage suggests that Feyerabend believes Galileo is, in important respects, anti­
empiricist. For Galileo, sensory experience is not the indubitable foundation of 
knowledge. Reason, not experience, is the arbiter of theoretical disputes.
If we accept that Galileo was, in effect, anti-empiricist, it may not be damaging to 
empiricism: there may have been convincing empirical reasons for a choice of one natural 
interpretation over another, regardless of Galileo's position. However, in this situation 
this is not the case: the new natural interpretation which Galileo introduces does not alter 
our sensory impressions. In this respect, Galileo does not impugn the veridicality of 
sensory impressions, he impugns the veracity of interpretations o f sense impressions:
The interpretation which Galileo uses restores the senses to their position 
as instruments of exploration, but only with respect to the reality o f 
relative motion. Motion 'among things which share it in common' is 'non-
28 Finocchiaro has challenged these assertions of Feyerabend: he contends that Galileo did not know of, 
or use, any sort of theory/observation distinction; and that Galileo was unaware of the natural 
interpretations presupposed by Aristotelianism. See M. Finocchiaro, Galileo and the Art o f  Reasoning: 
Rhetorical Foundations o f Logic and Scientific Method, pp. 182-200 esp. p. 195 .1 am uncertain as to 
the veracity of that assertion, nevertheless, even if  it is true, Feyerabend's program is unaffected. 
Feyerabend is conducting his analysis of Galileo with Rationalist' philosophies in mind. Many of those 
philosophies accept some sort of theory/observation distinction. It does not matter whether Galileo 
accepted such a distinction, that is not the point, in fact, if  Finocchiaro is right, then it gives more 
support for Feyerabend: it shows that Rationalist’ philosophies of science which support a 
theory/observation distinction, cannot explicate the rationality of paradigmatic cases of rationality as 
they were at the time. Moreover, the point of Feyerabend's analysis is that given a theory/observation 
distinction, as empiricists maintain, there is, at best, no advantage in accepting the Galilean natural 
interpretation, and, given the balance of evidence, more reason to accept the Aristotelian interpretation. 
I will say more on this in section 1.5 below.
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operative', that is, 'it remains insensible, imperceptible, and without any 
effect whatever'. (AM, p. 78)29
Just as a person sitting still on a moving ship is, in fact, in motion with the ship, so too a 
rock dropped from the top of a tower on a rotating earth is, in fact, in motion with the 
earth. The motion which is perceived, the straight down motion of the rock, is that 
motion which is peculiar to the rock, in relation to the tower and the earth.
These two natural interpretations: that most motion is 'operative' and therefore 
perceptible,30 and that all motion is 'non-operative' and therefore imperceptible, are 
empirically indistinguishable. If  we are empiricists, then there is no way of deciding 
which of these interpretations to accept. All observations which support the one, support 
the other. Consequently, an inductive inference from the observations, or any other 
logical operation upon the observations, cannot favour one or the other interpretation. 
But, as I previously stated, the Aristotelian natural interpretation is empirically very 
plausible: we do not see the earth moving. Therefore, even though the sensory 
impressions are the same for both interpretations, there seems to be more empirical 
common-sense in favour o f the Aristotelian interpretation.
The point Feyerabend makes is that the rotating earth, and Galileo's new natural 
interpretation, are correct. The stable earth and the Aristotelian natural interpretation are 
incorrect. But an empiricist philosophy of science and rationality, at the time of the 
debate, cannot come to that conclusion.
An empiricist who starts from experience ... now loses the very ground on 
which he stands. Neither the earth, 'the solid, well-established earth', nor 
the facts on which he usually relies can be trusted any longer. It is clear 
that a philosophy that uses such a fluid and changing experience needs new 
methodological principles which do not insist on an asymmetric judgement 
of theories by experience. (AM, p. 89)
According to its own standards, empiricism cannot give us the rational, correct 
conclusions.
29 The quote is from Galileo, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems.
30 I say most motion is 'operative' and therefore absolute because the Aristotelians could, and did, accept 
that there are instances of 'non-operative' relative motion; for example, movement on ships in motion. 
But it must be remembered that these instances of non-operative motion were all instances of forced 
motion, as opposed to natural motion. They were also perceptible, non-operative, relative motion can 
occur, but when it does occur it is perceptible.
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An empiricist will object to this conclusion: it may be granted that Galileo's 
arguments provide a paradigmatic case of rationality which an empiricist must be able to 
explain, but Feyerabend has not satisfied the ceteris paribus clause of the argument given 
in the last section. All relevant information, available at the time, has not been included in 
the analysis. Thus, Galileo had other empirical evidence at his disposal, in particular, 
Galileo had evidence from observations of the stars and planets. The empiricist will say 
that if these additional observations are included in the analysis, then inductive 
procedures will arrive at the desired conclusions.
The trouble is that if we include these other factors in our analysis, we find that 
empiricism is no better off than before, in fact, it can be said that empiricism fares much 
worse. Before the invention of the telescope and its application to observation of the 
heavens, the empirical evidence against the motion o f the earth was convincing and 
unequivocal. Though the phenomena which apparently contradicts the idea that the earth 
rotates can be defused by proposing new natural interpretations, as we saw above, the 
annual movement of the earth around the sun creates insurmountable difficulties,
Mars, when it is close to us ... would have to look sixty times as large as 
when it is most distant. Yet no such difference is to be seen ... Venus ... 
ought to appear to us a little less than forty times as large as when it is 
beyond the sun and near conjunction. Yet the difference is almost 
imperceptible. (AM, pp. 101-2)31
That is, the empirical evidence goes against the idea o f the motion of the earth. An 
inductive inference from the observations available would give the conclusion that the 
earth is motionless. If we add to these considerations the problem that no stellar parallax 
is observed, then the case against Copemicanism is very strong indeed.
Empiricists must conclude from this that, before the invention o f the telescope, 
anyone who believed that Copemicanism was correct, upheld those beliefs irrationally. 
Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler were all irrational!32 I think that this is a convincing
31 Quoted from Galileo, Dialogue, p. 334.
32 Fmocchiaro reconstructs Galileo as saying that "Copernicus's procedure is not rationally justifiable 
because he was inferring truth from mere simplicity and disregarding clear empirical counterevidence" 
Galileo and the Art o f  Reasoning, p. 129. If this is so, then Galileo indicts himself as having been 
irrational: Galileo was supporting Copemicanism by 1597, at least, see S. Drake, Galileo Studies:
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argument, but an empiricist will point to the telescope and say that it is the expansion of 
the empirical domain brought about by the telescope's application to the heavens which 
makes Copemicanism rationally justifiable. In the end, this was the case, but the 
telescope initially provided no empirical support for the Copemican hypothesis. Until the 
technical difficulties could be overcome, the physical counterarguments defused, and the 
required psychological readjustments achieved, the telescope did not win the day for 
Copemicanism.
Early telescopes were notoriously inaccurate and there was no principled manner 
in which to go about rectifying their problems: "the optical theories existing at the time 
were not sufficient as a theoretical foundation for building the telescope". (AM, p. 114) 
This foundation was only later provided by Descartes and others, before then trial and 
error were the main source of telescopic improvement. This meant that early 
observations with the telescope were often very wrong: illusions, distortions and other 
problems were rife.
On the surface o f the earth ... the telescope will o f course work well; these 
are familiar things and our knowledge of them eliminates most distortions 
... Moreover, all the familiar cues (such as background, overlap, 
knowledge of nearby size, etc ), which constitute and aid our vision on the 
surface o f the earth, are absent when we are dealing with the sky. (AM, 
pp. 119-22).
This situation meant that early observations made with the telescope were equivocal, 
debatable and sometimes contradicted by naked eye observations.33
It is important to see that Feyerabend does not deny that once the problems 
associated with the telescope were overcome, empirical facts do, in fact, support the 
Copemican hypothesis; but that is not the point at issue. What Feyerabend wants to 
emphasise is that before the telescope was developed sufficiently, empiricist 
philosophies, strictly applied, would have rejected the Copemican hypothesis in favour of 
the Aristotelian/Ptolemaic alternative. Even though the Copemican hypothesis had many
Personality, Tradition, and Revolution, p. 73 and p. 200. But Galileo did not use the telescope until 
1609.
33 See pp. 123-34 of AM for a plethora of examples of the illusions, distortions and uncertainties seen 
and felt at the time in question.
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good reasons to be upheld, these reasons are not explicable in terms of the empiricist 
'Rationahst' program. As Feyerabend contends, "the ideas survived and they can now be 
said to be in agreement with reason" (AM, p. 155). Thus, a paradigmatic case of 
scientific rationality cannot be explicated as rational by empiricism. Therefore, 
empiricism should be rejected, according to its own standards, as an adequate theory of 
scientific rationality.
1.4.3 The Reductio ad Absurdum o f  Popper’s Falsificationism.
Popper contends that we must make bold conjectures. These bold conjectures 
must have an increased truth-content relative to their predecessors: a new theory must 
include within it the truth-content o f the previous theory, exclude the known falsity 
content of the previous theory, and make new assertions, as yet unfalsified, but 
falsifiable. This increased truth-content is achieved by proposing theories with an ever 
increasing level of generality, with its correlative increasing degree of falsifiability. 
Falsifiability is of the utmost importance for Popper, hence, new theories must include as 
few auxiliary hypotheses as possible. Those auxiliary hypotheses which are acceptable 
are ones which increase the degree of falsifiability of the total system. Related to this is 
the idea that theories must not be protected from falsification by ad hoc hypotheses. 
Finally, theories can be conclusively refuted and it is the aim of science to subject 
theories to severe tests in order to refute them.34
It can be claimed that a Popperian account of science would (a) frown upon the 
introduction o f the original Copemican hypothesis as being scientifically improper: it had 
less truth-content than its rival. And (b) would have considered the continued support of 
Copemicanism as dogmatically unscientific: the original Copemican hypothesis should 
have been considered refuted and subseqently rejected.
34 In this short summary of Popper, and in what follows, I interpret Popper as a naive, or dogmatic 
falsificationist. Some philosophers may object to this characterisation, but I believe that there is ample 
textual evidence to support this claim. I take sophisticated falsificationism, of which there is some 
textual evidence in Popper, as best represented by Lakatos, who I will discuss next.
To begin with, it must be said that the original Copemican hypothesis was, for its 
time, a very bold conjecture. But its truth-content was certainly not in excess o f its 
Aristotelian rival. The proposition that the earth rotates daily around its own axis, and 
yearly around the sun, creates insurmountable difficulties in relation to the remainder of 
the accepted scientific knowledge of the day: the Copemican hypothesis is not 
compatible with the general Aristotelian world-view. For knowledge in general, the 
Copemican hypothesis amounts to a reduction in tmth-content.
Even if we stay within the confines of astronomy, the Copemican hypothesis is, 
at best, only equal in tmth-content to its Ptolemaic/Aristotelian rival. As we saw in the 
last section, the Copemican hypothesis predicts sizes and magnitudes o f Mars and Venus 
which are not discernible. The apparent sizes of Mars and Venus were inter-subjectively 
testable; constituted accepted basic statements' for all parties concerned; and lent 
support to the Ptolemaic system. Consequently, even in astronomy it can be argued that 
the Copemican hypothesis constituted a reduction in tmth-content.
Secondly, it can be argued that the original Copemican hypothesis was falsified. 
The example of Mars and Venus can be taken to be refuting instances, relying as they do 
upon accepted basic statements. The absence of stellar parallax was left unexplained by 
Copernicus. Also, the tower argument, and other similar arguments, can be seen as 
refutations of the Copemican hypothesis.
I don't know how Popper would respond to the claims that the original 
Copemican hypothesis constituted a reduction in tmth-content. I can only surmise that 
Popper would restrict the debate to astronomy and deny that in this area the Copemican 
system had less tmth-content, overall, than its Ptolemaic rival. I don't think that this is a 
valid response: the whole intellectual climate needs to be taken into account, simply 
because it is relevant. We would not say that a new biological theory exhibited increased 
tmth-content if that theory contradicted the remainder of the corpus o f accepted physical 
theory.
The apparent refutation o f the Copemican hypothesis, via Mars and Venus, could 
be defused by saying that the Ptolemaic system does not get it exactly right either, and
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that, in some areas, Copernicus is better than Ptolemy This may be true, but the 
apparent refutation provided by the tower argument is more difficult for Popper to avoid. 
It has been said that the tower argument does not refute Copemicanism; rather, the 
tower argument refutes Copemicanism plus Aristotelian physics. Consequently, the 
falsification can be validly attributed to Aristotelian physics and diverted from the 
Copemican hypothesis.35 According to this account, Galileo acted wholly in the spirit of 
falsificationism. This may be so, but if it is, then falsificationism gives wildly differing, if 
not contradictory, prescriptions concerning one and the same state of affairs. Consider 
this passage from Popper;
By means of this mode of inference [modus tollens] we falsify the whole 
system ( the theory as well as the initial conditions) which was required for 
the deduction of the statement p, i.e. of the falsified statement. Thus it 
cannot be asserted of any one statement of the system that it is, or is not, 
specifically upset by the falsification. Only if/? is independent o f some part 
o f the system can we say that this part is not involved in the falsification.
With this is connected the following possibility: we may, in some cases ... 
attribute the falsification to some definite hypothesis- for instance to a 
newly introduced hypothesis. (LSD, pp. 76-7.)
In relation to the tower argument, the falsified statement p, that a stone dropped from
the top o f a tower should fall away from the base of the tower, is independent of
Aristotelian physics; therefore, Aristotelian physics is not involved in the falsification.
According to the above prescriptions, it is the newly introduced Copemican hypothesis
which should be considered falsified.36
If we now turn away from the original Copemican hypothesis and look at
Galileo's expansion of Copemicanism, we find very similar states of affairs. Firstly, if we
grant, for the sake of argument, that the tower argument falsification can be diverted
away from the Copemican hypothesis, and on to Aristotelian physics, then, according to
Popper, the new hypothesis which is to replace Aristotelianism must have increased
35 This response has been made by G. Andersson, "Feyerabend on Falsifications, Galileo, and Lady 
Reason", p. 289. And J. Worrall, "Feyerabend and the Facts", p. 338. Both in Munevar (ed) Beyond 
Reason.
36 This specific argument is not Feyerabend's, it is mine. It seems to be a valid point; being derived from 
Popper's own writings, and it is certainly in a Feyerabendian spirit. The general argument, that Popper's 
notion of content increase preserves the older theory, is of course a central part of Feyerabend's critique 
of Popper.
truth-content: it must be more falsifiable than its predecessor. But this is not the case 
Galileo's new natural interpretations concerning the non-operative character of motion 
and the principle of circular inertia, while intended to replace a comprehensive 
cosmology, do not preserve the truth-content of that cosmology.
Galileo's procedure drastically reduces the content o f dynamics.
Aristotelian dynamics was a general theory of change, comprising 
locomotion, qualitative change, generation and corruption ... Galileo's 
dynamics and its successors deal with locomotion only ... Other kinds of 
motion are pushed aside with the promissory note ... that locomotion will 
eventually be capable of explaining all motion. (AM, pp. 99-100).
Worse than this for Popper, however, is the fact that neither the principle o f the non­
operative character of motion, nor the principle of circular inertia, lead to new falsifiable 
predictions: "No independent argument was given for its [the non-operative character of 
motion] validity. Galileo's support for the principle of circular inertia is o f exactly the 
same kind". (AM, p. 91) This claim of Feyerabend's is completely valid: other aspects of 
Galileo's physics led to falsifiable, new predictions; for example, Galileo's ideas 
concerning acceleration. But these aspects could be accommodated within an 
Aristotelian framework. The crucial assumptions necessary to support the Copemican 
hypothesis: non-operative motion and the principle of circular inertia, provided no new 
falsifiable predictions.
Popper contends that "As regards auxiliary hypotheses we propose to lay down 
the rule that only those are acceptable whose introduction does not diminish the degree 
of falsifiability or testability of the system in question, but, on the contrary, increases it." 
(LSD, pp. 82-3.) In Popper's philosophy, auxiliary hypotheses which do not meet this 
requirement are ad hoc; "'Always choose the hypothesis which goes as little beyond the 
evidence as possible!'... can be shown to be equivalent... to 'Always choose the 
hypothesis which has the highest degree of ad hoc character."’ (CR, p. 287.) These 
definitions of ad hocness implies that Popper should label Galileo's theories ad hoc. 
Therefore, for Popper, Galileo's science is *bad' science.
Feyerabend has also argued that Galileo's ideas on motion are ad hoc in another 
manner:
My guess is that a clear idea o f permanent motion with(out) impetus 
developed in Galileo only together with his gradual acceptance o f  the 
Copemican view. Galileo changed his view ab o u t... motions ... in order to 
make them compatible with the rotation of the earth and in order to evade 
the difficulties of the tower argument. His ideas concerning such motions 
are, therefore, at least partly ad hoc. Impetus in the old sense disappeared, 
partly for methodological reasons ... partly because of the vaguely 
perceived inconsistency with the idea of the relativity o f all motion. The 
wish to save Copernicus plays a role in either case. (AM, pp. 96-7)
This 'guess' o f Feyerabend's seems at least possible: Galileo's earliest writings on motion,
written some five years before his acceptance o f Copemicanism, though showing much
dissatisfaction with Aristotelian accounts, do not, for the most part, indicate his mature
views, or support Copemicanism.37 It is only after Galileo accepted the Copemican
hypothesis that his views on motion became decidedly pro-Copemican. Be that as it may,
we do not have to rely upon this hypothesis to show that the Popperian account of
science is in trouble.
In the Dialogue, Galileo assumes that the planets move in perfectly circular 
orbits. This idea constitutes a dramatic loss of content for the Copemican hypothesis. 
Even in Copernicus' early writings, planetary orbits were not perfectly circular: epicycles 
needed to be added to procure the fit between theory and phenomena. In his later 
writings, Copernicus needed to add even more machinery to achieve a greater fit. 
Perfectly circular orbits simply did not fit the facts: Galileo's circular orbits were known 
by all to be falsified. Needless to say, no new facts were predicted by postulating circular 
orbits. Galileo's reliance on circular orbits is even more puzzling when we consider the 
fact that Kepler had, many years previously, published his elliptical orbit theory: a theory 
which was in close agreement with the facts. One can only suggest that Galileo 
disregards the problems associated with exact astronomical prediction and supports a 
simplified system because circular orbits cohere with Galileo's dynamical theory of
37 See Drake, Galileo Studies, pp. 72-3. and pp. 261-4.
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circular inertia; that is, the postulation of circular orbits is ad hoc, it is supported by 
Galileo because it would lend support to his principle of circular inertia.38
One may add at this point that the explanation given by Galileo to resolve the 
difficulty created by the absence of stellar parallax: that the fixed stars are much further 
away than was thought to be the case at the time, is completely ad hoc. It only serves to 
save the Copemican hypothesis from refutation.
Turning to the telescope does not produce the desired increased truth-content 
necessary to rescue Popper's account. Recall that Popper believes that we should be 
parsimonious with the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses, for two reasons. Firstly, 
auxiliary hypotheses could be introduced simply to save a theory from refutation; this is 
not allowable. Secondly, the fewer auxiliary hypotheses we have, the more falsifiable a 
theory becomes. However, for the telescope to be considered a valid means of extending 
sense experience, various additional, unproven, and controversial auxiliary hypotheses 
needed to be proposed.
Accepting for the moment the technical adequacy of the telescope, auxiliary 
hypotheses concerning the nature and behaviour o f light were needed to ensure that 
observations of the heavens could be considered as accurate as those o f terrestrial 
observations. Feyerabend contends that for the Aristotelians "celestial objects and 
terrestrial objects are formed from different materials and obey different laws. This idea 
entails that the result of an interaction of lig h t... with terrestrial objects cannot, without 
farther discussion, be extended to the sky" (AM, p. 121) This seems to be true: we can 
admit that light is being transmitted to us from the ethereal spheres, but the light 
transmitted may be distorted in some manner, for example, no one will deny that light 
behaves noticeably different when passing through water; might not a similar process be
38 Drake, Ibid., pp. 257-68 has contended that Galileo never believed in circular inertia. For Drake, 
circular inertia, and the general reverence for all things circular to be found in the Dialogue, is part of 
an attempt by Galileo to show that he is more Aristotelian than the Aristotelians: it is part of Galileo's 
rhetoric of persuasion, designed to show that the Copemican hypothesis is not so radically un- 
Aristotelian as many thought. That may be so, but the question is, how does this type of legitimate 
scientific argument - the Dialogue was immensely influential in securing the victory of Copemicanism - 
square with a Poppenan analysis? Nowhere in Popper can I find exhortations to engage in rhetoric. See 
section 1.5 below for more on this.
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happening when light is transmitted through the ether? Galileo seems to take it for 
granted that there is no problem here, and, in relation to Popper, no independent tests are 
provided to prove that light behaves exactly the same in the two realms.
If we turn to the question of the technical adequacy of the telescope, we find that 
the functioning of the telescope could not be explained by the optical theories of the 
time; that is, the extant optical theories which could have been used to support the 
reliability of the telescope were false: they had been refuted.39 If we add to this the fact 
that it was accepted that
illusions can be readily demonstrated by examining the images produced by 
curved mirrors, or by crude lenses (and remember that the lenses used by 
Galileo were far from the level of perfection achieved today): they are 
distorted, the lens-images also have coloured fringes, and they may appear 
at a place different form the place of the object. (AM, pp. 148-9)
then the need for an adequate explanatory hypothesis which could explain and exclude
these illusions was pressing indeed. In this situation, the Aristotelian theory of
perception, which discouraged the use of instruments because ’'they interfere with the
processes in the medium”, (AM, p 148) seems to be a more adequate and untroubled
theory when compared to the new theory of vision, fraught with difficulties, which was
necessary to give support to telescopic observation.
As I said in the previous section, the requisite skill to correctly interpret what was
seen through the telescope was lacking: the usual visual cues and familiarity provided by
terrestrial objects is lacking when we look through the telescope at the sky. If we add to
these psychological difficulties the early technical inadequacies o f the telescope, then we
find that the observations made via the telescope are often false, and sometimes falsified
by naked eye observations. For example, Galileo's description of the moon was refuted
by Kepler's naked eye observations. (AM, p. 127)
If  we bring all these factors together the prognosis is not very promising for
Popper's theory o f scientific rationality. A new instrument is introduced whose workings
cannot be explained. A number of auxiliary hypotheses are necessary to make the use of
39 See AM, pp. 136-7, and pp. 59-60.
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the instrument relevant; however, none of these auxiliary hypotheses can be 
independently justified. Naked eye observations can refute some of the observations 
made with the new instrument. The situation seems to imply, according to Popper, that 
the telescope should not even be considered to be a valid instrument for the investigation 
of nature.
However, if we place these worries to one side, we find that there are at least 
some phenomena seen through the telescope which do support the Copemican 
hypothesis: the phases of Venus and the moons o f Jupiter. Consequently, Popper may 
say that, at least in these situations, Copemicanism passed crucial tests intended to falsify 
it. But the situation is not so simple: "The moon and some of the planets, such as for 
example Jupiter, were enlarged while the apparent diameter of the fixed stars decreased: 
the former were brought nearer whereas the latter were pushed away." (AM, p. 128)
This result was unexpected: Copemican theory had not predicted it, in fact, the telescope 
was meant to magnify objects, not to diminish them. Was this taken to be a refutation of 
the Copemican hypothesis? No, the result was explained away by Galileo by asserting 
that the eye introduces hindrances to sight, which the telescope removes. We can agree 
with Feyerabend when he says that "Galileo's hypothesis received support mainly from its 
agreement with the Copemican point of view and was, therefore, largely ad  hoc" (AM,
P- 139)
To conclude this section on Popper, I think we can agree with Feyerabend when 
he says that
detailed study of historical phenomena such as these, creates considerable 
difficulties for the view that the transition from the pre-Copemican 
cosmology to that of the 17th century consisted in the replacement of 
refuted theories by more general conjectures which explained the refuting 
instances, made new predictions, and were corroborated by the 
observations carried out to test these new predictions ... while the pre- 
Copemican astronomy was in trouble ... the Copemican theory was in 
even greater trouble ... but that being in harmony with still further 
inadequate theories it gained strength, and was retained, the refutations 
being made ineffective by ad hoc hypotheses and clever techniques of 
persuasion. (AM, p. 143)
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It must always be remembered that Feyerabend is not saying that pre-Copemican 
astronomy was not refuted, in the end. Nor is he saying that post-Copemican science 
remained ad hoc. The ad hoc hypotheses and the auxiliary hypotheses necessary were 
eventually substantiated. For example, by the middle of the 17th century optical theory 
had come a long way in providing theoretical explanations of the working of the 
telescope; consequently, bigger and better telescopes were being produced which were 
vindicating the Copemican hypothesis and providing a firm refutation of the Ptolemaic 
astronomy 40 The point Feyerabend is trying to make is that Popper's account of science 
leads us to label significant scientific episodes as irrational: if the protagonists at the time 
had been Popperians, then they would have rejected the Copemican hypothesis as 
irrational, time and time again.41
1.4.4 Galileo and Lakatos's Methodology o f  Scienti fic Research Programmes.
Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes presents Feyerabend a 
far harder nut to crack than either empiricism, or Popper's naive falsificationism. In fact, 
Feyerabend cannot conduct a reductio of Lakatos’s philosophy via an analysis of Galileo, 
however much he would like to. This is because Lakatos agrees with Feyerabend's 
analysis. In the case of empiricism, this conclusion is perhaps wholly within expectations, 
Lakatos is, after all, sympathetic with the anti-empiricist Popper.42 But in relation to 
Popper it may seem a little surprising: one could expect Lakatos to defend Popper, or at 
least mitigate the main conclusions, but this is not the case. Lakatos contends that "if we 
apply the falsificationist criterion to the question o f when Copernicus' theory superseded 
not only Ptolemy's but also Tycho Brahe's ... then falsificationism has only an absurd 
reply: that it did so only in 1838"43 This is so because, though the establishment of the
40 So, we can say that by about 1650, the Ptolemaic astronomy had been refuted, and the Copemican 
hypothesis accepted, but, as it turns out, the Copemican hypothesis should not have been accepted, even 
then. More on this in the next section.
41 For a broader discussion concerning the historiographical falsification of falsificationism, see 
Lakatos, "History of Science and its Rational Reconstruction", in Howson (ed) Method and appraisal in 
the Physical Sciences, pp. 21-7.
42 See I. Lakatos, and E. Zahar, "Why Did Copernicus' Research Program Supersede Ptolemy's?", in 
R.S. Westman (ed) The Copemican Achievement, pp. 356-8.
43 Ibid., p. 359.
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veridicality of the observations made through the telescope refuted Ptolemy's astronomy, 
it did not refute geocentrism. In particular, Tycho Brahe's system was compatible with 
the results o f telescopic observations. The conclusive refutation of geocentrism only 
came with the establishment of the existence of stellar parallax in 1838. Needless to say, 
by that time geocentrism had been considered refuted for centuries. Lakatos sums this 
situation up as follows:
Something must be wrong with the falsificationist account. This is a typical 
example o f how history of science can undermine a philosophy of science - 
too much of the actual history of science was irrational if scientific 
rationality is falsificationist rationality.44
This conclusion is identical to Feyerabend's, but Lakatos does not draw the further 
conclusion, as does Feyerabend, that 'Rationalism' is therefore an inadequate way in 
which to approach the rationality of science. On the contrary, Lakatos presents a 
stripped down 'Rationalism' designed to avoid the difficulties Popper's views 
encountered.
There were three factors which militated against Popper's falsificationism (i) take 
refutations seriously (ii) avoid ad hoc hypotheses and (iii) always aim for increased truth- 
content for successive theories. Lakatos repudiates strict versions of these theses, 
although, as I will show, he retains aspects of all three 45
Firstly, for Lakatos, a new research programme does not have to fulfil the truth- 
content increase requirements of Popper. New research programmes are almost always 
characterised by a reduction in truth-content. This is as it should be: it takes time for new 
research programmes to show their fruitfulness and adaptability. However, once a new 
research programme has been proposed, successive versions o f the research programme 
must show increased truth-content: there must be increased truth-content internal to a 
particular research programme. If this internal truth-content increase does not eventuate,
44Ibid., p. 360.
45 For detailed discussion of the following points, see I. Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of 
Scientific Research Programmes" in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds) Criticism and the Growth o f  
Knowledge. In what follows my aim is to show that Lakatos avoids the problems associated with 
Popper's falsificationism vis a vis Feyerabend's reductio. As such, the arguments are highly simplified 
and selective. In chapter 2 I will give a detailed analysis of Lakatos's methodology of scientific research 
programmes.
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Lakatos describes the research programme as entering a degenerating problem-shift. If a 
programme continues to degenerate, this constitutes tentative reasons for abandoning the 
programme.
Secondly, if new research programmes do not have to fulfil the requirement of 
truth-content increase, then it is easy to see that new programmes are 1)0111' refuted. 
Consequently, new research programmes should not be abandoned because of apparent 
refutations: in time the research programme may be able to overcome these apparent 
refutations. What is refuted is a version o f the research programme, not the programme 
itself. If new versions are proposed which exhibit internal truth-content increase, then the 
programme is considered to be unrefuted. Even if a programme is degenerating, it is not 
considered refuted: it may stage a successful comeback.
Thirdly, ad hoc hypotheses are acceptable. As long as there is some increased 
truth-content between successive theories within a programme, ad hoc hypotheses are 
useful in staving off apparent falsifications. Of course, ad  hoc hypotheses should 
eventually be replaced or transformed into testable hypotheses, but Lakatos does not rule 
out theories as unscientific if they happen to include ad  hoc hypotheses.
For Lakatos, science is rational if relations of truth-content increase between 
successive theories within research programmes can be demonstrated. In the case of the 
Copemican hypothesis, Lakatos contends that both Ptolemy and Copernicus were 
working within the one (super) programme: "Both programs branched off from the 
Pythagorean-Platonic program whose basic principle was that since heavenly bodies are 
perfect, all astronomical phenomena should be saved by a combination o f as few uniform 
circular motions ... as possible" 46 According to Lakatos, the Copemican hypothesis 
constituted an increase in tmth-content for this Pythagorean-Platonic research 
programme.47
46 Lakatos and Zahar, "Why Did Copernicus'..." p. 370.
47 For details, see Ibid., pp. 370-81. Whether Copernicus can be said to be continuing the problematic 
of the Pythagorean-Platonic research program, or working within a new research program, or continuing 
an entirely different, Aristarchan, research program, is a highly controversial theoretical and historical 
problem. In any case, the question of whether Copernicus' system constituted truth-content increase is a 
moot question steeped in complexity. See the discussion of these points in N. Thomason, "Could
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This is the only point at which Feyerabend attempts some sort o f reductio via this 
particular historical episode. Feyerabend contends that "Lakatos ... notes progressive 
changes but only because he omits the dynamical and the optical problems and 
concentrates on kinematics, pure and simple." (AM, p. 178) That is, Lakatos separates 
Ptolemaic astronomy from the context of the general Aristotelian world-view, then 
proclaims that Copernicus' hypothesis is a dramatic example of truth-content increase. 
Feyerabend's point is that if we do not separate astronomy from its Aristotelian context, 
then the contention that Copernicus' hypothesis constituted truth-content increase 
becomes highly debatable indeed. Of course, Lakatos could respond to this by saying 
that the loss of content sustained in the non-astronomical domains was balanced out by 
the gain in content in the astronomical domains. Adding up the scorecard here would be 
an impossible task. At any rate, even if it could be proved that there was an overall 
content loss, Lakatos could still defend his position by saying that there was at least some 
content increase, and that is all that is required. The fact that the tower argument seems 
to refute the Copemican hypothesis is also easily accommodated within Lakatos' system: 
refutations do not have to be taken seriously, or they can be temporarily explained away 
via ad hoc hypotheses.
Recall that Galileo incorporated circular orbits within his astronomy, and that this 
seemed to be an obvious case of content decrease. Lakatos solves this problem, and the 
other problems associated with Galileo's system (general loss o f content, ad hoc 
hypotheses, etc ), by dissolving it: "From the point of view of the methodology of 
scientific research programs the Copemican program was not further developed but 
rather abandoned by Kepler, Galileo and Newton".48 This is an ingenious move, as we 
saw above, Lakatos explicitly supports the idea that new research programmes do not 
have to fulfil the requirements of content increase. New research programmes can avoid
Lakatos, Even With Zahar's criterion for Novel Fact, Evaluate the Copemican Research Programme?", 
British Journal for the Philosophy o f Science, 43, 1992.
48 Lakatos and Zahar, "Why Did Copernicus'...", p. 375. But Cf. "Falsification ..." p. 124, text and fn. 3, 
and p. 142, fn. 3. where Lakatos presents Copemican astronomy as a new research programe, grafted 
onto, and inconsistent with, Aristotelian physics. While Galileo's circular inertia hypothesis is 
characterised as ad hoc, "the only purpose of which is to hide the 'deficiency'" p. 142, arising from an 
inconsistent research programme.
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refutations. And new research programmes are allowed to propose ad hoc hypotheses: 
they need breathing space. Consequently, it seems that Lakatos can construct a 
'Rationahst' account of scientific change based upon a modified, but nevertheless, 
universal concept of truth-content increase.
Though Lakatos' strategy is certainly questionable, I think that we must accept 
the fact that Lakatos can avoid Feyerabend's reductio via an analysis of Galileo's 
arguments. Feyerabend does not leave the issue there, he still believes that he can 
conduct a reductio of Lakatos' philosophy, but his reductio of Lakatos is conducted via 
different issues. However, analysis of this issue will have to wait until chapter 2.
1.5 Feyerabend’s Rhetoric: Propaganda, Irrationality and Subjective Wishes.
From the above analysis we can conclude that, for Feyerabend, 'Rationahst' 
philosophies, according to their own standards, should label prima facie rational activity 
as irrational. If a 'Rationalist' should label what are generally considered to be rational 
episodes in the history of science as irrational, then how can the 'Rationalist' account for 
the acceptance of those ideas? Feyerabend contends that 'Rationahst' philosophies leave 
no room for anything other than their Rationahst' theses as exphcations o f rational 
activity. Therefore, if anything else was involved in these historical episodes, those 
factors must be, at best, a-rational, if not irrational.
It must be remembered that Feyerabend has chosen Galileo as his main case study 
because it is generally considered, by 'Rationalists', to be a paradigmatic example of 
scientific rationality. This pushes aside the objection that 'Rationalists' do not contend 
that their standards are exceptionless, and that therefore any one case study does not 
impugn the validity of their standards. 'Rationalists' must be able to produce some 
unequivocal, paradigmatic examples, where their standards, without any other 
intervening factors, produced rational decisions.
The paradigmatic example o f Galileo cannot be reduced to the 'Rationahst' theses 
of empiricism, or Popper. Consequently, Feyerabend contends that "Galileo’s utterances 
are ... arguments in appearance only. For Galileo uses propaganda. He uses
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psychological tricks in addition to whatever intellectual reasons he has to offer. These 
tricks are very successful: they lead him to victory." (AM, p. 181) Notice here that 
Feyerabend does not deny that there are 'intellectual reasons', arguments, put forth by 
Galileo. So when Machamer claims that "Feyerabend is at pains to show that Galileo had 
no reason in 1632 to hold the Copemican hypothesis",49 he has misinterpreted 
Feyerabend's project. What Feyerabend denies is that all of Galileo's tactics, including 
some of the most cogent ones, can be encompassed within 'Rationalist' explanations. 
Consequently, empiricists and Popper, must say that Galileo uses propaganda and 
psychological tricks in order to secure victory for his ideas, because their 'Rationahst' 
accounts have been exhausted. Any other factors which proved to be determinative 
cannot, on their account, be rational and must therefore be a-rational or irrational: 
propaganda. Feyerabend believes that Galileo had all sorts of reasons for defending 
Copemicanism. For Feyerabend, the fact that 'Rationahst' accounts of rationality cannot 
explicate Gahleo's reasoning, reduces their accounts of rationality to absurdity.
It is interesting to note that some philosophers have labelled some of Gahleo's 
argumentative moves as propaganda. As I mentioned in the previous section, Stillman 
Drake regards Galileo's support of circular inertia in the Dialogue as propaganda:
Galileo as a physicist treated inertial motions as rectilinear. Nevertheless,
Galileo as a propagandist, when writing the Dialogue, stated that 
rectilinear motion cannot be perpetual, though circular motion may be 
...[however, Galileo] knew when he wrote the Dialogue that strong 
opposition could be expected from the professors of philosophy, most of 
them convinced Aristotelians. It was for this reason ... [that] he 
dehberately conceded ... to the philosophers everything he possibly could 
... Accordingly, when I read the metaphysical praise of circles in the 
Dialogue, I do not conclude with most historians that its author was 
unable to break the spell o f ancient traditions; rather, I strongly suspect an 
ulterior purpose in those passages.50
Finocchiaro has objected to this interpretation of Drake's, contending that one of the 
main reasons behind this attribution of propaganda to Galileo is the fact that circular 
inertia does not cohere with modem science, consequently, since Galileo was a great
49 P.K. Machamer, "Feyerabend and Galileo: The Interaction of Theories, and the Reinterpretation of 
Experience", Studies in History and Philosophy o f  Science, 4, 1973, p.35.
50 Drake, Galileo Studies, p. 253.
scientist, his support of circular inertia must have been for the purposes of propaganda.51 
If Finnochiaro is right, then we can conclude that aspects o f Galileo which do not cohere 
with modem expectations are labelled as propaganda, just as Feyerabend has proposed. 
On the other hand, if this interpretation of Drake's is correct, then we can conclude that 
propaganda may be a powerful tool in scientific debates. We can agree with Feyerabend 
that
Galileo's propaganda machinations are often guided by the insight that 
established institutions, social conditions, prejudices may hinder the 
acceptance of new ideas and that new ideas may therefore have to be 
introduced in an 'indirect' manner, by forging links between the 
circumstances of their origin and the forces that may endanger their 
survival. (AM, p. 106, fn. 22.)
It is easy to see that such 'propaganda', that is, rhetoric, is nowhere mentioned in the 
writings of'Rationalists' as an acceptable scientific tool.
In this context it is imperative to give an example of what Feyerabend actually 
means by propaganda. Recall that Feyerabend contends that Galileo introduced new 
natural interpretations to replace the Aristotelian natural interpretations. This process 
would be unobjectionable and relatively easy if  Galileo had had recourse to the 
theory/observation distinction: he would simply be proposing a new theory to account 
for the accepted observations. But, as Finnochiaro has pointed out, it can be argued that 
the theory/observation distinction was not an accepted distinction at the time.52 In fact, 
the Aristotelian theory of perception seems to forbid such a distinction: Aristotelian 
perception
is a process in which the form of the object perceived enters the percipient 
as precisely the same form that characterized the object so that the 
percipient, in a sense, assumes the properties o f the object. A theory o f 
perception of this kind ... does not permit any major discrepancy between 
observations and the things observed. (AM, p. 148)
In this situation, how can a new natural interpretation, which seems to run counter to the
most obvious empirical experience, be introduced without impugning the Aristotelian
51 Finocchiaro, Galileo and the Art o f  Reasoning, pp. 88-9.
52 Ibid., pp. 182-200 esp. p. 195.
theory o f  perception? "Galileo 'reminds' us that there are situations in which the non­
operative character of shared motion is just as evident and as firmly believed as the idea 
of the operative character of all motion is in other circumstances". (AM, p. 81) For 
example, events on boats, where a cannon-ball dropped from the top of a mast lands at 
the base of the mast. These circumstances, where Aristotelians accept that there is 
relativity o f motion, are then used by Galileo to point out that the relativity of motion has 
always been accepted, to put it crudely, you always have believed in the relativity of 
motion, so why can't you accept it for the earth as a whole? Galileo then introduces the 
Plato's theory o f anamnesis, that is, it really is the truth, you have always believed it, you 
only need to be shown its veracity and you will come to believe that it is true. Without 
recourse to the theory/observation distinction, Galileo must employ rhetoric in order to 
preserve the idea that observation provides us with true pictures of the world; and in 
order to get his arguments a hearing. Thus, reasonable arguments sometimes need to be 
accompanied by rhetoric - propaganda - so that the cogency o f the argument can be 
appreciated.
Feyerabend contends that propaganda/rhetoric is sometimes necessary in order to 
present an argument or view in its best light. This is especially so if the argument or view 
is controversial, or is in opposition to prevailing, accepted views. For example, after 
saying that scientific debates are characterised by political propaganda, Feyerabend goes 
on to say that this is not a bad thing and that it in fact constitutes a tremendous step 
forward, for
the fact that we are dealing with party lines is ... not really a drawback ... 
party lines play a most important role in many civilised institutions, such as 
in the democratic process, in the process of trial by a competition of 
opposing opinions which allows for the examination o f even the most 
fundamental assumption and the most expert testimony.53
What Feyerabend is saying here is that there is never a foolproof, absolutely certain,
answer to the questions which are asked in such diverse areas as democratic institutions,
legal processes and scientific debate. Given this idea, it is allowable for there to be
53 Feyerabend, "Classical Empiricism", in Philosophical Papers Vol.2. p. 51.
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rhetoric and propaganda to ensure that correct views, such as Galileo's, are not thrown 
out of court on the weight of circumstantial evidence, as it were. Of course, Feyerabend 
has not shown where the distinction between good propaganda and bad propaganda lies, 
but one feels that Feyerabend won't be drawing any absolute lines here. An important 
clue can be gathered if we consider this quote: "If we choose different kinds of 
standards, for example if we permit standards to change, in an 'opportunistic' manner 
from one case to the next, then the 'propaganda' turns into reason." (SFS, p. 214.) I 
interpret this passage as saying that what may appear, from one perspective, to be 
propaganda, intellectually unfounded, may be the epitomy of rationality from a different 
perspective. Thus, Feyerabend is arguing that what is believed to be rational is now 
dominated by 'Rationalist' standards, consequently, those moves which do not admit of 
'Rationalist' explication are labelled as propaganda. But if we were more 'opportunistic', 
more contextually sensitive, we may find that the 'propaganda' proves itself to be 
successful, and thus becomes reasonable.
If  Feyerabend's attribution of propaganda to Galileo, and scientists in general, can 
be explicated as arising out of his reductio, then so too can Feyerabend's frequent 
assertion that science is governed by 'subjective wishes'. 'Rationalists' contend that then- 
standards are rationally objective, therefore, if paradigmatic cases of rationality cannot be 
explicated in terms o f these objective standards, then the determinative factors must be 
either non-rationally objective, social, for example; or they must be governed by the 
subjective wishes o f the protagonists involved. These conclusions are unpalatable to the 
'Rationalist', but what Feyerabend means by subjective wishes is very different to what is 
usually meant:
They are connected partly with the tradition in which the scientist works, 
with the beliefs and the prejudices which are characteristic of that 
tradition; and they are connected partly with his own personal 
idiosyncrasies. The formal apparatus available, and the structure o f the 
language that he speaks, will also strongly influence the activity of the 
scientist... Another factor which strongly influences theorizing is
metaphysical beliefs ... theories may be influenced even by aesthetic 
motives.54
Now, saying that a scientist's choice is affected by the tradition in which the scientist 
works is a wholly uncontroversial idea. Scientists always make their choices in the light 
of their tradition's beliefs. A biologist will make the assumption that an organism's 
physical constitution is determined by genes and the environment. Non-physical factors 
are said to be causally non-existent: they are simply ruled out of consideration. Personal 
factors obviously enter into scientific decision-making: scientists are not robots. The 
formal apparatus available strongly affects scientific decision-making: non-linear physics 
was for a long time not utilised in theory choice because it was put into the too-hard 
basket. The advent o f computers has engendered the blossoming of the use of theories 
utilising non-linear equations.
Feyerabend places whatever is not explicable in terms o f 'Rationahst' theses under 
the rubric o f propaganda or subjective wishes. This can be seen as part of the reductio of 
'Rationahst' philosophies: 'Rationalists' should contend that propaganda and subjective 
wishes are rife in science, simply because their 'Rationahst' standards cannot explicate 
paradigmaticahy rational scientific episodes. Feyerabend contends that there is rhetoric 
and other factors in science, which are rational, but which cannot be subsumed under a 
'Rationahst' banner.
In conducting a reductio a philosopher doesn’t have to support the premises of 
the argument, usually they don’t. I would want to contend that Feyerabend doesn’t 
support the 'Rationahst' premises upon which he conducts his reductio. However, others 
have said that Feyerabend does beheve the 'Rationahst' premises and is therefore serious 
in his attribution o f irrationality to science. For example, Hooker says that
Feyerabend has stressed [that] the deployer o f a reductio ad absurdum is 
not committed to believing its premises. So then, I cannot convict 
Feyerabend o f tacit formalist presuppositions merely by noting the crudity 
of his formulations. But then reasonable people are entitled to ask for the 
positive account which is to replace that which has been rejected.55
54 Feyerabend, "Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism", in Philosophical Papers V oll. pp. 59-60.
55 Hooker, "Between Formalism and Anarchism", p. 95.
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This, in itself, is an acceptable demand, however, Hooker goes on to say that Feyerabend 
does not provide a positive account, and that he therefore tacitly supports 'Rationalist' 
theses, and therefore Feyerabend seriously believes that science is irrational. But I believe 
that Hooker is wrong. In the following chapters I hope to further substantiate this 
conclusion.
2 Feverabend, Lakatos and Anarchism
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we saw that Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes (MSRP) can avoid Feyerabend's attempted reductio of 
'Rationalist' philosophies: the methodological tool-kit o f MSRP is able to circumvent the 
conclusions resulting from Feyerabend's analysis of the arguments of Galileo. In this 
chapter I want to show that the same strategies which protect Lakatos's MSRP from 
Feyerabend's reductio in individual cases, such as that o f Galileo, are also the means by 
which Feyerabend constructs a general reductio ad absurdum argument against 
Lakatos's MSRP
In particular, Feyerabend's 'epistemological anarchism' must be understood within 
the context of his reductio o f Lakatos's 'Rationalist' MSRP. Just as, according to 
Feyerabend, Empiricists and Popper must either give up their 'Rationalist' positions, or 
accept the idea that large amounts of intuitive, paradigmatically rational, episodes in the 
history of science were irrational, so too Lakatos must either give up the remaining 
'Rationalist' strands in his MSRP, or accept the idea that the history of science is a 
chronicle of'anything goes' anarchism. Feyerabend does not believe that the history of 
science is irrational, in any absolute sense. What he does believe is that science appears 
irrational when viewed from the perspective of certain 'Rationalist' philosophies. 
Similarly, Feyerabend is not a committed anarchist, and his support of anarchism is of a 
very idiosyncratic nature, that is, Feyerabend doesn’t mean by anarchism what many 
people mean by anarchism, he doesn’t take it to mean chaos or complete disorder. 
However, from the perspective o f 'Rationahst' philosophies, the history of science seems 
to exhibit unprincipled change, chaos and anarchism.
In this chapter I will, (i) present Feyerabend's reductio o f Lakatos's MSRP and 
examine the question of whether Lakatos can reply to these charges o f internal 
incoherence, (ii) Elucidate a second argument of Feyerabend's to the effect that, even if 
Lakatos can avoid the charges o f internal incoherence, he is still guilty o f begging the
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question concerning the nature of rationality, (iii) Dispel the idea that Feyerabend 
welcomes the conclusion that science is anarchistic. And (iv) Show that, through the 
analyses of (i), (ii) and (iii), we can begin to see the positive aspects of Feyerabend's 
philosophy.
2.2 Feyerabend’s Reductio of Lakatos’s MSRP.1
2.2.1 Introduction.
At its most basic level, Lakatos's philosophy can be seen as an attempt to provide 
positive answers to three questions. Can we draw a demarcation between science and 
non-science? Can we distinguish rational factors in science from irrational, or a-rational 
factors? And, based upon the answers to the first two questions, can we give 
prescriptive, heuristic advice to working scientists? The specific content of Lakatos's 
answers to these questions must be seen as resulting from his exposure to the 
philosophies o f Popper and Kuhn. From Popper, Lakatos inherited the 'Rationahst' ideals 
that the answers to the questions must be of a universal, a-temporal and unequivocal 
nature. From Kuhn, Lakatos came to realise that Popper's normative methodology did 
not provide a reliable guide when it came to explaining the history of science.
Applying Popper's methodology to the history of science resulted in too much 
science, and too many scientists, being labelled irrational. But if this is the case, then an 
explanation of the apparent progressiveness and rationality of science becomes 
inscrutable: if scientists behave irrationally, but, nevertheless, science continues to 
rationally progress, then one o f the few options is to enlist the 'cunning of history' to 
compel worlc^ entities to mirror the denizens of world3. Lakatos does not take up this 
option. Instead, Lakatos liberalises methodology so as to be able to rationally explicate 
the history of science, whilst maintaining the universal, a-temporal, non-psychologistic
1 In what follows I take my cue from Feyerabend. I elaborate on, expand, and add to Feyerabend's 
arguments, which can be found in AM, ch. 16. and "On the Critique of Scientific Reason", in C. 
Howson (ed) Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences, pp. 309-39. However, I do not rely 
specifically upon Feyerabend's presentation of the arguments. In this sense, I want to bring out the 
objective characteristics of Lakatos's MSRP, which are the source of Feyerabend's reductio
Standards of'Rationalist' philosophy and world3. As we will see, the attempted 
preservation of this balancing act is the source of Lakatos's problems and the key to 
Feyerabend's reductio.
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2.2.2 Theory Appraisal: Intra-Research Programme.
Lakatos's entire methodological programme is summed up very clearly in the 
following passage:
Let us take a series of theories, T1? T2, T3, ... where each subsequent 
theory results from adding auxiliary clauses to (or from semantical 
reinterpretations of) the previous theory in order to accommodate some 
anomaly, each theory having at least as much content as the unrefuted 
content of its predecessor. Let us say that a series of theories is 
theoretically progressive (or 'constitutes a theoretically progressive 
problemshift) if each new theory has some excess empirical content over 
its predecessor, that is, if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact.
Let us say that a theoretically progressive series of theories is also 
empirically progressive (or 'constitutes cm empirically progressive 
problemshift') if some of this excess empirical content is also 
corroborated, that is, if each new theory leads us to the actual discovery of 
some new fact. Finally, let us call a problemshift progressive if it is both 
theoretically and empirically progressive, and degenerating if it is not. We 
'accept problemshifts as 'scientific' only if they are at least theoretically 
progressive; if they are not, we 'reject them as 'pseudoscientific'... We 
regard a theory in the series 'falsified' when it is superseded by a theory 
with higher corroborated content.2
If we add that series of theories, or research programmes, are connected by way of an 
irrefutable, by decision, hard-core, and that the modus tollens o f refutation is directed at 
the protective belt o f auxiliary assumptions surrounding the hard-core, then we have a 
fairly complete picture of Lakatos's MSRP.
This seems to present a very clear methodological picture of science.3 We have a 
demarcation criteria: a necessary and sufficient condition o f being scientific is that of
2 Lakatos, "Falsification..." p. 118.
3 1 will ignore the qualifications which seem to be endemic in Lakatos's writings, that is, the excessive 
use of scare quotes around important terms seems to leave interpretation highly ambiguous. When we 
delve deeper into Lakatos's thought, many of these qualifications can be explicitly spelled out. 
Nevertheless, one can't help feeling that the qualifications assume the status of immunisation strategies.
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theoretical progressiveness.4 It seems to preserve the rationality of science, in that we 
have criteria with which to judge the actions of scientists: the acceptance of some theory 
T, was rational, in that T represented an empirically progressive problemshift, while the 
acceptance of theory T  was irrational, in that it represented a degenerating problemshift. 
Consequently, it seems to offer quite explicit advice to scientists: only propose theories 
which are theoretically progressive; do not propose, and reject other proposals of, 
theories which are theoretically degenerate.
But, as it turns out, this is not the case: Lakatos's system is neither clear, nor 
straightforward. Demarcation, rationality and advice become muddied notions, even 
within research programmes, where the problems should be easier to handle. For 
example, Lakatos inherits from Popper an abhorrence of'conventionalist stratagems': 
moves made by a scientist to protect a theory from falsification; ad hoc manoeuvres. 
Lakatos identifies three different types of ad hoc stratagems, all "unfailingly pejorative".5 
Ad hocj theories are theories which "had no excess content over their predecessors",6 
that is, they are not theoretically progressive. Ad hoc2 theories are "theories which 
predicted novel facts but completely failed: none o f their excess content got 
corroborated",7 that is, they are not empirically progressive. And ad hoc3 theories are 
theories which "do not form an integral part of the positive heuristic [of a research 
programme]".8
When we look at actual examples, we find that these three senses o f ad hocness, 
far from being 'unfailingly pejorative', are tolerated, accepted and sometimes encouraged
4 But it is not so clear; in the next page after the quote in the text above, Lakatos contends that "A given 
fact is explained scientifically only if  a new fact is explained with it." (italicised in the original) p. 119. 
Also, that "A theory without excess corroboration has no excess explanatory power; therefore, according 
to Popper, it does not represent growth and therefore is n o t'scientifictherefore, we should say, it has 
no explanatory power" fn. 1. p. 119. That is, a theory is only scientific if  it is, not just theoretically 
progressive, but also empirically progressive. This requirement, apart from the fact that it contradicts 
what Lakatos says m the passage quoted in the text above, leads to what are intuitively absurd results. 
The simple fact that a theory's novel predictions may not have been tested yet, implies that that theory is 
unscientific. I think it is best to stick with the idea presented in the passage above. But this starts to 
bring to light the general prevarication which we find in Lakatos.
5 Lakatos, "Falsification ..." fn. 3. p. 175.
6 Ibid., fii.2. p. 175.
1 Ibid.,
8 Lakatos, "History ..." fn. 36.
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as an essential ingredient in scientific progress. According to Lakatos, ad hoc} theories 
are the worst possible theories: they do not even qualify as scientific. This should imply 
that no instances of ad hoc} theories are positively evaluated. But, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, many of the developments in Galileo's argument are ad hoch for 
example, the principle of circular inertia, which Lakatos admits is ad hoc},
introduced no improvement since it did not forbid anything that had not 
been forbidden by the relevant theories he intended to improve upon (that 
is, by Aristotelian physics and by Copemican celestial kinematics). This 
theory was therefore ad-hoc and therefore- from the heuristic point of 
view- valueless.9
But, from an historical point of view, the principle o f circular inertia was highly valuable 
in that it enabled Galileo's theories to be taken more seriously by his Aristotelian 
opponents, thereby creating "a breathing space" 10 for the emerging Copemican world­
view. This idea of a 'breathing space' as a rationale for overlooking ad hoc1 stratagems in 
new research programmes is repeated a number of times by Lakatos. For example, 
Lakatos contends that "some of the most important research programmes in the history 
of science were grafted on to older programmes with which they were blatantly 
inconsistent" . * 11 These inconsistencies are "usually concealed by ad-hoc stratagems ... the 
only purpose of which is to hide the 'deficiency'" .12 But, these stratagems "are harmless 
as long as they are clearly seen as problems, not as solutions" ;13 but even more than that, 
"it may be rational to put the inconsistency into some temporary, ad-hoc quarantine, and 
carry on with the positive heuristic of the programme. " 14 This seems to suggest, contrary 
to some of Lakatos's statements, that there is no real 'deficiency' in ad hoc1 theories; 
hence the scare quotes above. Rather, there are times when the proposal o f ad hoc} 
theories is rational, and also necessary for the continued growth o f science. 15
9 Lakatos, "Falsification ..." p. 124.
10 Lakatos, "History ..." p. 25.
11 Lakatos, "Falsification ..." p. 142. Italicised in the original.
12 Ibid..
13 Ibid., fit. 3.
14 Ibid., p. 143. My italics. Cf. also Lakatos, "History ..." pp. 24-5. where the existence and tolerance of 
ad hoc stratagems is seen by Lakatos as an advantage of MSRP over Popper's methodology.
15 Here, I may mention that Lakatos's conception of ad hoc j  hypotheses, dependent as it is upon content 
increase and novelty, does not do justice to prima facie acceptable moves in science. For example, the
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As mentioned in footnote 4 above, Lakatos has presented two interpretations of 
ad hoc2  theories. A version of Lakatos's more radical interpretation has been 
championed by Ehe Zahar .16 Zahar contends that theories are "ad-hoc ? (at time t) if none 
of its excess content over its rivals has, at time t, been corroborated" .17 This does seem 
to be consistent with the passages from Lakatos I mentioned in fii. 4 above, and also 
brings with it an air of absurdity. If no-one had bothered to look, or thought of the 
possibility, that Einstein's General theory of Relativity could explain the previously 
anomalous precession in the perihelion of Mercury, then the General theory of Relativity 
would have been ad hoc2  until the observation of the eclipses of 1919. Or, alternatively, 
if the precession in the perihelion of Mercury had not been an anomalous phenomena for 
Newtonian mechanics, again, the General theory of Relativity would have been ad  hoc2 
until the eclipse observations! Consequently, because ad hocness is 'unfailingly 
pejorative', Einstein's General theory of Relativity was not good science. This seems to 
me to be an unacceptable conclusion: it seems irrational to label a theory unscientific at 
one point in time, but then to relabel the unchanged theory as eminently scientific at 
another. Apart from the fact that this does huge violence to our common-sense notions 
concerning ad hocness, the real problem concerns how Lakatos, given the conclusion 
above, can justify saying that ad hocness, in all o f its varieties, is 'unfailingly pejorative'.
Lakatos's more moderate criterion of ad hoc2 theories does not seem to carry 
these particular absurdities: ad  hoc2 theories are at least scientific. But even this 
conclusion creates problems, that is, in this situation, the dictum which proclaims, 'avoid 
ad hoc conventionalist stratagems', exhorts scientists to know in advance that some of 
the excess content of their theories will be corroborated, if they do not know that their 
theory will be corroborated, they are obliged to reject the theory, regardless o f the fact
latest theory, T, in a research programme, may be simpler than its predecessor, requiring fewer auxiliary 
hypotheses, while not possessing any excess content over its predecessor. Or, T may provide a physical 
interpretation for a previously uninterpreted mathematical formalism, again, without excess content. The 
point is that Lakatos's MSRP has nothing to say about these prima facie acceptable types of theories, 
except that they are unacceptable because they are ad hoc.
16 E. Zahar, "Why Did Einstein’s Programme Supersede Lorentz's?", in C. Howson, Method and 
Appraisal in the Physical Sciences, pp. 211-75.
17 Ibid, fii. 12. p. 216.
52
that the theory is, nevertheless, wholly scientific. This requirement seems to be unrealistic 
and, in many cases, unrealisable. If  taken seriously, it would rule out of consideration 
important scientific theories simply because they had not yet been tested.18
When we come to ad hoc3 theories, we find that the situation is very unclear. 
Recall that an ad hoc3 theory is one which does not form an integral part of the positive 
heuristic o f a research programme, or, as Zahar phrases it, a "theory is said to be ad-hoc3 
if it is obtained from its predecessor through a modification of the auxiliary hypotheses 
which does not accord with the spirit of the heuristic of the programme".19 Lakatos 
developed this idea so as to rule out theories which are
not ad-hoc in the senses which we had earlier discussed. ... [they] may 
predict novel facts some o f which may even be corroborated. Yet one may 
achieve such 'progress' with a patched up, arbitrary series of disconnected 
theories. Good scientists will not find such makeshift progress satisfactory, 
they may even reject it as not genuinely scientific 20
Consequently, theories which are not in the spirit o f the heuristic of the programme are
ad hoc3 and must be avoided. At first glance, this requirement seems quite reasonable,
however, upon reflection, and deeper reading, we find that Lakatos encourages the
proposal of ad hoc3 hypotheses. Lakatos contends that "it occasionally happens that
when a research programme gets into a degenerating phase, a little revolution or a
creative shift in its positive heuristic may push it forward again".21 But what is a 'creative
shift' in the heuristic of a programme, other than a shift occasioned by a proposal o f an
ad hoc3 hypothesis?221 think the answer is that ad hoc3 hypotheses can be the means in
18 With regard to this particular point, Popper seems to have a better grasp of our common-sense notions 
of ad hocness. For Popper, any theory which is falsifiable is good science; the fact that a theory receives 
no corroboration of its excess content does not impugn this fact. For example, Popper applauds the 
theory of Bohr, Kramers and Slater, which, even though it was refuted immediately, epitomised the 
spirit of scientific theorising. CR, pp. 242-3 Popper contends that "One might well say that it is merely 
an historical accident if a theory is refuted after six months rather than after six years, or six hundred 
years". Ibid., But according to Lakatos it makes a big difference: it transforms a second-class, ad hoc 
theory, into a successful and laudatory example of scientific theorising.
19 Zahar, "Why Did Einstein's p. 217.
20 Lakatos, "Falsification ...". p. 175.
21 Ibid., p. 137.
22 Cf. A. Musgrave, "Method or Madness?: Can the Methodology of Research Programmes be Rescued 
From Epistemological Anarchism?", in R S. Cohen, P.K. Feyerabend and M.W. Wartofsky (eds) Essays 
in Memory o f  Imre Lakatos, pp. 457-91. "Lakatos was led by Noretta Koertge to admit that 'creative 
shifts' were an anomaly for him, since any creative shift is ad-hoc $ in his sense ... He hoped to 
accommodate this meta-anomaly in a non-ad-hoc fashion" n. 21. p. 484.
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which degenerating programmes are revived; or the means by which new research 
programmes arise out of older programmes. For example, Lakatos contends that 
"Planck's original 'ad-hoc' formula ... could be explained progressively within the new 
quantum theoretical programme, while ... [it] could be explained within the classical 
programme ... at the price of a degenerating problemshift",23 that is, the rise of one of the 
most successful research programmes in scientific history was partly occasioned by the 
proposal of an ad hoc3 hypothesis. In general, we can conclude that the advice to avoid 
ad hoc hypotheses would have significantly impaired the development of science, and, 
what is worse, there does not seem to be any principled way in which Lakatos can 
delineate between good and bad ad hoc3 hypotheses.24
2.2.3 Theory Appraisal: Inter-Research Programme.
So much for rationality o f decisions made within particular research programmes. 
If we now turn to the question o f what the relationships are between different research 
programmes, the unclarity of Lakatos's MSRP is compounded. The idea of series of 
theories, or research programmes, was proposed by Lakatos to recover Popperian 
insights embarrassed by the fact that new research programmes are invariably bom 
refuted; and often exhibit a reduction in content compared to their established rival. As 
we saw above, Lakatos "regardfs] a theory in the series 'falsified' when it is superseded 
by a theory with higher corroborated content.".25 Falsification and subsequent rejection, 
instead o f constituting a universal must o f scientific procedure, becomes a notion with 
normative power only with respect to successive theories within a series of theories, or 
research programme. Collaterally, the requirement of content increase is reserved for the 
relationship between successive theories within a research programme. A new research
23 Lakatos, "Falsification ..." p. 167. Lakatos gives Planck's formula as a paradigm of an ad hoc3 
hypothesis. Ibid., fh. 3. p. 175.
24 Logically, Lakatos's taxonomy of ad hocness entails five different types of ad hocness, rather than the 
three mentioned. We have ad hocj and ad hoc2  as explained in the text above; ad hocj plus ad hoc3  , 
that is, a theory not in the spirit of the heuristic which has no excess content; ad hoc2  plus ad hoc3 , that 
is, a theory not in the spirit of the heuristic, but with excess content; and, what we might call pure ad 
hoc3 , that is, not in the spirit of the heuristic, but with corroborated excess content. Can this help 
Lakatos? Not at all.
25 Lakatos, "Falsification ..." p. 118.
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programme may exhibit dramatic loss of content, in comparison to its established rival, 
and may also face large amounts of unexplainable anomalies. But these considerations 
are irrelevant: all that matters is if the new research programme can be seen to be 
producing a progressive problemshift.
These manoeuvres seem to preserve Popper's ideals, while at the same time 
incorporating historical reality. Consequently, 'Rationahst' philosophy can preserve our 
basic value judgments concerning the rationality of science, utilising universal, a- 
temporal standards, to create a veridical rational reconstruction of the history of science. 
But this only seems to shift the problem from the evaluation and appraisal o f individual 
theories, to the evaluation and appraisal o f research programmes. Though the 
demarcation problem may be the same, the question o f the rational preferability of 
research programmes, and the question o f what advice can we give to scientists as to 
which research programme to pursue, now have to be answered anew.
At times Lakatos seemed to imply that the framework outlined above for the 
rational appraisal of theories within research programmes could be applied to the rational 
appraisal o f competing research programmes. For example, Lakatos contends that
I give criteria of progress and stagnation within a programme and also 
rules for the 'elimination' of whole research programmes ... If  a research 
programme progressively explains more than a rival, it 'supersedes' it, and 
the rival can be eliminated 26
But this hope was never realised: "One may rationally stick to a degenerating programme 
until it is overtaken by a rival and even after,"27 The reasons for this are summed up by 
Feyerabend very nicely:
Considering a research programme in an advanced state of degeneration 
one will feel the urge to abandon it, to replace it by a more progressive 
rival. This is an entirely legitimate move. But it is also legitimate to do the 
opposite and to retain the programme. For any attempt to demand its 
removal on the basis of a rule can be criticized by arguments almost 
identical with the arguments that led to the 'securing o f a breathing space' 
in the first place. (AM, p. 185)
26 Lakatos, "History..." p. 11. 
21 Ibid., p. 15.
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If a new 'budding' research programme is allowed a breathing space where inconsistent 
foundations, loss of content, apparent refutations and ad hoc stratagems, are all tolerated 
because o f future promise, heuristic fruitfulness, then an old programme, currently 
degenerating, should be allowed the same leeway to recover its future promise. After all, 
as Lakatos states, "programmes may get out o f degenerating troughs" .28
Feyerabend contends that if we allow a breathing space for every research 
programme, then the standards of rational appraisal are vacuous: they do not forbid any 
action whatsoever, they are mere "verbal ornaments" .29 On the other hand, if we impose 
some sort of time limit upon acceptable periods of degeneration, then we are left with 
two problems (i) Any specific demarcation line will be arbitrary: "if you are permitted to 
wait, why not wait a little longer? " 30 And (ii) It is probable that history won't oblige you 
with neat corroboration; for example, heliocentrism and atomism. Lakatos's response to 
this is to deny that methodology is in the business o f giving advice to scientists: "both 
Feyerabend and Kuhn conflate methodological appraisal o f a programme with firm 
heuristic advice about what to do" ,31 while, for Lakatos, "methodology is separated from 
heuristics, rather as value judgments are from 'ought' statements" .32
Lakatos is now on the slippery slope towards Feyerabend's reductio. The idea 
that methodology is separated from heuristics seems to contradict Lakatos's own 
methodology o f scientific research programmes. To say that new theories in a series of 
theories within a research programme are arrived at via the negative and positive 
heuristic of that research programme, and must exhibit content increase over its 
predecessor, is to provide a heuristic programme. Lakatos's 'methodology' is 'heuristics' 
through and through. How can we separate the appraisal o f theories from the acceptance 
or rejection o f those theories? Consider a scientist working on a new theory. The 
scientist goes through the process of formulating and refining that theory, presents the
28 Lakatos, "Falsification ..." p. 164.
29 Feyerabend, "Consolations for the Specialist", in Lakatos and Musgrave, (eds) Criticism and the 
Growth o f Knowledge, p. 215.
30 Ibid,
31 Lakatos, "History ..." pp. 15-16.
32 Ibid., fii. 2. p. 2.
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theory to his peers who reject it out of hand because it either does not follow from the 
research programme, does not exhibit content increase, or is ad hoc. If Lakatos's MSRP 
is a valid methodological guide for the appraisal of theories, then a scientist will consider 
the criteria of appraisal as a precondition of theory construction: the scientist will not 
expend energy on proposing theories which will be dead in the water. The criteria of 
appraisal are, or should be, the heuristic guides to theory construction.33 Just as the 
putative distinction between value statements and ought statements, which, admittedly, 
can be made, is simply a verbal distinction of no substantive content: who could deny 
that there are deep and profound connections between value statements and ought 
statements? So too the attempt to distinguish appraisal and advice amounts to no more 
than a verbal distinction. If something is rational to do, then there is heuristic force 
behind the do-ing of that action.
Lakatos makes his distinction between methodology and heuristics to save his 
theory from refutation. It is an obvious fact, as we saw above, of scientific history that 
Lakatos's criteria are often, fruitfully, transgressed. If Lakatos has presented his criteria 
as heuristic guides which must, or should, be followed to produce good science, then the 
counter-examples would have crushed his programme. Instead, Lakatos hedges his bets, 
preserving his theory in a purely ad hoc manner in order to save his philosophical 
programme. But if it is rational to stick to degenerating programmes, if it is rational to 
propose ad hoc theories, and no criterion can be given as to when these moves are 
irrational, then it is hard to see that there is any normativeness, of the 'Rationahst' variety, 
in rationality. One is forced to agree with Feyerabend that, for Lakatos, "Any choice of 
the scientist is rational, because it is compatible with ... [his] standards" (AM, p. 186) 
and that Lakatos abandons "permanent standards in fa c t though retaining them in 
words",34 That is, Lakatos's rhetoric is of 'Rationalism', while his actual position is one 
which is in fact anti-'Rationalistic'.35
33 Cf. Musgrave, "Method or Madness?", pp. 474-6.
34 Feyerabend, "Consolations ..." p. 216.
35 Cf. Feyerabend, AM, pp. 186-7.
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If Lakatos's point is that some actions are more rational than others, that 
rationality is not something categorical, but hypothetical and diverse, then that can be 
accepted.36 But in that case there should be no heuristic restriction upon adoption of any 
one of the range of actions which have some degree of rationality; this for two reasons:
(i) If it is rational to do something, then there is no reason to not do it. And (ii)
Judgments as to degree of rationality of various alternative actions may be awry. If 
everyone followed what was considered to be the most rational course o f action, then the 
possibilities inherent in the other courses o f action will not be followed. Consequently, 
fruitful lines o f research will be ignored, to the possible detriment o f the progress of 
knowledge.37
But this is not Lakatos's response to the conclusion that judgments of rationality 
have no heuristic force.
This does not mean as much licence as might appear for those who stick to 
a degenerating programme. For they can do this mostly in private. Editors 
of scientific journals should refuse to publish their papers which will, in 
general, contain either solemn reassertions o f their positions or absorption 
o f counterevidence by ad-hoc, linguistic adjustments Research
foundations, too, should refuse money.38
That is, in the absence of rational advice, science is determined by sociological power 
structures. And, it may be added, where does the justification o f the two 'shoulds' above 
come from? These 'shoulds' find no legitimation within Lakatos's philosophy. Lakatos 
goes on to say that "I do, o f course, not claim that such decisions [to refuse to publish; 
to withhold funds] are necessarily uncontroversial. In such decisions one has to use also
36 For a good discussion of categorical rationality, see R.N. Giere, 'The Cognitive Study of Science", in 
N. Nersessian (ed) The Process o f  Science: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding 
Scientific Practice, esp. pp. 143-4.
37 The solution implied here is one which Musgrave, following Kuhn, adopts. That is, if  we cannot give 
specific advice to individual scientists as to the research programme they should pursue, we can 
nevertheless give advice to the community of scientists: research programme R seems to be the most 
rationally pursuable alternative, therefore, most scientists should work on it. Research programme R', is 
degenerating, therefore, fewer scientists should work on it. See Musgrave, "Method or Madness?" pp. 
479-80.
38 Lakatos, "History ..." p. 16. My emphasis.
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one's commonsense" 39 Lakatos goes on to say that commonsense is actually informed by 
particular philosophical predispositions and he contends that
My [commonsense] judge directs the jury to agree on appraisals of 
progressive and degenerating research programmes ... although it is 
important to reach agreement on such verdicts, there must also be the 
possibility of appeal. In such appeals inarticulated commonsense is 
questioned, articulated and criticised 40
That is, if we are to appeal against the decision which places a degenerating research 
programme on the outer, we must use commonsense. But here 'commonsense' means 
decisions made in accordance with the criteria which produced the controversial decision 
in the first place. Commonsense is posited as something different than the criteria of 
MSRP, but for Lakatos, it is not. In any case, Lakatos actively countenances the 
shunning o f scientists working within degenerating research programmes: they can't get 
published, they can't get funding, they are effectively stifled. How then can they make 
themselves heard in a court o f appeal? Especially when 'commonsense' itself denies the 
validity o f their actions.
2.2.4 Fever abend's Reductio o f  MSRP.
We can see now that the position of Lakatos is looking increasingly desperate. Of 
the three questions we began this analysis with, which Lakatos wants to answer 
positively, we have found that his own proposals designed to ensure positive answers 
have, in fact, led to negative answers to the questions concerning advice and rationality. 
The positive answer to the demarcation question is also looking very shaky. But, as we 
will see, the incoherence o f Lakatos's MSRP has not yet been fully diagnosed.
Feyerabend asks us to entertain the idea of epistemological anarchism. In this he 
distinguishes epistemological anarchism from positions with which it may be confused.
Epistemological anarchism differs both from scepticism and from political 
(religious) anarchism. While the sceptic either regards every view as 
equally good, or as equally bad ... the epistemological anarchist has no 
compunction to defend the most trite, or the most outrageous statement.
39 Ibid, fa. 58. p. 16.
40 Ibid.,
59
While the political or the religious anarchist wants to remove a certain 
form of life, the epistemological anarchist may want to defend it, for he has 
no everlasting loyalty to, and no everlasting aversion against, any 
institution or any ideology. (AM, p. 189)41
Feyerabend distinguishes epistemological anarchism from both scepticism and
political/religious anarchism. This is an important point to keep in mind: many criticisms
of Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism have failed to appreciate that he distinguishes
epistemological anarchism from scepticism. For example, Musgrave contends that
epistemological anarchism is "the thesis that any theory or research programme is as
good as any other" 42 But this is the position Feyerabend labels scepticism, a position
Feyerabend unequivocally contrasts with epistemological anarchism. Though the
statement of Feyerabend's that "the epistemological anarchist has no compunction to
defend the most trite, or the most outrageous statement" may be considered to be
tantamount to scepticism, at this point we should take Feyerabend's words at face value
and suppose that he has further, cogent, reasons for distinguishing epistemological
anarchism from scepticism.43
Feyerabend goes on to say that
The one thing he [the epistemological anarchist] opposes positively and 
absolutely are universal standards, universal laws, [and] universal ideas ... 
though he does not deny that it is often good policy to act as if such laws 
(such standards, such ideas) existed, and as if he believed in them. (AM, p.
189).
Feyerabend then asks us to imagine an epistemological anarchist living at the time of the 
Copemican revolution:
41 This passage, and the ones surrounding it, can be used against Watkins and Gellner, who accuse 
Feyerabend of implicitly supporting political anarchism and violence. Feyerabend does indeed mention 
violence, but this is said in relation to political anarchism. Feyerabend is contrasting political 
anarchism and epistemological anarchism. Part of the contrast is that violence is not a part of 
epistemological anarchism. As the quote above implies, an epistemological anarchist does not want to 
remove or destroy anything; they may become useful at some future date. For Watkins assertions see his 
"Corroboration and the Problem of Content Comparison", in Ibid., pp. 339-78. esp. 339-44. For 
Feyerabend's vindicated outrage, see his "The Gong Show - Poppenan Style", in Ibid., pp. 387-92.
42 Musgrave "Evidential Support, Falsification, Heuristics, and Anarchism", in G. Radnitzky and G. 
Andersson (eds) Progress and Rationality in Science, p. 192.
43 Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism and the factors which distinguish it from scepticism are 
discussed further in Section 2.3 and Section 7.6.
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What will be his attitude? What moves will he recommend? What moves 
will he oppose? What will he say? What he will say depends on his 
interests, on the 'social laws', the social philosophy, the opinions 
concerning the contemporary scene he has decided to adopt fo r the time 
being. (AM, p. 191).
Through a series of hypothetical situations (AM, pp. 191-5) Feyerabend shows that an 
epistemological anarchist could adopt any position whatsoever, depending upon the 
personal predilections of the hypothetical anarchist. This conclusion seems to be correct: 
the way in which Feyerabend has constructed epistemological anarchism entails that no 
outward signs, no specific behaviour or thoughts, can distinguish an epistemological 
anarchist from a nationalist'.
Feyerabend then asks whether activity governed by Lakatos's standards can be 
distinguished from the "intellectual freelancing of the anarchist". (AM, p. 196) The 
answer is that there is so much leeway built into Lakatos's standards, as a consequence of 
which, they can not distinguish the activities of an anarchist from a nationalist'. This is 
not a happy conclusion for Lakatos. It leaves open the possibility that the entire history 
of science could be a chronicle of the actions of opportunistic epistemological anarchists, 
which somehow, nevertheless, through some sort of cunning of reason and history, led to 
rational results. This possibility goes against Lakatos's entire programme: Lakatos wants 
to write internal, rational, world3 history; thereby excluding to a minimum the amount of 
external, non-rational, world2 history necessary to complement the internal account.44 
But the possibility of an anarchist history makes the progress and process of science 
wholly dependent upon psycho-social, worlc^ entities.
This conclusion is further enhanced when we consider the fact that we don't need 
the hypothetical assumption of an anarchistic history of science to show that Lakatos's 
MSRP, far from showing science to be 'internal', inevitably leads us to 'external' 
explanations of the history of science. If all moves in science are, to some extent, 
rational, then the decisive factors which lead to cessation of work on a particular 
research programme, and the beginning of work on another, different research
44 This is the rationale behind Lakatos's "History..." article, and his historiographical research 
programme.
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programme, are necessarily external. Otherwise, research programmes would never be 
abandoned. The MSRP is ambiguous enough such that any move can be justified 
according to its standards. As Feyerabend contends, we can either adopt a conservative 
attitude to the standards, where the simple fact that a research programme is 
degenerating is reason enough to abandon it, or we can adopt a liberal attitude towards 
the standards, where the fact of degeneration has no effect upon the acceptance or 
rejection of a research programme. (AM, pp. 196-200) The standards themselves are not 
the prime consideration here: the standards are but vehicles through which particular, 
conservative or liberal, psycho-social predilections are justified.
It follows that the fight between the conservatives and the liberals and the 
final victory of the conservatives is not a 'rational change' but a 'power 
struggle' pure and simple, full of'sordid personal controversy'. It is a topic 
not for methodology, or for the theory of rationality, but for 'mob 
psychology'. (AM, p. 199)
I don't see how Lakatos can avoid these conclusions, especially considering that Lakatos 
explicitly adopted a conservative attitude himself. Lakatos's support for the idea that 
journals should refuse to publish, and foundations refuse to fund, degenerating research 
programmes, cannot be interpreted in any way other than a personal preference for a 
conservative attitude towards his own standards.45
Lakatos contends that "progress in the theory of scientific rationality is marked 
by discoveries of novel historical facts, by the reconstruction o f a growing bulk o f value- 
impregnated history as rational [internal]",46 that is, the more history a particular 
methodology can rescue and explicate as rational (internal), the better the methodology. 
Thus, whereas other methodologies: falsificationist, inductivist, conventionalist, have to 
bring in external, non-rational explanations where their methodologies cannot explicate 
particular scientific episodes as rational, the MSRP is better in that it can reconstruct
45 In this respect, it is interesting to consider the contention of M. Grene that Lakatos reached his 
conclusions concerning his methodology of research programmes because "science depends on public or 
industrial support; so we have to develop a conceptual apparatus that will show which research 
programme is likely to pay o f f  M. Grene, "Imre Lakatos: Some Recollections", in Cohen, et al, Essays 
in Memory o f Imre Lakatos, p. 210. In other words, Lakatos was concerned with science policy, not with 
rationality or methodology.
46 Lakatos, "History ..." p. 32. Italicised in the original.
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those same episodes without introducing additional external explanations. But, in the 
light o f what has been discussed above, this is not a very surprising or profound 
achievement: if any move a scientist makes can be explicated as rational, then all of 
science becomes internal. Where others see TMewton-worship' in relation to the 
prolonged acceptance of the corpuscular theory of light, research programmists see 
rational adherence, despite the success of the wave programme, to an intermittently 
progressive research programme.47 The details of particular cases are neither here nor 
there; the general point to be made is that it is hard to conceive of a situation which 
could not be explicated internally by MSRP. I think it is significant that in all of Lakatos's 
own case studies, and that o f his followers, the admission of external factors is non­
existent.48 Where Lakatos would admit external explanations are in the case of extremely 
wild situations:
Let us imagine ... that in spite of the objectively progressing astronomical 
research programmes, the astronomers are suddenly all gripped by a 
feeling of Kuhnian 'crisis'; and then they are all converted, by an irresistible 
Gestalt-switch, to astrology. I would regard this catastrophe as a 
horrifying problem , to be accounted for by some empirical externalist 
explanation.49
But even here, what justification, in terms of Lakatos's standards, can be given for 
Lakatos's horror? If astrology received new impetus such that it became progressive, 
then there is no valid, Lakatosian, justification for the horror evinced.
In fact, as a testament to the outright external character of MSRP, and its absurd 
internal incoherence, Lakatos claims that the sophisticated falsificationist
sees nothing wrong with a group of brilliant scientists conspiring to pack 
everything they can into their favourite research programme ... with a 
sacred hard core. As long as their genius - and luck - enables them to 
expand their programme 'progressively', while sticking to its hard core, 
they are allowed to do it. And if a genius comes determined to replace 
('progressively') a most uncontested and corroborated theory which he 
happens to dislike on philosophical, aesthetic or personal grounds, good
47 Cf. J. Worrall, 'Thomas Young and the 'Refutation' of Newtonian Optics: A Case Study in the 
Interaction of Philosophy of Science and History of Science", in Howson, Method and Appraisal in the 
Physical Sciences, pp. 107-79.
48 See Howson, Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences.
49 Lakatos, "History ... " p. 34.
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luck to him. If two teams, pursuing rival research programmes, compete, 
the one with more creative talent is likely to succeed ... The direction of 
science is determined primarily by human creative imagination and not by 
the universe of facts which surround us. Creative imagination is likely to 
find corroborating novel evidence even for the most 'absurd' programme, if 
the search has sufficient drive ... Scientists dream up phantasies and then 
pursue a highly selective hunt for new facts which fit these phantasies ... A 
brilliant school of scholars (backed by a rich society to finance a few well- 
planned tests) might succeed in pushing any fantastic programme ahead, 
or, alternatively, if so inclined, in overthrowing any arbitrarily chosen pillar 
of 'established knowledge'50
But scientists are not allowed to pursue the 'fantastic' programme of astrology on pain of 
being externally explained? According to the passage above, with enough creative 
imagination and money, astrology could overthrow the established astronomical order. 
But the passage is important in another respect: the rational pursuability o f any research 
programme is dependent upon the creativeness and imagination of individual scientists. 
To determine the rational acceptability of any particular research programme, we don't 
have to examine the substantive theories proposed in rival programmes, all we need do is 
conduct psychological studies to ascertain the respective creativeness and 
imaginativeness of the scientists involved. The objective merits o f a research programme 
is not an issue: creative scientists make whatever they work on progressive. Therefore, 
nothing can objectively entice a scientist to work on a specific research programme, 
however, money, funding and prestige can.
2.2.5 Content Increase and the Circularity o f  MSRP.
Feyerabend makes one further criticism of Lakatos: the idea of content increase 
and its associated concept o f novelty is arrived at in a circular manner, and is therefore in 
need of deeper justification than that which is offered by Lakatos.51 This criticism is 
offered in two parts, (i) Lakatos's standards are circular, in that he derives them from the 
very same scientific episodes from which he seeks corroboration. And (ii) no independent 
justification is given for these standards.
50 Lakatos, "Falsification ..." pp. 187-8 .1 quoted this passage at length for its sheer audacity, and for its 
all too obvious contradiction of so many of Lakatos's other passages.
51 Cf. AM, pp. 201-8. and Feyerabend, "In Defence of Aristotle: Comments on the Condition of 
Content Increase", in G. Radnitzky and G. Andersson, (eds) Progress and Rationality in Science.
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Firstly, the circularity arises when we consider the fact that Lakatos wants to 
provide a system which can explain the success and rationality of science. But the 
standards which Lakatos proposes are said to be taken from the history o f science: 
Lakatos accepts the "basic value judgments" 52 o f scientists as to what has been great 
science. He then contends that his MSRP is able to give a rational account of those 
episodes in science from which his system was created. If  we ask the question, 'What's so 
great about science?' The answer is that it follows the rational standards o f MSRP. If we 
then ask, 'What's so great about these standards?' The answer is, scientists follow them .53 
It is Feyerabend's contention that Lakatos gives no independent arguments for the 
validity or preferability of his standards.
When basic value judgments not addressed by Lakatos are brought up, which are 
difficult for Lakatos to explain, for example, the basic value judgment that Darwin's 
theory of evolution was a great scientific step forward, we are given replies that impugn 
the rationality of the scientists involved. Darwinian evolution, as promulgated by Darwin, 
had no specific predictive power: there were no testable consequences. The vast 
geological time-scales which Darwin evoked as necessary for the process of evolution, 
and which therefore constituted part of the hard-core of Darwinian evolution, effectively 
ruled out any detailed predictions. Therefore, according to Lakatos, Darwinian evolution 
was ad hocj. Not only that, but the huge number of anomalies, for example, gaps in the 
fossil record, while not in themselves indicting evolution as pseudo-scientific, can be seen 
as a major problem for Darwin's doctrine o f evolution by selection of small effects: 
'saltationists' and Lamarckians could more easily, with more faithfulness to the empirical 
data, explain the gaps in the fossil record. The resources o f Darwinian theory to deal 
with these, and other, problems, was greatly curtailed in that they were only explicable, 
according to Darwinian selectionist criteria, in terms of a very weak heuristic.
52 Lakatos, "History ..." p. 31.
53 Cf. N. Koertge, "Rational Reconstructions" in Cohen, et al, Essays in Memory o f Imre Lakatos esp. 
pp. 363-4. where Koertge indicts Lakatos for preselecting the historical episodes which are intended to 
be the tests of historiographical theories (reconstructions), that is, Lakatos selects those episodes which 
can best be explicated via his account.
65
The weak heuristic, according to Lakatosian conceptions, of the original 
Darwinian program is very striking, for two reasons. Firstly, the most fundamental hard­
core assumption of Darwinian evolution is the idea of natural selection. But the 
mechanics of inheritance and variation, which underscored the idea of natural selection, 
were completely unknown at the time. The maxim that 'like begets like' passed as 
knowledge concerning inheritance; as Darwin stated,
The laws governing inheritance are quite unknown, no one can say why 
the same peculiarity in different individuals of the same species, and in 
individuals of different species, is sometimes inherited and sometimes not 
so; why the child often reverts in certain characters to its grandfather or 
grandmother or other more remote ancestor; why a peculiarity is often 
transmitted from one sex to both sexes, or to one sex alone, more 
commonly but not exclusively to the like sex .54
When we come to the mechanics of variation there is again general lack o f knowledge.
Darwin states that "I have ... spoken as if the variations ... had been due to chance. This,
of course, is a wholly incorrect expression, but it serves to acknowledge plainly our
ignorance of the cause of each particular variation. ' '55 he then goes on to conjecture that
"the reproductive system is eminently susceptible to changes in the conditions of life, and
to this system being functionally disturbed in the parents, I chiefly attribute the varying or
plastic condition of the offspring." 56 Thus, two central assumptions crucial to the idea of
natural selection were left as virtual black-boxes. Possible avenues of development are
left wide open and no specific testable predictions are given.
Secondly, and more importantly, "Darwin did not repudiate explanations o f the 
Lamarckian kind altogether, as is sometimes assumed, and there are numerous references 
to the effects of use and disuse, and the inheritance of acquired characteristics in The 
Origin, " 57 That is, even though Darwin promulgated the idea that natural selection can 
account for speciation and variation, from the very beginning he softened his thesis by
54 C. Darwin, The Origin o f Species by Natural Selection or The Preservation o f Favoured Races in the 
Struggle for Life, J. W. Burrow (ed) p. 76.
55 Ibid., p. 173.
56 Ibid,
57 J. Burrow, "Editor's Introduction" in The Origin o f Species, p. 37. For a representative passage from 
Darwin, see the section entitled "Effects of Use and Disuse" pp. 175-9.
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admitting the possibility of limited Lamarckian explanations. This maneuver substantially 
lowers the falsifiability of Darwinian evolution by introducing the possibility of ad hoc 
stratagems: if some new evidence is put forth which seems to impugn natural selection, 
Darwin can turn around and explain away the anomalous evidence by invoking 
Lamarkian explanations.
In fact, this possible use of Lamarkian considerations to offset problems became 
actual. Two problems necessitated this eventuation. Firstly, "a physicist, the future Lord 
K elvin,... proposed to reduce the estimated age o f the earth ... to a hundred million years 
or less. This estimate was profoundly damaging to Darwin's supposition of the slow 
accumulation of chance variations" .58 That is, natural selection required a far longer span 
of time to account for evolution. Secondly, the mechanics o f variation was beset with 
problems: "The current theory was that the characters of each parent were 'blended' in 
the offspring ... in that case the chances that important variations would be transmitted, 
and not blended away, were minute" .59 Consequently, Darwin "in later editions of The 
Origin began to lay more stress than he had done at first on the direct influence of the 
environment, and on the inheritance of acquired characteristics, as Lamarck had done. "60
In summary, we can see that the comprehensive character of evolutionary theory,
its 'metaphysicalness', would seem to suggest that, in Darwin's formulation, no
conceivable evidence could contradict it. Additionally, as evidenced by Darwin's
weakenings, the positive heuristic was not followed consistently. Consequently, the
theory o f evolution constituted an exceedingly degenerating research programme.
However, contrary to Lakatos, evolutionary theory survived throughout its putative
degeneration.61 M. Grene gives an anecdotal account where she asked Lakatos about
58 J. Burrow, "Editor's Introduction", p. 46.
59Ibid., p. 47.
60 Ibid., Burrows explains that the first edition of the book is published, even though Darwin brought out 
six editions in his lifetime, because of the subsequent editions' concessions to Lamarckian evolution. See 
the "Note on This Edition" p. 49. For a general discussion of the difficulties outlined above, see M.
Ruse, The Darwinian Revolution, ch. 8. and P.J. Bowler, Evolution: The History o f an Idea, ch.7.
61 Lakatosians may nevertheless feel encouraged by the fact that the Darwinian natural selection 
explication of evolution was on shaky ground in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, being 
challenged by neo-Lamarckian, orthogenetic and Mendelian explications of evolution. But this situation 
was the result of Neo-Darwinians pushing for the exclusive acceptance of natural selection as the 
mechanism of evolution; something Darwin himself never promulgated. Ironically, for Lakatos, when
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Darwin, Lakatos's reply, "I have a student whose dissertation will show that Darwin was 
a lousy scientist" 62 This can be construed as further evidence that Lakatos wants his 
standards to be interpreted conservatively: he wants them to have a 'Rationahst' 
character. But this creates a dilemma for Lakatos: if we interpret his standards 
conservatively, then Darwin is labelled as irrational and Darwinian evolution should have 
been abandoned. But this creates a major counter-example to his own project of 
capturing the basic value judgments of scientists, and thus a major counter-example to 
his historiographical research program. On the other hand, if we interpret Lakatos's 
standards liberally, then Darwin and his followers were rational because research 
programs can get out of degenerating troughs. But this too creates problems for 
Lakatos: it seems to rob Lakatos's MSRP of any 'Rationalist', universalistic bite.
If we turn now to point (ii), Feyerabend argues that the standards o f MSRP, for 
example, that of content increase and the essential role novelty plays in it, are not given 
independent justification. Feyerabend contends that if we look at the Aristotelian world­
view, we find that the idea of content increase and novelty have no role in that system .63 
Much of Aristotle's thought is built around the ideas that the material world is finite and 
continuous. These two deep cosmological-metaphysical assumptions structure the entire 
Aristotelian world-view. Within this world-view, which is backed by good philosophical 
and empirical arguments, it follows that content increase and novelty have no place: the 
basic value judgments of Aristotelianism are antithetical to such notions. Consequently, it 
is no use, Feyerabend claims, in saying that Aristotelianism is therefore unacceptable: the 
acceptability or unacceptability of content increase is the issue under discussion.
why is the Aristotelian procedure unacceptable? The only legitimate reason
that might be given at this stage of the argument would be a difficulty for
Aristotelianism that is independent of its being a 'degenerate research
Darwinians remained within the mildly immunised structure, with its correspondingly weak heuristic, 
set out by Darwin, Darwinism survived. However, once natural selection was set up without any 
Lamarckian fail-back positions, it ran the risk of dropping out of science altogether. For a discussion of 
these points see P. J. Bowler, The Eclipse o f Darwinism: Anti-Darwinian Evolution Theories in the 
Decades Around 1900, and his Evolution, ch. 9.
62 M. Grene, "Imre Lakatos ..." p. 211.
63 See Feyerabend, "In Defence of Aristotle", pp. 144-54. For his analysis of Aristotelianism.
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programme'. We certainly do not want to take content increase for 
granted, we want to argue for it and against its opponents.64
If we look at the reasoning behind the adoption of content increase in science, we find
that
the idea that nature is infinitely rich both qualitatively ... and quantitatively 
leads to the desire to make new discoveries and thus to the principle of 
content increase which gives another standard to judge theories by: 
theories that have excess content over what is already known are 
preferable over theories that have not.65
That is, underlying the standards o f science are two deep cosmological-metaphysical 
principles: the world is infinite and discontinuous. Given these assumptions, given these 
basic value judgments, content increase and novel predictions for successive theories are 
then natural extrapolations. So the question remains, whose set of basic value judgments 
are preferable?
the restless change of modem science that announces itself with Galileo, 
its loose use of concepts, its refusal to accept customary norms, its 
'unempirical' procedures violated the professional ideology of the 
Aristotelians and was an example of incipient degeneration fo r them. In 
forming this judgement the Aristotelians made use of their general 
philosophy, their desiderata ... and of the basic value judgements of their 
science. (AM, p. 207.)
Consequently, anyone, like Lakatos, who bases their principles of rationality upon 
accepted basic value judgments, is ultimately engaged in a process of question-begging. 
Unless further arguments can be developed, not reliant upon the value judgments in 
question, then the position is defended in a circular manner, and is correspondingly 
weaker for that very reason.
The point of this discussion is to see that Feyerabend contends that, in analysing 
science and rationality, we must see the values o f science as arising out o f deep 
cosmological-metaphysical world-views. Arguments concerning rationality must be 
traced back to this deepest level, if they are not, arguments appear dismissive and reliant 
upon power.66
64Ibid., p. 153.
65 Ibid., d . 164.
66 This idea will be explored further in chapter 7. It must be remembered that Feyerabend is not 
claiming that Aristotelianism has never been adequately addressed by the proponents of modem science,
69
2.3 Conclusion.
Feyerabend contends that Lakatos's MSRP is internally incoherent, in that the 
objectives which Lakatos was trying to fulfil: demarcation, internal rationality, and 
heuristic advice, by the adoption of his standards, were not able to be achieved. In fact, 
the standards meant to fulfil the objectives were the reason and cause of those objectives 
not being met. In this sense, we can say that Lakatos's MSRP, according to is own 
standards, constitutes a degenerating research programme.67 In this situation, I think we 
can see that Feyerabend's 'anarchism' forms part of his reductio ad absurdum of 
'Rationalist' philosophies, in particular, Lakatos's 'Rationalist' philosophy: 'Rationalists' 
contend that without 'Rationalist' theses to guide us, all that is left is anarchism. The 
question still remains, however, does Feyerabend welcome such a conclusion? That is, is 
Feyerabend's anarchism really anarchism, in the usual sense o f the word?
Firstly, we only have to look at appendix 3 of AM (pp. 215-20) to see that 
Feyerabend's anarchism does not imply chaos and complete disorder. Here Feyerabend 
states that "Science needs people who are adaptable and inventive, not rigid imitators of 
'established' behavioural patterns." (AM, p. 215) He then goes on to say that this is what 
he means by 'Anything goes', that is, that is what he means by anarchism. Well, that isn’t 
really anything goes: being adaptable and inventive is consistent with an ordered life-style 
and thought. That anything goes is not Feyerabend's own philosophy can be easily seen 
when he then goes on to discuss 'intellectual pollution':
Illiterate and incompetent books flood the market, empty verbiage full of 
strange and esoteric terms claims to express profound insights, 'experts' 
without brains, without character, and without even a modicum of 
intellectual, stylistic, emotional temperament tell us about our 'condition' 
and the means for improving it. (AM, p. 219)
or that the modem scientific world-view cannot marshal formidable arguments against Aristotle. What 
is claimed is that Lakatos, and other 'Rationalists', do not produce these arguments.
67 Cf. M. Pera, "Methodological Sophisticationism: A Degenerating Project ", in K. Gavroglu, Y. 
Goudaroulis and P. Nicolacopoulos (eds) Imre Lakatos and Theories o f  Scientific Change, pp. 169-87.
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It is not anything goes, it is simply a freeing of intellectual standards, not in the sense of 
allowing sloppy or inane viewpoints accessible to everyone, but in the sense of allowing 
alternate standards the leeway to develop their point, thus Feyerabend states that
the change of perspective [in a liberal education] makes it clear that there 
are many ways of ordering the world that surrounds us, that the hated 
constraints of one set of standards may be broken by freely accepting 
standards of a different kind, and that there is no need to reject all order 
and to allow oneself to be reduced to a whining stream of 
consciousness.(AM, p. 218)
We cannot reject all order, that is not the hoped for outcome of a Feyerabendian 
anarchist, what is hoped for is a provisional understanding of our knowledge, so that if 
we are wrong, which we most likely are, then the transcendence of our current accepted 
knowledge will be much more able to be effected.
More than this, Feyerabend contends that the concept of rationality was taken 
over by 'Rationalists'. Consequently,
A society that is based on a set of well-defined and restrictive rules so that 
being a man becomes synonymous with obeying these rules, forces the 
dissenter into a no-man 's-land o f no rules at all and thus robs him o f his 
reason and his humanity (AM, p. 218)
This implies that Feyerabend believes that we do have reason and we do have humanity, 
even if we do not follow any strict code o f first-order accepted rules.68 Feyerabend then 
goes on to say that "It is a paradox of modem irrationalism that its proponents silently 
identify rationalism with order and articulate speech and thus see themselves forced to 
promote stammering and absurdity" (AM, p. 218) And in Farewell to Reason, he states 
that "Rationalism did not introduce order and wisdom where before there was chaos and 
ignorance, it introduced a special kind of order, established by special procedures and 
different from the order and the procedures of historical traditions". (FTR, p. 118.) 
Feyerabend wants to wrest rationality back from the clutches of the 'Rationalists' and 
their conception o f order and invest it with a broader vision o f order and a more humane,
68 I say first-order rules, because a system which contends that rationality consists in choosing among an 
open-ended set of rules according to the peculiarities and context of the situation requiring rational 
decision, can be formulated as a strict meta-rule.
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less mechanical, vision which it has always had, but which has been covered up and 
obscured 69
Secondly, it should be said that Feyerabend's criticisms o f Lakatos outlined in the 
previous sections can and should be balanced by more positive assessments of Lakatos's 
philosophy. Joseph Margolis has contended that Lakatos presented a methodology and 
meta-methodology which was intended to fulfil the need for a new conception of 
rationality: one which doesn't fall to Feyerabend's criticisms of'Rationalism'.70 This may 
have been the case, but Lakatos still clung to vestiges o f 'Rationalism', as evidenced by 
Lakatos's reliance upon content increase for succeeding theories in a research 
programme. As we saw, this was the major defect, in Feyerabend's eyes, of Lakatos's 
system. But many of the other ideas of Lakatos Feyerabend welcomed whole-heartedly.
Feyerabend contends that the only difference between himself and Lakatos is one 
of rhetorics (AM, p. 187): Lakatos's rhetorics are those o f the 'Rationalist', whereas 
Feyerabend's rhetorics are those of the anarchist, the underlying theoretical viewpoints 
are the same. Thus Feyerabend applauds Lakatos for he sees "the methodology of 
research programmes [as] providing] standards that aid the scientist in evaluating the 
historical situation in which he makes his decisions; it does not contain rules that tell him 
what to do" (AM, p. 186). The point and focus o f Feyerabend's own philosophy has been 
to show that science is not run according to strict methodological rules, but that it is an 
idiosyncratic historical process which only allows us to formulate provisional standards 
which are taken as no more than rules-of-thumb: "my 'anarchism' does not eliminate
69 Well, this was the case when he wrote AM, he now seems to have given up any hope of rescuing the 
words reason and rational and rationality from the clutches of the authoritarians, he contends that they 
have become too contaminated with absolutistic and universalistic connotations to be now of any use.
See FTR, p. 13 .1 don't believe that they have become contaminated beyond hope of rescue; enough 
people are trying to reconceptualize them so that there can be a general reappraisal. At any rate, we 
don't have the alternative words with which to express what we mean and neologisms will not strike a 
receptive chord.
70 J. Margolis, "Scientific Methods and Feyerabend's Advocacy of Anarchism", in Munevar (ed) Beyond 
Reason, pp. 465-86. It is quite ironic in an article on Feyerabend, that Margolis, in an addendum to his 
original article, points out that the demand for content increase in Lakatos's theory was a left over from 
the classical conception of rationality, and attributes the criticism of content increase to Laudan and 
Grunbaum!
methodologies, but merely reforms them: instead of'principles', 'presuppositions', 
'necessary conditions of being scientific' we have rules of thumb" .71
The rules-of -thumb, standards view of science leads Feyerabend to contend that 
"Reason as defined by Lakatos does not directly guide the actions of the scientist. Given 
this reason and nothing else, 'anything goes'" (AM, p. 186) So, anything-goes anarchism 
means not being directly guided by rules: not having your actions dictated to. Once we 
get beyond the impression created by Feyerabend's rhetoric of anarchism, we can start to 
see that what Feyerabend is proposing is not something totally destructive and negative. 
Reasoning, for Feyerabend, is something done within a context; consequently, in 
identifying a context, it may be apparent that there was only a limited number of rational 
options available to the people within that context. It may even be the case that when we 
look at the rational options available, some abstract, general rule may seem to be at 
work. But that is only an illusion, in a different context, one of the rational options may 
be to abandon, say, for example, the law of excluded middle. But these results cannot 
then be generalised: the option in Quantum Mechanics associated with abandoning the 
law of excluded middle is an option specifically connected to the problem situation in 
Quantum physics. We can see that Lakatos's philosophy is also, at its heart, and in its 
effect, a contextual philosophy; in that respect it is supported by Feyerabend. What 
Feyerabend objects to in Lakatos is Lakatos's 'lack of honesty' regarding this ultimate 
contextual nature o f judgments of rationality. That Feyerabend never supported 
anarchism, in the usual sense o f the word, can be further evidenced by the fact that 
Feyerabend states that "Having concluded my essay, I shall... join Lakatos rather than 
continuing to beat the drum of explicit anarchism." (AM, p.214.) That is, Feyerabend's 
'anarchism' was always meant to be understood in terms of his reductio, not as a 
confession of belief.72
71 Feyerabend, "Concluding Unphilosophical Conversation", in Munevar (ed) Beyond Reason, p. 503.
72 In relation to the last quote, it is interesting to note that chapter 16 of the first edition of AM, the 
chapter critical of Lakatos, has been edited out of the third edition of AM. Is this an indication that 
Feyerabend came to feel that the criticism of Lakatos was no longer necessary, in that many of the 
changes in the intellectual atmosphere, wished for by Feyerabend, had been effected, and that defense of 
explicit anarchism was therefore no longer necessary?
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Thus it can be contended that Feyerabend has no absolute objection to 
'Rationalist' philosophies; rather, what Feyerabend objects to is the attempt to apply 
'Rationalist' philosophies absolutely. Feyerabend believes that there should be a balance 
between generalised 'Rationalist' principles and a contextualised, 'anarchic',
'opportunistic' response to the idiosyncrasies of context. 'Rationalism', says Feyerabend, 
"like cars, airplanes, nuclear reactors ... has side effects which may make it necessary to 
regulate its use",73 'Rationalism' is not inherently bad: 'Rationalistic' principles can be 
applied and do have a place, but they need to be regulated and assessed as to their 
applicability to the individual circumstances in which rational decisions must be made. If 
we look at Feyerabend in this manner, the apparent extremity of some of his viewpoints 
can be seen as a heavy dose of a medicinal draught administered to an ailing patient.
I do not say that epistemology should become anarchic, or that the 
philosophy of science should become anarchic. I say that both disciplines 
should receive anarchism as a medicine. Epistemology is sick, it must be 
cured, and the medicine is anarchy. Now medicine is not something one 
takes all the time. One takes it for a certain period of time, and then one 
stops ... Anarchism, I say, will heal epistemology and then we may return 
to a more enlightened and more liberal form of rationality. (SFS, p. 127.)
Radiation therapy administered to a healthy person can make them ill, but given to a
person with cancer it may make them w ell74
Consequently, Feyerabend considers his espousal o f anarchism as a dialectical
move within the either/or dichotomy of "law-and-order methodologies and anarchism in
science" (AM, p. 171). Feyerabend uses the dichotomy within the context o f his
reductio; once we have ventured past his reductio, we can transcend the dichotomy and
the assumptions which underlie it. That is, the law-and-order/ anarchism dichotomy is a
dichotomy adhered to by 'Rationalists': if events or thoughts do not conform to the laws
and principles of a 'Rationalistic' philosophy, then they are lawless, and therefore
anarchistic. Consider this quote:
73 "Concluding Unphilosophical Conversation", p. 498.
74 Whether or not philosophy was, in fact, in need of the medicine is a completely different question. I 
tend to side with Feyerabend on this. But whatever you say about the particular diagnosis in this case, 
the general strategy seems defensible.
The difference between science and methodology which is such an obvious 
fact of history ... indicates a weakness of the latter, and perhaps of the 
'laws of reason' as well. For what appears as 'sloppiness', 'chaos' or 
'opportunism' when compared with such laws has a most important 
function in the development of those very theories which we today regard 
as essential parts of our knowledge of nature. (AM, p. 179)
Notice that it is only what appears sloppy, chaotic or opportunistic, in comparison with
the putative laws o f  reason. It is not that they are sloppy, chaotic or opportunistic in any
absolute sense: "there is rigour in all these prima facie chaotic procedures ... but it is a
rigour that fits the situation, is complex, changes and differs greatly from the 'objective'
rigour of our less gifted logicians and epistemologists" (FTR, p. 10.) For Feyerabend, to
say that something is anarchistic is simply to say that it doesn’t conform to any proposed
universal laws of reason. Notice also that Feyerabend does not reject methodology, he
only says that there is a weakness in any methodology which labels significant episodes in
the history of science as anarchistic. This implies that methodology, far from being
rejected, is seen as in need of reconceptualisation so that the significant episodes in the
history of science, and significant procedures which were used in those episodes, which
currently escape rational explication, will be able to be brought into the sphere of rational
discussion. We can then produce theories o f rationality which would be far more
sensitive to the demands o f contextual and situational vagaries.
I think we can conclude that the 'anything goes' slogan and the apparent 
anarchism of Feyerabend's philosophy is not a description of his substantive position. 
These terms and ideas follow from the fact that Feyerabend is conducting a reductio. 
"'anything goes' is definitely not Feyerabend’s motto. It is only a description of how a 
despairing rationalist sees the situation once the nature of science has been examined 
closely".75 I f  you are looking for universal, necessary, a-temporal, rational standards, and 
it is only standards of this sort which are deemed adequate, then the only standard of this 
sort which can be consistently defended is 'anything goes'. It is interesting to see 
philosophers who have noticed and appreciated Feyerabend’s reductio, but who have not 
seen his anarchism as part of this reductio; thus Hooker comments that "as far as I can
75 G. Munevar, "Introduction", in Munevar (ed) Beyond Reason, p. xvi.
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see, he [Feyerabend] leaps from a critique of the formalist theory of reason directly into 
his anarchism" 76 Well, I would want to say that Feyerabend's 'anarchism', when put into 
the context of his reductio, is not really an anarchism at all.77
7  ^Hooker, "Between Formalism and Anarchism" p. 90.
77 These somewhat sketchy remarks as to the positive nature of Feyerabend's 'anarchism' will be 
expanded and clarified in further chapters.
3 Feyerabend’s Incommensurability and the Pragmatic Theory of
Observation.
3.1 Introduction
In the first two chapters I have been arguing that Feyerabend is not an 
irrationalist: Feyerabend can be seen as arguing against a particular conception of 
rationality, not against the very idea of rationality itself There are three reasons why this 
interpretation of Feyerabend has not been fully appreciated. Firstly, Feyerabend's 
rhetorical, provocative and polemical style of writing has sometimes made it difficult to 
separate the substantive positions which Feyerabend defends from the blatant 
provocations which we sometimes find him uttering. Consequently, quick readings can 
produce misunderstandings. Secondly, it has often been asserted that Feyerabend's 
theories are inherently radically relativistic, and that this radical relativism precludes any 
systematic account of rationality. Thirdly, Feyerabend's thesis o f incommensurability is 
said to make rational choice between competing theories impossible. The first point will 
be dealt with throughout this thesis. I will examine the second point in the next chapter. 
In this chapter I will show that the third point concerning the putative irrationality 
following from the admission of incommensurable theories does not, in fact, follow. 
Feyerabend would want to say that theories are, in fact, commensurable, in certain ways, 
and that changes of theory are rationally motivated. However, a 'Rationalist' account of 
theory comparison and inter-theory relations leaves certain types of theories 
incommensurable. If no other principles of rationality are countenanced other than the 
'Rationalist' ones, then Feyerabend's conclusion is that the 'Rationalist' account of 
rationality leaves some types of theory change without the possibility of rational 
explication.
In this chapter I want to do three things. Firstly, I want to give an account, taken 
exclusively from Feyerabend's writings, of Feyerabend's notion o f incommensurability. 
This will include where Feyerabend saw incommensurability arising, the range of 
applicability of the notion, and the sorts of legitimate comparisons that Feyerabend
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contended can be made between incommensurable theories. Secondly, in giving this 
account of Feyerabend's notion of incommensurability, it will become apparent that 
there exist large discrepancies between standard interpretations of incommensurability 
and the interpretation which we find Feyerabend supporting. In this respect my primary 
concern is not to vindicate Feyerabend in his support for incommensurability, but simply 
to show that the discussions surrounding incommensurability, in the most part, do not 
even address Feyerabend's position. Thirdly, I want to construct, out of the clues that are 
littered throughout Feyerabend's writings, a clearer picture of the impact that 
Feyerabend's notion of incommensurability has on the general structure of scientific 
decision-making. More specifically, I want to say that Feyerabend is offering an account 
of the rationality o f science which differs significantly from some of the most prominent 
standard accounts.
3.2 Feyerabend’s Incommensurability as Formal Incommensurability.
3.2.1 Universal Theories.
The thesis of incommensurability is probably the most famous o f Feyerabend's 
doctrines. There seems to be an inverse function operating here: the more famous the 
doctrine, the more misunderstood it is. Popular accounts of the meaning and 
consequences of incommensurability only have tenuous relations to what Feyerabend 
actually intended the meaning and consequences of incommensurability to be.
It is often contended that the thesis of incommensurability implies that any two 
theories cannot be compared in any way. Newton-Smith, for example, states that
the thought that theories are incommensurable is the thought that theories 
simply cannot be compared and consequently there cannot be any 
rationally justifiable reason for thinking that one theory is better than 
another ... taken literally it is implausible because it suggests that I could 
never have rationally justifiable grounds for holding any belief whatsoever 
... [but] if I could have grounds for rationally preferring one ... belief to ...
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[an]other why could I not have grounds for preferring one theory to 
another?1
It must be asked, whose theory is Newton-Smith talking about? Certainly not 
Feyerabend's or Kuhn's, indeed it is not a position I have seen anyone defend. It is a 
complete dummy position: a straw man of the highest order. Feyerabend himself states 
that "I never said ... that any two rival theories are incommensurable ... what I did say 
was that certain rival theories, so-called 'universal' theories, or 'non-instantial' theories, i f  
interpreted in a certain way, could not be compared easily". (AM, p. 114)
It is crucial that we are clear as to what exactly universal, non-instantial theories 
are, for, as the quote above implies, this idea is the crux around which Feyerabend builds 
his conception of incommensurability. According to Feyerabend, universal non-instantial 
theories are theories which, unlike empirical generalisations, are not directly testable via 
empirical experience.2 They are theories which make claims about "everything there is"3, 
and they are testable only after suitable initial conditions, boundary conditions, and 
associated empirical generalisations are added.4
I shall assume that the rules (assumptions, postulates) constituting a 
language (a "theory" in our terminology) form a hierarchy in the sense that 
some rules presuppose others without being presupposed by them. A rule 
R' will be regarded as being more fundamental than another rule R", if it 
[is] presupposed by more rules of the theory, R" included, each of them
1 Newton-Smith, The Rationality o f  Science, p. 148 This conception of incommensurability has been 
held by many philosophers, for example, D. Shapere, "Meaning and Scientific Change", in his Reason 
and the Search for Knowledge and J. Giedymin, "The paradox of Meaning Invariance", British Journal 
for the Philosophy o f Science, 21, (1970) pp. 257-68. Even Hooker, who in his paper in Beyond Reason 
seems to have an adequate understanding of Feyerabend's incommensurability, shows, in an earlier 
paper, a similarly complete misunderstanding: "Such a view [incommensurability] fractures the history 
of science into a number of unrelated, and unrelatable, episodes ... it becomes impossible to understand 
how one could decide between rival theories", in "Empiricism, Perception, and Conceptual Change", 
Canadian Journal o f Philosophy, 3, (1972) p. 62. For more balanced presentations of 
incommensurability, see H I. Brown "Incommensurability", Inquiry, 26, (1983) pp. 3-29, G. Couvalis, 
Feyerabend's Critique ofFoundationalism, andH. Sankey, The Incommensurability Thesis.
2 See Feyerabend, "Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism", in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds) 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy o f Science. Vol.III. pp. 28-97. fn. 1. This article has also been 
reprinted in P.K. Feyerabend, Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers Voll.  
pp. 44-96.
3 Feyerabend, "Replies to Criticism: Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam" in R S . Cohen and 
M.W. Wartofsky (eds) Boston Studies in the Philosophy o f Science. Vol.2. pp. 223-61, n. 5. This article 
has also been reprinted in Phil. Papers. Vol. 1.
4 See, "Explanation ...", fii. 1. A.N. Perovich. jr. "Incommensurability, Its Varieties and its Ontological 
Consequences" in Munevar (ed) Beyond Reason pp 313-28, goes some way towards this distinction, but 
leaves it somewhat unclear.
79
being at least as fundamental as the rules presupposing R". It is clear that a 
change of fundamental rules will entail a major change of the theory, or of 
the language in which they occur. Thus a change in the spatio-temporal 
ideas of Newton's celestial mechanics makes it necessary to redefine 
almost every term, and to reformulate every law of the theory, whereas a 
change of the law of gravitation leaves the concepts, and all the remaining 
laws, unaltered .5
As a first approximation, we could conclude that universal, non-instantial theories, are 
those theories which are expressed in terms of a set of fundamental rules which do not 
presuppose any other rules other than the rules within the set. A theory o f this sort 
would certainly be fundamental, but it seems that Feyerabend does not want to limit the 
idea of universal theories to this characterisation. In the quote above, the most 
fundamental aspect o f Newtonian mechanics is considered to be the spatio-temporal 
structure of the universe: absolute, Euclidean space with an independent, absolute, 
temporal dimension. That may be an accurate description; however, Feyerabend 
contends in many places that Newtonian mechanics, understood as the three laws of 
motion, is a universal theory .6 This would seem to suggest that universal theories are not 
confined to theories at the top of the hierarchy: lower level fundamental rules can be 
grouped together and classified as a universal theory. This would seem to create a 
looming problem for Feyerabend: if the incommensurability thesis is to hinge critically 
around the idea of a universal theory, then that concept should be able to be clearly 
identified and a line drawn between universal theories and 'particular', non-universal 
theories.
I think that this problem can be resolved if we concentrate on Feyerabend's 
contention that universal theories say something about "everything there is". Consider 
the full quote:
when speaking of theories I shall include myths, political ideas, religious 
systems, and I shall demand that a point o f view so named be applicable to 
at least some aspects of everything there is. The general theory o f relativity 
is a theory in this sense, "all ravens are black" is not.7
5 Feyerabend, "Replies to Criticism", n. 27.
6 See, for example, "Explanation ..." pp. 52-62, where Feyerabend discusses the impetus theory and 
Newtonian mechanics.
7 Feyerabend, "Replies to Criticisms" n. 5. Feyerabend goes on to say that "there are certain similarities 
between my use of'theory' and Quine's 'ontology'... Carnap's 'linguistic framework'... Wittgenstein's
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"All ravens are black" is not a universal theory because it does not say something about 
everything there is: it says nothing about skyscrapers, people, and so on. Similarly, the 
kinetic theory of heat, for example, is a limited theory, it does not say anything about the 
general constitution of matter.* 8 On the other hand, Newtonian mechanics brings with it 
assumptions concerning the spatio-temporal structure of the universe, the nature of 
matter, and the nature of forces, all of these things are universally applicable. We can 
conclude that if a particular theory T, can be interpreted as attributing properties 
universally, then that theory is a universal theory, in Feyerabend's sense.
Let us consider again this quote "I never said ... that any two rival theories are 
incommensurable ... what I did  say was that certain rival theories, so-called 'universal' 
theories, or 'non-instantial' theories, i f  interpreted in a certain way, could not be 
compared easily". (AM, p. 114) The main point to be made from this is that 
incommensurability arises only through particular types of interpretations o f universal 
scientific theories; which implies that different interpretations o f universal scientific 
theories will not eventuate in incommensurability Even when incommensurability does 
arise, Feyerabend explicitly states that they "could not be compared easily", not that they 
could not be compared at all. As a first summary it can be said that, for Feyerabend, 
incommensurability was never intended to be a categorical claim about the nature of 
theories as such.
3.2.2 The Logical Empiricist Background.
To show that Feyerabend never intended incommensurability to be as Newton- 
Smith and other philosophers see it, we must first place Feyerabend's ideas in the context 
from which they arose, that is, in the context of a critique o f logical empiricism and the 
formal notion of theoretical comparison found therein. Feyerabend's original exposition 
of the incommensurability thesis can be found in his "Explanation, Reduction and
'language gam e'... Pareto's 'theory'... Whorfs 'metaphysics'... Kuhn's 'paradigm'... etc.[!]" Feyerabend
never went on to detail these claims and interrelationships. I won't even attempt such a mammoth task.
8 Of course, logically, 'all ravens are black' says of everything that if  it is a raven, then it is black. But we 
should not let this logical point obscure the intent of Feyerabend's position: the sense is sufficiently 
unambiguous.
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Empiricism" article o f 1962. In this article Feyerabend contends "that a formal account of 
reduction and explanation is impossible for general theories, or non-instantial theories" 9 
More generally, Feyerabend intends to show that formal logical analysis of the relations 
between successive universal scientific theories does not account for the relations that in 
fact obtain between successive universal scientific theories. Feyerabend is contending 
that one of the ways o f interpreting universal theories which leads to incommensurability 
are those realist interpretations which see universal scientific theories as formal axiomatic 
systems, and where the relations between successive universal scientific theories can be 
explicated as formal logical relations of deducibility and derivability.
Feyerabend explicitly criticises the views of Hempel and Oppenheim, Nagel, and 
Carnap. But his main attack is upon logical empiricism in general. I think it can be 
assumed that all logical empiricists adhered to a two language view o f scientific theories; 
that is, there is an identifiable dichotomy between the theoretical terms of a scientific 
theory and the observational terms of that theory. The observational language in which 
observations are stated is said to be a pre-existing, neutral language, completely devoid 
of any theoretical components. Observations are said to be the foundation of knowledge 
and the repository o f information and meaning. The theoretical languages are said to be 
uninterpreted, abstract, propositional systems which gain an interpretation, and meaning, 
from being linked with the observational foundation. Feyerabend quotes this passage 
from Carnap:
there is "no independent interpretation for L j  [the language in terms of 
which a certain theory, or a certain world view, is formulated]. The system 
T [the axioms o f the theory and the rules of derivation] is in itself an 
uninterpreted postulate system. [Its] terms ... obtain only an indirect and 
incomplete interpretation by the fact that some of them are connected by 
the [correspondence] rules C with observation terms ... ". (AM, p. 279)10
9 Feyerabend, Phil. Papers Vol. 1, p. 44.
10 Cf. also "Explanation ...", pp. 41-2. For a classic presentation of this sort of view, see R.B. 
Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation, where Braithwaite introduces the 'zipper' metaphor whereby 
meanings are introduced into scientific systems from the bottom, observational level, upwards into the 
theoretical levels. Theoretical levels only have indirect meanings given to them by their place in a 
deductive system and their ultimate connection to observations. This view is what has sometimes been 
called the 'upward seepage' of meaning, for a discussion of which, see H I. Brown, Perception, Theory 
and Commitment pp. 46-9.
I think it is safe to say that the above position of Carnap's was a general logical empiricist 
position.
Feyerabend contends that in the logical empiricist analysis of inter-theoretic 
relations, such as that of reduction and explanation, there are two assumptions, or 
demands which must be met. Firstly, that the relations that exist between two theories be 
one of deducibility. In the case of reduction this amounts to the claim that the reduced 
theory should be able to be logically deduced from the reducing theory. Similarly, for an 
explanation to be adequate "the explanandum must be logically deducible from the 
information contained in the explanans".11 The second assumption is that, with respect to 
the processes of both reduction and explanation, meanings are to remain completely 
invariant. Feyerabend contends that meaning invariance is necessary because without 
meaning invariance the required relations o f deducibility would not be attainable.
I think that Feyerabend is correct in his contention that meaning invariance is a 
consequence of logical empiricism: it seems to follow naturally from its basic tenets. If all 
meaning and information is encapsulated in pre-theoretical experience articulated in a 
neutral observation language, and meaning is given to theoretical terms via the 
observation language, then the theoretical component of successive scientific theories is 
compared logically through their correlation and connections to the common observation 
language. Consequently, provided that the pre-theoretical, theory neutral experience 
does not change, the logical empiricist conception entails that all theories are able to be 
compared to any other theory. The very idea of incommensurability is an impossibility in 
this system.
Feyerabend responds to this logical empiricist position in three steps (i) 
Feyerabend blocks the instrumentalistic move by contending that there is indeed an 
objective, independent world. Our theories are meant to be interpreted realistically: they 
are designed to be accurate descriptions of the processes and things constituting the 
world, (ii) Given this realism, Feyerabend contends that we must replace the dual 
language model of scientific discourse and the role that observation plays within that
11 Hempel and Oppenheim, in Feyerabend, " E x p l a n a t i o n p .  34.
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model. He does this by proposing his own pragmatic theory of observation.12 (iii) Given 
(i) and (ii), meaning invariance is violated, therefore, formal accounts o f inter-theoretic 
relations fail and incommensurability results.
3.2.3 The Pragmatic Theory o f  Observation.
Feyerabend asserts that he is an empiricist, however, he interprets empiricism to
be
a cosmological hypothesis concerning the relation between man and the 
universe ... It is assumed by the hypothesis that there exists a real objective 
world that contains human observers, and that sensations, but not 
thoughts, are highly correlated with events in this world.13
That is, Feyerabend is a realist concerning theories: the theoretical entities and processes
postulated by scientific theories are intended to be realistic descriptions o f the nature of
the world. Feyerabend contends that if we are realistic about theories, then the
perceptions we have should be interpreted in terms of the theory which we hold: the
perceptions we have are caused by the entities and processes which are posited as
existing in the world.
for example, we may admit that the sentence 'this is a raven' uttered by an 
observer who points at a bird in front o f him is an observational sentence 
and that the observer has produced it because of the impressions, 
sensations, and perceptions he possesses. We may also admit that he 
would not have uttered the sentence had he not possessed those 
impressions. Yet, the sentence is not therefore about impressions; it is 
about a bird which is neither a sensation nor the behaviour of some 
sentient being. Similarly, it may be admitted that the observation sentences 
which a scientific observer produces are prompted by his impressions.
12 I will go on throughout the remainder of this chapter to say that it is a realistic interpretation of 
theories, conjoined with a theory-ladenness thesis of observation, and formalistic accounts of inter- 
theoretical relations, which leads to incommensurability. Feyerabend has rejected the idea that 
observations are theory-laden; he contends that his own pragmatic theory of observation relinquishes the 
very idea of a dichotomy, theory/observation, which the theory-ladenness thesis seems to defend. But for 
the purposes of Feyerabend's argument, the thesis of the theory-ladenness of observation is sufficient to 
undermine the idea of meaning invariance. It is therefore sufficient to lead to incommensurability. Thus 
Feyerabend's incommensurability is not dependent upon acceptance of his pragmatic theory of 
observation, but is a more generally applicable notion.
13 Feyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism" in R.G. Colodny (ed) Beyond the Edge o f  Certainty: Essays in 
Contemporary Science and Philosophy, pp. 215-16.
However, their content will again be determined, not by these impressions, 
but by the entities allegedly described. 14
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In this situation, observations are not independent sources of meaning, through which 
theoretical terms are given indirect meanings, rather, it is the theoretical terms which are 
primary, and through which observational terms are given meaning.
Thus, Feyerabend proposes the pragmatic theory of observation in place of the 
dual-language semantic theory o f observation. The semantic theory of observation is 
construed as the theory which contends that observational terms can be delineated from 
theoretical terms by examination of the meaning o f the term in question. If a term's 
meaning can be given solely in relation to perception, then that term is an observational 
term. In contradistinction to this, the pragmatic theory of observation construes 
observational terms as those terms an observer will utter when confronted with 
perceptual stimuli:
a statement will be regarded as observational because of the causal context 
in which it is being uttered, and not because of what it means. According 
to this theory, 'this is red' is an observation sentence, because a well- 
conditioned individual who is prompted in the appropriate manner in front 
of an object that has certain physical properties will respond without 
hesitation with 'this is red', and this response will occur independently of 
the interpretation he may connect with the statement (he may interpret it 
as referring to a property of the surface o f the object, as a property of the 
space between the object and the eye (as did Plato), as a relation between 
the object and a coordinate system in which he himself is at rest). All we 
need in order to provide a theory with an observational basis are 
statements satisfying this pragmatic property . 15
Observations are theoretical, but they can be distinguished in terms of statements uttered
in relation to causal, perceptual contexts. Some examples will make this point clearer.
When an observer utters the sentence, 'this is a raven', the semantic theory of observation
contends that the sentence is observational only in so far as the meanings of the terms
within it can be reduced to perceptual stimuli. The pragmatic theory of observation
separates observability and meaning. Imagine two observers, both of whom utter the
sentence 'this is a raven', the first observer is a biologist who interprets the term 'raven' in
14 Feyerabend, "Explanation p. 35.
15 Feyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism" p. 198.
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terms of current biological theory, the second observer, on the other hand, believes in an 
animistic-mythological world; consequently, the term 'raven' is interpreted by the second 
observer in terms of animistic spirits portentous of evil happenings. The term 'raven' as 
uttered by the two observers has completely different meanings, but, nevertheless, both 
observers can utter the same sentence, and in both utterances the sentence is 
observational: a sentence or term is observational i f  it is produced in response to 
perceptual stimuli. "Sensations and perceptions are indicators, and they are in this 
respect on a par with the indications of physical instruments. Like these indications, they 
are in need o f interpretation"16 Thus, when a scientist points to a line in a cloud chamber 
and says, 'this is an electron', it is an observational sentence because it is produced in 
response to perceptual stimuli. O f course, the meaning of the term 'electron' is provided 
by the complex theories of theoretical physics, but this only goes to show that if we are 
realistic about theories, then we literally see the world as the theory we hold pictures the 
world to be.17
3.2.4 Meaning Variance and the Failure o f Formalism.
The third step of Feyerabend's criticism is to say that if we accept the idea that 
each individual universal theory carries its own ontology, rules and presuppositions, 
which together give meaning to observational statements, rather than observation 
statements giving meaning to theoretical statements, then the logical empiricist 
explications o f explanation and reduction fail because the requirement o f meaning 
invariance is violated: different universal theories give fundamentally unique meanings to
16 Ibid., p. 216.
17 Cf. Shapere, in his Reason and the Search for Knowledge, pp. 215-17 and Ch.16. where he discusses 
the 'observation' of the centre of the sun through solar neutrino experiments. I think that it can be 
concluded that scientists use observational idioms in the manner of the pragmatic theory of observation. 
It is quite ironic that Shapere criticises Feyerabend's pragmatic theory of observation, in his Ibid., pp. 
75-8, given that Shapere proposes a theory of observation which seems to be identical in spirit to that 
which Feyerabend was proposing. It must also be said that Feyerabend's pragmatic theory o f observation 
does not lead him back to any 'older empiricism' Ibid., p. 76 which compromises Feyerabend's critical 
philosophy. See J.G. McEvoy "A 'Revolutionary' Philosophy of Science", pp. 58-62 for this contention. 
As we have seen, there is no common meaning for alternative universal theories to draw upon through 
observations and incorporated into observational statements. Meaning is provided solely by theoretical 
presuppositions. Reference, on the other hand, is partly determined by the pragmatics of observation. Cf. 
section 3.3.2 below for a discussion of reference.
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the terms in their theory. If there is meaning variance between any two universal theories, 
then there can be no relations of strict deducibility between any two universal theories .18
To make this last point a little clearer, consider Feyerabend's example of the 
impetus theory o f motion and the Newtonian theory of motion. On the impetus theory, 
the application of constant force is required to sustain inertial motion. According to 
Newtonian theory, no forces are necessary to sustain inertial motion. Consequently, in a 
Newtonian world, the concept of impetus is incoherent: the two ideas of motion cannot 
co-exist as descriptions of reality. In this situation, if the impetus theory could come out 
as a logical consequence o f Newtonian theory, then the Newtonian theory would have to 
be internally inconsistent. As Feyerabend contends, it "would imply the demand to 
derive from correct premises what is false" . 19 Needless to say, if the ideal of scientific 
theories is that scientific theories should be formal axiomatic systems, then the 
consequence that scientific theories are internally inconsistent is an unacceptable 
conclusion.
A second example may make the point even clearer. Imagine ourselves in the 
nineteenth century at the time of the victory of the wave theory o f light over the particle 
theory of light. In this situation, how can a particle theory o f light, interpreted 
realistically, be a logical deduction from a wave theory of light, interpreted realistically? 
The ontologies postulated by the two theories are mutually exclusive, and a deduction of 
one from the other an impossibility. The only way to achieve such a deduction is to 
interpret theories instrumentalistically; and say that the wave theory o f light can be used 
to deduce all the relevant empirical facts. Because the empirical facts are considered to 
be a stable, independent, theory-neutral domain, then, inasmuch as the particle theory of 
fight could be said to deduce the facts, the particle theory is deducible from the wave 
theory.
To see where Feyerabend's incommensurability enters into this picture, I will 
recap Feyerabend's main argument. If we accept a realistic account o f theories, with its
18 Cf. the very detailed account of meaning invariance in Couvalis, Feyerabend's Critique of 
Foundationalism, pp. 60-80.
19 Feyerabend, "Explanation p. 68.
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concomitant consequence of theory-ladenness of observation, then, for universal 
theories, purely formal procedures o f comparison fail. If, in this situation, we accept a 
realistic account of theories and the subsequent theory-ladenness of observation, but still 
wish to retain purely formal procedures of theoretical comparison, then we must accept 
the conclusion that some theories are incommensurable. This is not to say that 
Feyerabend himself believes that universal theories are incommensurable.20
I think that this point needs stressing. If we read through most of Feyerabend's 
writings, we find that he often claims that there are incommensurable theories. I would 
even say that Feyerabend believed that the existence of incommensurable theories is an 
objective fact.21 But these claims are meant to be understood in the context of (i) 
assumptions concerning the nature of theory and observation. And (ii) formal logical 
methods of theoretical comparison. That is, it is an objective fact about the nature of 
some theories, interpreted in a particular manner, that they will be incommensurable in 
relation to certain formal methods of comparison. So, when Feyerabend states in Against 
Method that "Theories can be interpreted in different ways. They will be commensurable 
in some interpretations, incommensurable in others. Instrumentalism, for example, makes 
commensurable all those theories which are related to the same observation language and 
are interpreted on its basis", (AM, p. 279) we can now see more clearly what he means, 
though the quote is incomplete as it stands, that is, as I said above, it is the combination 
of an interpretation and a formal method of comparison which leads to 
incommensurability.
20 This is one of the few weaknesses of Couvalis', otherwise quite excellent, account of 
incommensurability in his book Feyerabend's Critique o f Foundationalism. That is, Couvalis does not 
fully appreciate that it is a realistic interpretation of universal theories, conjoined with the demand for 
formalistic notions of inter-theory relations, which leads to incommensurability. Thus Couvalis contends 
that it is "a necessary condition for two theories to be incommensurable that the later theory excludes all 
of the ontology of the earlier theory" p. 76. This is true, but it must be remembered that this is not a 
sufficient condition for incommensurability: the two theories in question must also be interpreted 
realistically. If two theory’s ontological claims are mutually exclusive, they are not necessarily 
incommensurable: if  they are interpreted instrumentalistically, then they are commensurable. Couvalis 
also contends that incommensurability is the idea that no primitive desriptive term, in the one theory, 
can be defined in terms of the primitive desriptive terms of the other theory. Again, this is true, but only 
if  we interpret universal theories realistically. If we are instrumentalists, then we can define the terms of 
one universal theory, in terms of another universal theory, without any problems arising.
21 See, AM, pp. 271-4.
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That theories are commensurable, has always been a part of Feyerabend's 
thought, for example, he states that "incommensurability is no difficulty for the sciences 
... it is a difficulty only for some very naive philosophical theories" 22It is no difficulty for 
the sciences because scientists do not compare theories in the manner advocated by 
logical empiricists: it is only of secondary importance to scientists whether a particular 
theory can, or cannot, be logically deduced from another theory 23
3.2.5 Popperian Incommensurability
The preceding discussion may give the impression that Feyerabend intended his 
notions to apply solely to logical empiricism: that incommensurability is something that 
only logical empiricists must deal with. Feyerabend has stated that incommensurability is 
"a puff of hot air extinguishing some burnt-down positivist candles."24 But, as we saw, 
logical empiricists can validly avoid any accusation of incommensurability if they remain 
within the dual-language scheme, and interpret scientific theories as not realistic, but 
simply as fictional instruments for moving from one empirical experience to another in an 
efficient, short-hand, manner. Feyerabend believes that this instrumentalistic form of 
empiricism is suspect for two reasons: because o f general realist arguments and 
sentiments; and because of his support for the pragmatic theory of observation. But as 
we have seen, it is these two conceptions, realism and theory-ladenness of observation, 
when combined with formalistic concepts of inter-theory relations, which leads to 
incommensurability. Consequently, it is Popper and his followers, and any others who 
accept the above combination o f factors, who must face the problem of 
incommensurability.
If we examine the relations that Popper sees as necessary to obtain between two 
successive scientific theories, then we have to come to the conclusion that they are o f a 
highly formal nature. The requirement that a new theory must meet is that a new theory 
must have greater empirical content than its predecessor. Or, equivalently, the new
22 "Third Dialogue" in Three Dialogues on Knowledge, p. 154. See also Phil. Papers Vol. 1. p. xi.
23 How Feyerabend sees comparisons between theories I will address in section 3.4 below.
24 "Third Dialogue", p. 156.
theory must be more falsifiable than its predecessor. The falsifiability, or empirical 
content of a theory, is determined by purely logical procedures: it is that class of 
statements, out o f the class of all logically possible statements, which are inconsistent 
with the theory.25
There are three conditions on this requirement, the first two of which are: (i) The 
ratio o f truth-content to falsity-content must be improved. This is achieved by requiring 
that the false consequences of the previous theory be denied by the new theory. And (ii) 
The new theory must make new predictions which are falsifiable and testable, thereby 
potentially increasing the truth-content of the new theory. (CR, p. 246.) This second 
condition can be explicated as the demand that new theories must be of a higher level of 
universality than their predecessors, which means, in Popper's system, that the old theory 
becomes a logically deduced middle-level hypothesis in an axiomatised system.
Popper contends that one of the aims of scientific theorising is to arrive at 
rigorous axiomatised systems, "this is very necessary, for a severe test of a system 
presupposes that it is at the time sufficiently definite and final in form to make it 
impossible for new assumptions to be smuggled in." (LSD, p. 71.) That is, in order for 
Popper's deductive falsificationist methodology to work, the potential falsifiers of a 
theory must be clearly ascertainable; the best way to achieve this is to construct the 
theory as an axiomatic system. According to Popper, in this sort of system, "the axioms 
are chosen in such a way that all the other statements belonging to the theoretical system 
can be derived from the axioms by purely logical or mathematical procedures" (LSD, p. 
71.) and that "we may distinguish, within a theoretical system, statements belonging to 
various levels of universality. The statements on the highest level of universality are the 
axioms; statements on the lower levels can be deduced from them." (LSD, p. 75.) Not 
only are axiomatic systems preferable because of the precision which they engender, they 
are also preferable because the more universal a theory is, the more testable (falsifiable) a 
theory becomes:
25 Popper, LSD, Sections 21,31 and in many other places.
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we could now say that our methodological decision ... is to leave nothing 
unexplained, i.e. always try to deduce statements from others of higher 
universality. The decision is derived from the demand for the highest 
attainable degree of universality and precision, and it can be reduced to the 
demand, or rule, that preference should be given to those theories which 
can be most severely tested. (LSD, p. 123 .)
That is, it is a deep consequence o f Popper's philosophy that we must search for theories 
of an ever more universal character: axiomatic systems must be found which are of a 
higher level of universality, and therefore o f a higher level of falsifiabihty, than the 
previous system. In fact, "a theory which has been well corroborated can only be 
superseded by one of a higher level o f universality, that is, by a theory which is better 
testable and which, in addition, contains the old, well corroborated theory." (LSD, p. 
276.)
This brings us to the third condition which a new theory must meet: a new theory 
must explain the facts that the preceding theory successfully explained. Once we see 
what Popper means by explanation, we find that his conception of explanation is virtually 
identical to that of the logical empiricists. For example, Popper states that "to give a 
causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement which describes it, using as 
premises o f the deduction one or more universal laws, together with certain singular 
statements." (LSD, p. 59.) As with the logical empiricists, so too for Popper: to explain 
is to deduce. Now, it may be said that Popper only applies this idea of explanation as 
deduction to the explanation of facts. But this is not so: for Popper, all statements are 
hypothetical in nature, they are simply of more or less degrees o f universality. If we look 
carefully at the quotes from Popper given in the previous paragraph, we see that it is not 
only 'facts' which are to be explained via logical deduction from higher level universal 
statements, all statements and hypotheses are explained by their logical deduction from 
higher level, more universal, hypotheses, "explanation is always the logical reduction of 
hypotheses to others which are of a higher level of universality." (LSD, p. 63.) If this is 
the nature of explanation for Popper, then we can see that when Popper claims that "one 
can work with the idea of hierarchical levels of explanatory hypotheses. There are 
comparatively low level ones ... higher ones such as Kepler's laws, still higher ones such
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as Newton's theory, and, next, Relativity", (CR, p. 173 .) the relation between these 
hypotheses is supposed to be one of logical deducibility.
We can see here that Popper's ideas concerning the formal requirements that a 
new theory must meet includes, as a necessary condition, the idea that theories must 
possess relations o f logical deducibility between them. As Feyerabend has argued, to 
have logical deducibility, we must also have meaning invariance. But universal theories, 
interpreted realistically, are meaning variant. Therefore, universal theories cannot enter 
into relations where one is a logical deduction of the other. Consequently, universal 
theories cannot be compared as to empirical content.
This is probably being a little unfair to Popper: though the passages I quoted 
seem to suggest, quite unequivocally, that the relations between theories is meant to be 
one of deducibility, Popper has admitted at other places that strict deducibility is not 
obtainable for some theories. Thus, Popper accepts that Kepler's laws and Newton's 
theory are, in fact, contradictory, and that they therefore cannot be placed in relations of 
deducibility, one from the other. (CR, pp. 61-2.) But this development does not mitigate 
the conclusions so far reached: Popper still retains the ideal o f the deducibility of 
theories, but it is now weakened in that, though some unchanged theories cannot be 
deduced from superseding theories, it is still necessary for an approximation of the 
previous theory to be able to be deduced from the superseding theory. This requirement, 
along with the general requirement of content increase for successive theories, 
presupposes that the theory which is to deduce an approximation of the superseded 
theory, and the superseded theory itself, are sufficiently similar in content for the process 
of approximation to be valid; that is, the two theories must share large amounts of 
background knowledge, including observational theories, for a true statement of the one 
theory to be able to be conceived as a true statement of the other theory. But this is 
exactly what does not obtain when we consider two universal theories: it is of the nature
of universal theories that their ontologies, and therefore their content, are completely 
different. This difference also usually includes a difference of observational theories 26
It is interesting to note that Popper did seem to have some sort o f inkling as to 
the problems that could arise if we followed his requirements. For example, in giving his 
definition of verisimilitude, Popper prefaces his definition with the condition that "the 
truth-content and the falsity-content of two theories t l  and t2 are comparable", (CR, p. 
233.) and he also says that "as long as there are no revolutionary changes in our 
background knowledge, the relative appraisal of our two theories, t l  and t2, will remain 
stable." (CR, p. 235.) These passages imply that two theories might not be comparable, 
especially if there has been revolutionary changes in background knowledge. Is Popper 
accepting the idea that incommensurability is possible? Well, I don't think Popper ever 
accepted that there are incommensurable theories.
Recall that a logical empiricist can avoid the result o f the incommensurability of 
theories, whilst retaining the formal requirements of theory comparison of deducibility 
and derivability, by relinquishing the idea that scientific theories are to be interpreted 
realistically, and retaining the idea of the theory-neutral domain of observation. Popper 
does not have this choice: Popper is a realist who accepts the notion o f the theory- 
ladenness of observation. Consequently, Feyerabend's challenge is to say to Popper that 
he must either accept the notion that universal theories cannot be compared via formal 
requirements of empirical content increase, and thereby accept the idea that universal 
theories are incommensurable, or he must abandon the formal requirements of empirical 
content increase and look for an alternative account of inter-theoretic relations, one 
which does not lead to incommensurability.
Feyerabend also contends that Lakatos's methodology o f scientific research 
programmes runs into the obstacle of the incommensurability o f scientific theories. Even 
though Lakatos develops ideas which are remarkably similar to ideas proposed by 
Feyerabend, in that the character of research programmes is very similar to what
26 Cf. the differences in observational theories discussed in chapter 1, vis a vis Aristotelian observational 
theories and the observational theories necessary to support the scientific revolution. For a discussion of 
Popper on the points mentioned above, see "Explanation pp. 92-4.
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Feyerabend meant by universal, cosmological theories, nevertheless, Lakatos still retains 
in his, elsewhere very much modified Popperianism, the crucial notion of content 
increase. For example, Lakatos contends that, within a research programme, a theory T 
is falsified, and another theory T  accepted only if
T  has ... the following characteristics: (1) T' has excess empirical content 
over T: that is, it predicts novel facts, that is, facts improbable in the light 
of, or even forbidden, by T; (2) T' explains the previous success o f T, that 
is, all the unrefuted content of T is included ... in the content of T'; and 
(3) some of the excess content of T  is corroborated 27
This version of content increase is identical to Popper's notion; therefore, the conclusion
should be the same. Lakatos must accept that, given this formal requirement of content
increase, then successive theories will be incommensurable.
But the situation is not quite the same as it was for Popper. Recall that
Feyerabend contended that it is only the formalistic attempt to compare universal
theories which fail. If  we identify the universal theories of Feyerabend with the research
programmes of Lakatos, then the content increase thesis outlined above does not entail
incommensurability, the reason being that the theories being compared are internal to a
particular research programme.
However, this does not mean that Lakatos escapes. When Lakatos comes to the 
question of how research programmes can be compared and evaluated, he tries to apply 
the same conditions of content increase that he applies to theories within research 
programmes. He states that "an objective reason [to reject a programme] is provided by 
a rival research programme which explains the previous success of its rival and 
supersedes it by a further display of heuristic power"* 2* Heuristic power here means the 
ability to predict novel facts. That is, the criterion for successive research programmes is 
the exact same criterion for successive theories within research programmes. But in the 
discussions which follow this quote, Lakatos himself seems unconvinced as to the
27 Lakatos, "Falsification ...", p. 116.
2* Ibid., p. 155.
veracity of this prescription: there are always valid reasons for continuing to support a 
degenerating research programme.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Lakatos is quite ambivalent on many issues 
and his substantive position hard to pin down. But I think we can conclude that if 
Lakatos stuck wholeheartedly to the idea of relative content increase as an indicator of 
the preferability of one research programme over another, which seems to be his wish, 
then Feyerabend can claim that the comparison cannot succeed because research 
programmes are incommensurable.29 If, however, Lakatos gives up on the idea that 
relative content increase is an indicator of the preferability of research programmes, 
which, as we saw in the previous chapter, seems to be his actual course, then Feyerabend 
can embrace Lakatos as a 'fellow anarchist'.
3.3 Responses to FeverabemTs Incommensurability
3.3.1 The Strategy o f Misinterpretation.
At this point I will give a short summary of Feyerabend's position. Feyerabend 
never contended that scientific theories are incapable of comparison: the 
commensurability of scientific theories is an obvious fact. What Feyerabend did say was 
that if we are realistic about our theories, then certain very popular and deeply 
entrenched philosophical ideals o f theoretical comparison do not work. If  these 
philosophical ideals are considered to be the only way in which theoretical comparison 
can take place, then it is Feyerabend's contention that we are left with incommensurable 
theories. To consolidate this conclusion, consider this quote from Feyerabend
scientific discourse which contains detailed and highly sophisticated
discussions concerning the comparative advantages o f paradigms obeys
94
29 A particularly striking example of this situation is the idea that the requirement of content increase is 
itself an epistemic value and methodological maxim, traceable to a particular world-view: the 
Aristotelian world-view did not include content increase, as conceived by Popper and Lakatos, as one of 
its epistemic values, in fact, the very idea is inconsistent with Aristotelianism and, therefore, cannot be 
made a part of the Aristotelian world-view. Consequently, the use of such a formal criterion of 
theoretical comparison is question begging when applied to the comparison of Aristotelianism with the 
"scientific” world-view. Cf. the discussion in Section 2.2.5, and Feyerabend's "In Defence of Aristotle".
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laws and standards that have only little to do with the naive models which 
philosophers of science have designed for that purpose. There is 
comparison, even 'objective' comparison, but it is a much more complex 
and delicate procedure than is assumed by rationalists. Thus in my first 
paper on the matter ["Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism"] I claim 
that 'a formal account o f reduction and explanation is impossible for 
general theories' but show how predictions can still be used for 
comparing theories: what fails is not the process o f theory comparison, it 
is a rather simpleminded theory of explanation.30
In the next section I will elaborate some of Feyerabend's positive notions concerning
theoretical comparison. But before I do that, I will present and respond to some of the
criticisms levelled at Feyerabend's incommensurability, in the light of the conclusions
reached above.
Early in this paper I quoted a passage from Newton-Smith which contended that 
incommensurability implies that no theory can be compared, in any manner whatsoever, 
to any other theory. The further implication was drawn from this that incommensurability 
implies that there can be no rationality in scientific decision-making. Newton-Smith is not 
alone in this interpretation: the interpretation is the standard interpretation of 
incommensurability. For example, Laudan states that incommensurability is the thesis 
"that theories before and after a revolution are so radically different that we cannot even 
speak meaningfully of any similarities between them",31 and that "scientists working in 
different research traditions cannot communicate with, and cannot understand the 
statements of, their fellow scientists in other traditions ... theories cannot be compared 
and rationally evaluated" .321 hope I have shown that this interpretation of Feyerabend's 
incommensurability is completely false; it may be that others have defended such an 
interpretation, though Kuhn certainly didn't, but that is irrelevant, Feyerabend did not 
support such a thesis.33
30 Feyerabend, "More Clothes From the Emperor's Bargain Basement: A  Review of Laudan's Progress 
and its Problems", in Phil. Papers. Vol.2, p. 238
31 L. Laudan, Progress and its Problems: Towards a Theory o f Scientific Growth, p. 141.
32 Ibid., p. 142.
33 The source of these misinterpretations is difficult to find. Though I do provide another reason below, 
a major factor in this misrepresentation seems to follow from an inability to accept, or see, a new 
paradigm, and a consequent inability to read texts objectively. In that sense it is a vindication of 
Feyerabend and Kuhn's philosophical position. For example, Feyerabend states, in "Consolations for the 
Specialist" that "succeeding paradigms can be evaluated only with difficulty an d ... they may be 
altogether incomparable", if we left the quote there we would think that the critics interpretations of
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Laudan comes to the conclusion that "the possible incommensurability of theories 
and research traditions ... does not preclude the existence of comparative appraisals of 
their acceptability. "34 Apart from the fact that this is what Feyerabend has said all along, 
it shows the general strategy of critics of incommensurability: examine theories so as to 
come up with some way, any way, of comparing theories, then pronounce 
incommensurability defeated.
This strategy of defeating incommensurability by showing that theories can be 
compared, is based upon two false assumptions: (i) That cmy change in meaning of 
theoretical terms results in incommensurability.35 Thus, Shapere contends that "we are 
led to believe that the theory-dependence of meanings is a necessary truth, that since the 
meaning of every term depends on its theoretical context, therefore a change of theory 
must produce a change of meaning of every term in the theory ." 36 And (ii) That, for 
Feyerabend, incommensurable is synonymous with incomparable. The conclusion drawn 
from these two assumptions is that incommensurability implies that science is completely 
irrational.
Feyerabend are correct; but the passage continues, "at least as far as the more familiar standards of 
comparison are concerned (they may be readily comparable in other respects)" p. 219. Surely, anyone 
who read this article must have read that passage? There is one aspect of Feyerabend's early writings on 
incommensurability which could be said to vindicate some of the criticisms of him, that is, in his early 
writings, Feyerabend did not draw the line sharply between theories which are merely inconsistent, and 
those which are incommensurable. This may have created the impression that simple inconsistency 
between two theories was enough to create incommensurability. If that was the case, then every theory 
would indeed be incommensurable with respect to every other theory. However, Feyerabend's contention 
that incommensurability only arises when considering realistic interpretations of universal theories, 
should have alerted the critics to the idea that non-universal, lower-level, theories are not 
incommensurable, though they are certainly inconsistent. At any rate, Feyerabend corrected this source 
of misunderstanding in later writings, see "Replies to Criticisms" pp. 230-1. What is interesting to note 
is that the logical empiricist ideal of logical deducibility and derivability between successive scientific 
theories runs into trouble when it comes to accounting for the relations between merely inconsistent 
theories: how can two inconsistent theories be put into exhaustive relations of deducibility, one from the 
other? Shared fundamental ideas will allow near complete deducibility, but a problematic residuum will 
remain.
34 Laudan, Progress and its Problems, p. 146.
35 This is the most ubiquitous criticism and the list of philosophers who make it is lengthy . Shapere, 
Reason and the Search for Knowledge, K.P. Parsons, "A Criterion for Meaning Change", Philosophical 
Studies, 28, (1975) pp.367-96. esp. p.370. And I. Szumilewicz, "Incommensurability and the Rationality 
of the Development of Science", British Journal for the Philosophy o f  Science, 28, (1977) pp. 345-50, 
are a representative class.
36 Shapere, Reason and the Search for Knowledge, pp. 69-70.
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The first assumption, that any change in meaning of theoretical terms results in 
incommensurability, is a thesis that Feyerabend has always denied. Feyerabend has 
always contended that it is universal theories which are incommensurable: lower level 
theories, theories within a universal theory, may be meaning variant, but this variance 
does not result in incommensurability. Theories within universal theories share too many 
assumptions for them to be incommensurable. Consider these two passages:
it seems reasonable to assume that the customary concept of meaning is 
closely connected, not with definitions ... but with the idea of a 
fundamental rule, or a fundamental law. Changes of fundamental laws are 
regarded as affecting meanings while changes in the upper layers of our 
theories are regarded as affecting beliefs only. There exists therefore a 
rather close connexion between meanings and certain parts of theories.37
A diagnosis of stability o f meaning involves two elements. First, reference 
is made to rules according to which objects or events are collected into 
classes. We may say that such rules determine concepts or kinds of 
objects. Secondly, it is found that the changes brought about by a new 
point of view occur within the extension of these classes and, therefore, 
leave the concepts unchanged. Conversely, we shall diagnose a change of 
meaning either if a new theory entails that all concepts o f the preceding 
theory have zero extension or if it introduces rules which cannot be 
interpreted as attributing specific properties to objects within already 
existing classes, but which change the system of classes itself.38
These two highly vague and ambiguous passages have been the source of much of the
criticism of Feyerabend, especially the second passage. But I think a plausible position
can be reconstructed out of the two passages.
Firstly, different universal theories are defined by Feyerabend as theories which
have different fundamental laws. If fundamental laws are considered to be the source of
meanings, then the terms in different universal theories will have no meaning in common.
This is what Feyerabend is trying to say when he contends that there is a change of
meaning when "all concepts of the preceding theory have zero extension". But, as the
second passage attests to, for Feyerabend, there is a second type of meaning change
wherein there is a change in the system of classes. If this second type of meaning change
37 "Replies to Criticisms" n. 27.
38 Phil. Papers. Vol. 1. p. 98.
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is to be different from the first type, then we have to assume that some concepts o f the 
older theory have non-zero extension in the new theory. This is another way o f saying 
that the two theories must share some fundamental laws in common: the two theories are 
not different universal theories, and they therefore share some meanings in common.
Secondly, Feyerabend is working with some sort of notion of a hierarchical 
structure of theoretical systems, whereby changes in concepts at one level only effect 
changes in meanings of terms occurring at that level, or at lower levels. For example, 
even though both the wave and particle theories of light were intimately related to 
Newtonian mechanics, the victory of the wave theory of fight did not occasion any 
change in basic Newtonian theory. This can be explained by saying that the hypotheses 
relating to fight were at a lower level in the theoretical hierarchy than the fundamental 
Newtonian laws; consequently, a change in the meaning of fight could only effect 
changes in concepts at the same level or lower in the hierarchy.
I think that this is a valid interpretation o f the two passages above; but some 
philosophers have only seen paradoxes arising. For example, Shapere contends that "if a 
new theory entails that one concept of the preceding theory has extension zero, 
apparently no meaning change has taken place" and that "if all but one of the classes of 
the preceding theory have extension zero, again no meaning change has taken place". 
Finally, for the height of misrepresentation, Shapere contends that "if the extensions of 
all classes are changed radically, but not so much that the previous extensions are zero, 
again no meaning change has taken place" 39 All these examples of Shapere's are wrong, 
in that all three examples can be classified as a "change [in the] system of classes itself', 
which implies that, for Feyerabend, all three examples qualify as changes of meaning. Of 
course, the changes o f meaning are not o f a fundamental nature, and do not, therefore, 
result in incommensurability.
The second assumption, that the term 'incommensurable' is synonymous with the 
term 'incomparable', may be what you will find in a dictionary, but it is not how 
Feyerabend conceived the terms. It has been the point of this chapter to show that, for
39 All from Shapere, Reason and the Search for Knowledge, n. 78. p. 100.
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Feyerabend, incommensurability arises between two theories only when the theories in 
question are universal theories; when they are interpreted in a particular manner, and 
when formalistic procedures of comparison and inter-theoretic relations are applied to 
those theories. Thus, a judgement of incommensurability is a relative judgement, not an 
absolute judgement. In fact, it could be said that, for Feyerabend, the idea that theories 
are absolutely incomparable is an impossibility.40
3.3.2 The Irrelevance o f  Re ference.
One of the most popular forms of attack is to say that theories are 
commensurable because theories can be brought into relations of referential overlap, that 
is, putative incommensurable theories are not in fact incommensurable, because the two 
theories refer to the same things.41 Even though these theories have been around a long 
time, Feyerabend has never responded to them at any great depth. It might be said that 
he hasn't responded to them because he can't. I don't think that this is the case: 
Feyerabend hasn't responded to the referential overlap theories simply because they are 
irrelevant.
Sankey has attributed to Feyerabend the belief that incommensurable theories are 
referentially discontinuous. But Sankey has also said that Feyerabend needs, and 
implicitly accepts, some sort o f referential overlap, if Feyerabend is to call himself a
40 It is actually quite amusing to read lengthy articles criticising Feyerabend, at the end of which, means 
of comparison are proudly produced which Feyerabend had proposed before. D.W. Moberg, in his,"Are 
There Rival incommensurable Theories" Philosophy o f Science, 46, (1979) pp. 244-62. esp. pp. 257-60, 
for example, proposes that, for two incommensurable theories, if one is inconsistent, and the other 
consistent, then the consistent theory should be preferred over the inconsistent one. In fact, Moberg 
spends three pages in coming to that conclusion. Moberg, Ibid., p. 260, and Devitt, "Against 
Incommensurability" Australasian Journal o f Philosophy, 57, (1979) pp. 29-50. esp. p. 47, both contend 
that some sort of relative measure can be made of how well incommensurable theories fit their own facts, 
the one that fits its own facts better is preferable. Well Feyerabend proposed both of these techniques, 
among others, as means of comparing theories, which do not rely on formalist assumptions. The second 
idea is especially important: it has always been upheld by Feyerabend as a means of comparing and 
testing realistically interpreted universal theories. See "Replies to Criticisms" pp. 232-4, and AM, pp. 
282-4.
41 This approach has a long history, starting with I. Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, and H. Putnam, 
see for example his "How Not to Talk About Meaning: Comments on J.J.C. Smart" in his Language and 
Reality: Philosophical Papers Vol.2, pp. 117-131. Then gaining support and elaboration by P. Kitcher, 
"Theories, Theorists and Theoretical Change", The Philosophical Review, 87, (1978) pp. 519-47. K.P. 
Parsons, "A Criterion for Meaning Change", M. Devitt, "Against Incommensurability", and most 
recently H. Sankey, The Incommensurability Thesis, to name but a few.
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realist.42 The answer to this apparent contradiction is that Feyerabend accepts referential 
overlap, as long as we are careful as to what we mean by reference. Recall the discussion 
of Feyerabend's pragmatic theory o f observation earlier in this chapter. The pragmatic 
theory of observation is predicated upon the idea that our theories are meant to be 
realistic accounts of the nature of the world, and that the independently existing world is 
the source o f the perceptions we receive. In this situation, observation statements are 
those statements we are predisposed to utter when confronted with perceptual stimuli. 
This realism o f Feyerabend's implies that all theories have common reference: all theories 
refer to the (one) world. The actual entities and processes which we take to be 
constitutive o f the world may differ radically from theory to theory, but the referent is 
the independently existing world posited as causing the perceptions we have. Thus, 
particular common reference can be established, via perceptual stimuli, by ostension. For 
example, an observer can point to a bird and say 'this is a raven', a second observer can 
agree that what is pointed to is a bird and that the sentence 'this is a raven' is true. But 
the two observers may have radically different ideas as to what the raven is: the first 
observer may think of the raven in terms of the most recent biological theories, while the 
second observer may think of the raven in terms of an evil portent in an 
animistic/mythological world view. It could be argued that the two descriptions o f the 
raven are not jointly satisfiable, but the fact that the two descriptions are not jointly 
satisfiable does not preclude the idea of common reference. A realist simply concludes 
that one, or both, of the descriptions are wrong, because the common world which both 
theories refer to can only have one nature. This conclusion is corroborated by the 
examples which Feyerabend uses when discussing incommensurable theories, for 
example, when Feyerabend discusses the incommensurable Aristotelian and Galilean 
world views with respect to their, jointly unsatisfiable, descriptions of the tower 
argument, the common reference o f the tower, the rock, the ground, and the position 
where the rock hits the ground, is never denied, and couldn't possibly be denied: the
42 Sankey, The Incommensurability Thesis, for referential discontinuity, pp. 139-52. For Feyerabend's 
implicit acceptance of referential overlap see pp. 184-7.
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common reference to an independently existing world is not the issue between 
incommensurable theories The issue concerns the nature o f that which is commonly 
referred to. In fact, it would be ludicrous for Feyerabend not to accept some sort of 
referential overlap; for example, when Feyerabend says that materialistic theories of 
mind, and dualistic theories of mind, are incommensurable, it would be ridiculous for him 
to deny that there is referential overlap: how could he deny that both theories refer to 
humans? 43
So how does Sankey come to the conclusion that Feyerabend accepts radical 
referential discontinuity? Firstly, we may say that, for Feyerabend, meaning and reference 
are intimately connected: "meaning-talk can be replaced, without residue, by theory- 
talk"44 and, since theories are to be interpreted realistically, the relations between 
meaning and reference are very close. This would seem to imply that, in the case of 
incommensurable theories, where Feyerabend has contended that there exists no 
common meanings, there would also be no common reference: there would be radical 
referential discontinuity. Consequently, Sankey, alluding to the second o f the two 
passages quoted above concerning Feyerabend's views on meaning, contends that
if reference is determined by rules, then in order for there to be common 
reference the same objects must satisfy different systems of rules. But on 
the first alternative the same objects cannot satisfy both sets of rules: 
incompatible sets of rules are not jointly satisfiable. While on the second 
alternative no common objects can belong to both systems of classes. For 
if the new rules attribute no properties to members of old classes, then no 
criterial property specified in a new rule can be instantiated by any 
members o f an old class. The system of classes must be completely 
disjoint. Thus, in both cases there can be no common reference between 
incommensurable theories, so the transition between such theories is 
referentially discontinuous.45
This argument is valid, i f  we assume that, for Feyerabend, reference is in fact determined 
by rules, and nothing else. But I don't think that this is the case, though Feyerabend does
43 Couvalis comes to a similar conclusion that a form of reference is involved in Feyerabend's talk of 
incommensurability. See his Feyerabend's Critique o f  foundationalism, pp. 87-126. Of course, Couvalis 
points out, in great detail, that the notion of reference to be found in Feyerabend is not that of the causal 
theory of reference, as proposed by Putnam and his intellectual cohorts. With this I totally agree.
44 "Replies to Criticisms" n. 27.
45 Sankey, The Incommensurability Thesis, p. 147.
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seem to contend that reference is intimately connected to meaning, nevertheless, meaning 
and reference are not interchangeable. In Feyerabend's brand of realism there is always 
the minimal reference to an independently existing world, which is the cause of the 
perceptions we receive. Consequently, though it is true that incompatible sets of rules are 
not jointly satisfiable, this does not imply that there is, therefore, complete referential 
discontinuity. If we interpret Feyerabend as an idealist, then the above argument of 
Sankey's is valid. But if we interpret Feyerabend as a realist, then the argument is not 
valid.46
However, the more important considerations are that, (i) the reference of theories 
and theoretical terms, is not something that can be deduced from a theory: it is 
something we come to know by using and applying a theory. And (ii) that two 
incommensurable theories have referential overlap, and where this referential overlap is, 
is again something that can only be known through practical familiarity with the two 
theories, and through empirical investigation of the two theories: not simply through the 
comparison of logical consequences. The conclusion is that referential overlap theories 
are irrelevant to criticisms of Feyerabend's incommensurability.
3.4 Feyerabend’s Commensurabilitv.
I want now to sketch some of the ways in which Feyerabend sees so-called 
incommensurable theories as, in fact, commensurable. In the following I will only 
concentrate on those techniques which Feyerabend presented and argued for with 
specific reference to incommensurability.
To begin with, we should "remember that the problem of incommensurability 
arises only when we analyse the change of comprehensive cosmological points o f view - 
restricted theories rarely lead to the needed conceptual revisions". (AM, p. 284) What 
this implies is that the formal accounts o f inter-theoretic relations, accepted by logical 
empiricists and Popperians, can still be applied to successive theories which are within
46 A second source for Sankey's charge of referential discontinuity is derived from passages found in 
SFS, the problems that arise for my interpretation of Feyerabend by these passages will be dealt with in 
the next chapter.
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the same cosmological world-view. For example, the long development of quantum 
physics from the 20's to the present can be compared using all the Popperian and/or 
empiricist ideals. Contents can be compared, for successive quantum physical 
innovations use the same language. Measures o f verisimilitude may even be calculable. 
Comparison of content-classes and refutation can all be calculated and used with every 
justification.
But, according to Feyerabend, if we want to keep a formalistic account of 
science, then changes of cosmological theories will become inexplicable: cosmological 
theories are formalistically incommensurable. O f course, many, if not most, philosophers 
have objected to this idea and chastised Feyerabend for proposing it. But Feyerabend 
never believed that theories are incommensurable, in the sense of absolutely 
incomparable. The fact that formal accounts seemed to lead to incommensurability was 
good enough reason for Feyerabend to look for an alternative account.
Feyerabend believed that his pragmatic theory of observation provided grounds 
through which we can understand the way in which universal-cosmological theories can 
be compared, for example, Feyerabend states that
both [incommensurable] theories may be able to reproduce the 'local 
grammar' of sentences which are directly connected with observational 
procedures. In this case the utterance of one of the sentences in question in 
accordance with the rules of the local grammar ... can be connected with 
two 'theoretical' statements, one o f T, and one T' respectively ... We may 
now say that the empirical content of T' > the empirical content of T, if for 
every associated statement of T there is an associated statement of T', but 
not vice versa. And we may also say that T' has been confirmed by the 
very same evidence that refutes T if there is a local statement S whose 
associated statement in T' confirms T' while its associated statement in T 
refutes T.47
For Feyerabend "the local grammar of a statement is that part o f its rules o f usage which 
is connected with such direct operations as looking, uttering a sentence in accordance 
with ostensively taught (not defined) rules, etc" 48 Once we get past the technical 
wording of these passages, the substantive content is very mundane indeed. According to
47 "Replies to Criticisms" p. 233.
48 Ibid., n. 32.
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general relativity, light is bent by massively gravitating objects, consequently, during an 
eclipse, the light from a particular star should be seen in a particular point in the sky. On 
the other hand, according to classical mechanics light is always propagated rectilinearly, 
therefore, during an eclipse the light from a particular star should be seen in a particular 
point in the sky. As it turns out, the two positions are perceivably different, therefore, an 
experiment can be conducted. The result of the experiment will confirm, or disconfirm, 
one or both of the theories in question, but one theory has not therefore refuted the other 
theory. Rather, what has happened is that one theory has been refuted by its own 
experience: "Incommensurable theories ... can be refuted by reference to their own 
respective kinds of experience; i.e. by discovering the internal contradictions from which 
they are suffering". (AM, p. 284) The two theories are not placed in relations of logical 
deducibility, one from the other, nor is there a formal notion o f empirical content 
increase applied. But, nevertheless, the comparison of the theories is uncontroversial and 
clear.
An objection has been raised against the possibility of comparing 
incommensurable theories, given Feyerabend's pragmatic theory of observation. Shapere, 
for example, quotes this passage from Feyerabend: "Observational findings can be 
reinterpreted, and can perhaps even be made to lend support to a point of view that was 
originally inconsistent with them",49 and concludes that this passage, and the pragmatic 
theory of observation generally, precludes the possibility o f any sort o f comparison. 
Observation is too malleable and any experience or observation which may be 
inconsistent with a universal theory can be reinterpreted so that the inconsistency no 
longer exists. In response we can say that Feyerabend does indeed conceive of 
observation and experience as inherently malleable, but it is this fact which drives 
Feyerabend's conception of comparison and test. Feyerabend contends that any one 
universal theory can be adapted to account for all empirical phenomena. To remedy this
49 "Problems of Empiricism" p. 202. Quoted by Shapere in Reason the Search for Knowledge, p. 77. Cf 
also B. Townsend, "Feyerabend's Pragmatic Theory of Observation and the Comparability of Alternative 
Theories" in RC. Buck and R S . Cohen (eds) Boston Studies in the Philosophy o f Science. Vol. VIII pp. 
202- 11.
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problematic situation, Feyerabend proposes that we should always work with a plurality 
of inconsistent, incompatible, high-level universal theories: theories which give different 
accounts of all empirical phenomena, and which, moreover, are essential for discovering 
new empirical phenomena in need of explanation, or for highlighting the relevance of 
previously disregarded empirical phenomena. If we are realists, then we must accept that 
only one, or none, of the extant alternatives can be correct. We are then driven to 
critically examine the various alternatives. But given that these high-level universal 
theories can be made to account for all empirical phenomena, the way in which we can 
create tests is via predictions o f previously unknown phenomena, or via predictions of 
specific phenomena of a certain type, say, in the future. There is no room here for 
reinterpretation of the phenomena after the fact, prima facie evidence is thus provided 
for the relative strength of one o f the alternatives over another, and for the inability of 
one of the universal theories to explain its 'respective kind of experience' according to its 
own principles. I think that the pragmatic theory o f observation can indeed provide 
means by which universal, incommensurable, theories can be compared and that these 
means are uncontroversial and clear.
Feyerabend has stated that "incommensurability is no difficulty for the sciences ... 
it is a difficulty only for some very naive philosophical theories and, as these theories 
were regarded as essential ingredients of a certain type o f 'rationality', for this type as 
well" .50 This is an important passage for understanding Feyerabend: for even though 
formalist theories are adequate for explicating the relations between theories within 
cosmological theories, the fact that they cannot explain the relations between 
cosmological theories is a deadly blow, not only to the particular theories, but to the 
whole programme of analysis. Feyerabend wants to produce an alternative account of 
rationality, one which can not only account for the relations that exist between theories 
within a cosmological theory, but also explain the relations that exist between 
cosmological theories.
50 .<'Third Dialogue" p. 154.
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I don't think that Feyerabend ever arrived at a hilly satisfactory alternative theory 
of rationality. But there are bits and pieces, asides, and many clues throughout his 
writings which seem to point in a certain direction. I don't have time to go into this in any 
detail, so a very quick sketch will have to suffice.
Feyerabend has said that cosmological theories can be compared in many ways, 
for example, he sees comparison via mathematical simplicity, coherence, many and 
daring approximations as opposed to few and safe approximations, number of facts 
predicted, conformity with basic theory and conformity with metaphysical principles, to 
name but a few .51 These notions can be best described as values; they function in science 
like the virtues of Aristotle function in the eudemonic life. They sometimes conflict, 
sometimes reinforce each other. They are usually placed in hierarchical relationships, but 
these hierarchies are not rigid or well denned: they change over time and according to 
the situation. Mathematical simplicity, for example, is not a necessary aspect of scientific 
theories, and a theory exhibiting greater mathematical simplicity than another is not 
necessarily preferable. Science is an activity where skilled judgement is necessary. To 
acquire this judgement a scientist needs to immerse themselves in the practice of their 
chosen field.
In a theory such as this, the comparison of scientific theories is achieved through 
an in-depth study of the values that the theories exhibit and the relationship that is seen 
to exist between these values. For example, the scientific revolution associated with 
Copernicus and Galileo can be explicated as a far reaching change in the value-system 
hierarchy. It is this change in the value-system hierarchy, from Aristotelianism to the new 
science, which becomes the area for discussion of the relative merits of the alternative 
world-views: what values remained the same; where in the hierarchy these values were 
placed, which values were dropped, which values were introduced, and so on, are the 
sorts of questions which are asked. What is happening here is that debate is being 
broadened past simple empirical adequacy, apparent falsifications, and formalistic notions 
of theoretical preferability, which themselves only function as values amongst other 
51 Phil. Papers Voll. p. 16. £n. 39.
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values. For example, the acceptance of relativity theory can be seen as being influenced 
by the values of mathematical simplicity, elegance, and such, just as much by relativity 
theory's empirical adequacy. In the debate between Einstein and Bohr over the adequacy 
of quantum mechanics, empirical adequacy was not the point at issue, the debate was 
conducted over what other sorts of values scientific theories should fulfil.52
3.5 Conclusion.
Feyerabend never said that any two theories are incommensurable. For 
Feyerabend, incommensurability is the result of trying to apply formalistic, 'Rationalistic', 
notions of inter-theoretic relations to realistically interpreted, high-level, universal 
theories. Thus the conclusion that some theories turn out to be incommensurable was 
designed to be a reductio ad absurdum o f the formalistic notions involved: that theories 
could be totally incommensurable is an absurd and ridiculous result. Feyerabend's 
alternative involves working with a plurality o f theories, taking a values-oriented 
approach, and highlighting the reconceptualised importance of predictive empirical 
experience.
52 This sketch of the idea of values-based rationality is taken up again in chapters 5-7.
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4 Feverabend’s Relativism
4.1 Introduction.
In the last chapter I contended that Feyerabend supports a minimal realism: there 
is a world, it has a nature. And that there is a minimal sense of accessibility to that world, 
given to humans causally via sense perception. These two postulates are essential for 
understanding Feyerabend's conception of incommensurability: two incommensurable 
theories, if interpreted realistically, cannot both be fully realistic accounts of the world, 
one, or both, must be faulty. Feyerabend's exhortation to actively search for 
incommensurable alternatives to dominant theories can be seen as a means to encourage 
deeper investigations as to the nature of the world. This is achieved in two senses: firstly, 
the realisation that there are incommensurable alternatives to a dominant theory, gives to 
the individual investigator, or community of investigators, psychological motivation to 
search for a more comprehensive theoretical standpoint. Secondly, and, for Feyerabend, 
more importantly, the proposal of incommensurable alternatives is necessary for the 
discovery of hitherto unthought of empirical facts.1
However, these conclusions seem to run counter to the assertions, which can be 
formulated independently of the issue of incommensurability, that Feyerabend is a 
relativist. In fact, Feyerabend has described himself as a Protagorean relativist; for 
example, Feyerabend states th a t"Relativism (in the old and simple sense of Protagoras) 
gives an adequate account o f the situation [the particular relation between reason and 
practice which Feyerabend endorses] which thus emerges" (SFS, p. 9.)2 Can these two 
positions, realism and relativism, be coherently, jointly, entertained? Even if the answer 
to that question is positive, does Feyerabend support such an account? Or has 
Feyerabend adopted a position o f relativism in his later career in contradistinction to his 
earlier espousal of realism?
1 Cf. for example, Feyerabend's discusion of Brownian motion: the second law of thermodynamics was 
able to be refuted only after the kinetic theory had been proposed. AM, pp. 38-41.
2 Cf. also SFS, pp. 79-86. and "Notes on Relativism", in FTR, pp. 19-89.
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As a preliminary conclusion, Feyerabend has stated that "relativism is as much of 
a chimaera as absolutism, its cantankerous twin".3 Notice here that relativism is opposed 
to absolutism, not to realism. Notice also that, for Feyerabend, the relativism/absolutism 
either/or dichotomy is illusory and does not capture any deep philosophical divisions. So 
too, I want to conclude, the realism/idealism dichotomy is, for Feyerabend, misleading in 
its mutual exclusiveness. Feyerabend's philosophy cuts across these dichotomies and, as 
such, contains aspects of all distinctions involved. Nevertheless, it is interesting to track 
Feyerabend's philosophy in terms of relativism and realism as it gives us insight into 
Feyerabend's unique metaphysical and epistemological outlook.
4.2 Realism and Relativism.
There is no single identifiable position which we can name unequivocally as 
relativism, or one identifiable position which we can unequivocally name realism. 
Consequently, to say that realism and relativism can be compatible depends on what 
substantive stance we take on these positions.
There is a very common tendency, identified by Richard Bernstein, to conceive 
the relativism debate in terms of an either/or dichotomy between 'objectivism' and 
'relativism':
By 'objectivism,' I mean the basic conviction that there is or must be some 
permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately 
appeal in determining the nature o f rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, 
goodness, or rightness
and, conversely:
relativism is the basic conviction that when we turn to the examination of 
those concepts that philosophers have taken to be the most fundamental... 
we are forced to recognize that in the final analysis all such concepts must 
be understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical 
framework, paradigm, form of life, society or culture ... For the relativist, 
there is no substantive overarching framework or single metalanguage by
3 Feyerabend, "Concluding Unphilosophical Conversation" p. 515.
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which we can rationally adjudicate or univocally evaluate competing 
claims of alternative paradigms 4
Bernstein contends that there has been a tendency to conceive the choice between these 
alternatives as an either/or situation: there is no middle ground. Once objectivism is 
rejected then, it is felt, there is no other alternative except the radical relativism 
adumbrated above. Bernstein believes that this either/or dichotomy is false and needs to 
be relinquished. This point of Bernstein's is exactly Feyerabend's point. In conducting his 
reductio o f what Feyerabend calls 'Rationalist' philosophy, which can be identified with 
Bernstein's 'objectivism', Feyerabend plays upon the either/or dichotomy: by showing that 
'Rationalist' philosophies cannot explicate the rationality of science, and that science 
seems to work in ways directly counter to the presuppositions o f 'Rationalist' philosophy, 
Feyerabend contends that the 'Rationalist', according to their own philosophy, must 
accept that science is irrational and relativistic. This conclusion is not meant to be taken 
literally, it is meant to be understood in the context of a reductio; as Feyerabend has 
pointed out, the employer of a reductio argument does not have to accept the premises 
upon which the reductio is conducted. Feyerabend wants to do away with 'Rationalism', 
and this includes the either/or dichotomy with which it is indelibly linked.5
Given this analysis, the variety of relativism as characterised by Bernstein is not 
the relativism which Feyerabend wants to defend. This may be just as well, for it is this 
variety of radical relativism which falls victim to the oft-repeated charge of incoherence, 
that is, that relativism of this sort is self-defeating. The incoherency predicated of 
relativism rests on a very simple argument: if all truth is relative to system, scheme, 
paradigm, form of life, then the status o f the relativistic claim itself is problematic. If the
4 R.J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis, p. 8. J. 
Margolis, in his Pragmatism Without Foundations: Reconciling Realism and Relativism, pp. 69-73. has 
taken issue with Bernstein for presenting relativism in such a manner. Relativism, Margolis contends, is 
not synonymous with the extreme radical relativism which Bernstein portrays. While we may agree with 
Margolis's sentiments, he has completely missed the point of Bernstein's analysis. Bernstein is 
presenting a tendency in modem thought, one which he does not necessarily ascribe to himself. This 
tendency, caught in the either/or dichotomy, places relativism with scepticism, irrationalism, nihilism, 
and other 'bad' positions. Whether relativism, interpreted correctly, can be rescued from this association, 
a claim that Margolis (and Feyerabend and Bernstein) makes, is beside the point for the purposes which 
Bernstein appropriates the term 'relativism' for.
5 For details, see chapter 1.
I l l
relativistic thesis is considered absolutely true, then the thesis is wrong, there are non- 
relativistic, absolute truths. Alternatively, if the thesis is taken literally, then the 
relativistic claim itself is true only in relation to a paradigm or form of life, and therefore 
does not preclude the possibility of absolute truths 6
The incoherency argument imputing self-refutation to radical relativism does not 
have to be questioned: it can be accepted without qualms. But this does not then carry 
the further implication that any form of relativism is thus refuted. Rather, we can follow 
Margolis and say that any form of relativism which is susceptible to the charge of 
incoherence is 'uninteresting' and should be avoided from the outset.7 The further 
question to be asked is whether different, non-radical, forms o f relativism can be 
proposed which do not fall victim to self-refutation. Margolis's solution is to say that
relativism can be made formally compatible with the admission of the 
standard use of 'true' and 'false,' provided only that the set of judgments 
that take the values 'true' and 'false' be segregated from those that take the 
weaker values. Any such system, in which the ascription of the weaker 
values presupposes a domain to which the stronger values apply and 
depends upon the application to that domain of the stronger values may be 
termed a robust relativism. Tor example ... if [in relation to Quine] ... 
ontology can be segregated from a certain minimal range of empirical 
findings about behavioral responses to 'non-verbal stimulation' - then, to 
that extent, ontology can be treated relativistically, relative to a body of 
empirical knowledge or science that is not construed relativistically.8
This solution is identical in form to my contention that Feyerabend accepts a minimal
realism with a minimal, two-way, causal accessibility to that world. It is easy to see how
such a conception can obviate the charge of incoherence: the 'all truths are relative'
6 Comprehensive presentations of this argument can be found in H. Siegel, Relativism Refuted: A 
Critique o f  Contemporary Epistemological Relativism. And in J.F. Harris, Against Relativism: A 
Philosophical Defense o f Method. It is quite ironic that both authors, in 'refuting' radical relativism, a 
position they have to push their protagonists into, do not then accept radical, Vulgar' absolutism. (Siegel 
pp. 163-4.) The irony consists in the fact that Harris, an absolutist, and Margolis, a relativist, both look 
to Pierce and pragmatism as a means of providing their respective absolutist/relativist frameworks. This 
seems to suggest that once we move away from straw-positions and obfuscating, partisan terminology, 
the substantive positions arrived at meet in the middle, so to speak. It is also interesting to note that 
Harris's book, as the title suggests, is ostensively an attack upon Feyerabend: Feyerabend is presented as 
the arch-relativist. However, apart from out of context quotes and asides, nowhere in the book are 
Feyerabend's ideas examined in any detail. Such a ready pigeon-holing of Feyerabend for rhetorical 
purposes (we need demons to fight) is a regrettable tendency.
7 Margolis, Pragmatism Without Foundations, p. 11.
% Ibid.. p. 19.
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formula, with its obvious logical blunder, is not asserted. Rather, many, possibly 
uncountable, universal, absolute truths, of a particular kind, are acceptable.
Consequently, the idea that relativism is presented as true is not self-defeating: a 
relativist thesis can be an absolute truth, alongside the other absolute truths.
For Feyerabend, the non-relativistic truths are the low-level truths associated 
with perceptual stimulation. This is to be understood as in no way returning Feyerabend 
to some sort o f positivistic position with regards to empirical experience, sense 
experience is not completely indubitable, and does not the provide the foundations upon 
which all knowledge is built. Certainly, all knowledge has connections, and makes 
reference to, sense experience, but the structure of knowledge is not reducible to sense 
experience. An example may clarify the situation: imagine a westerner and a native 
walking through the jungle, they do not know each others language and little of each 
others culture; suddenly, from very close by, a ferocious roar is heard; both westerner 
and native show obvious signs o f fear and assume defensive positions. In this example, it 
does not matter what the higher level world views, forms of life, paradigms and so on, of 
the westerner and native are, in fact, we may presume that they are radically different.
But their difference of world view in no way obviates the fact that they both hear a loud, 
threatening sound and react accordingly to it. The existence o f the sound was an 
objective fact. It is the interpretation of sense experience, our higher level theorising 
about the world, which is conducive to a relativistic rendering.
One can even state the case for minimal realism, with two-way causal interaction 
with, and accessibility to, this minimal realist world, in a much stronger form: minimal 
realism is a necessary condition of any social relativism. This might sound a little drastic, 
but even David Bloor, one of the defenders of the 'strong programme' in the sociology of 
knowledge, adopts just this position in order to avoid the charges o f incoherence levelled 
at the strong programme. Bloor contends that
No consistent sociologist could ever present knowledge as a fantasy 
unconnected with our experiences of the material world around us ... For 
consider how such a fantasy would have to be transmitted to new members 
of society. It would depend on education, training, indoctrination, social
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influence and pressure. All of these presuppose the reliability of perception 
and the ability to detect, retain and act upon perceived regularities and 
discriminations. Human bodies and voices are part of the material world 
and social learning is part of learning how the material world functions ... 
Materialism and the reliability of sense experience are thus presupposed by 
the sociology of knowledge and no retreat from these assumptions is 
permissible.9
The assumption o f veridical sense perception, and successful meaningful communication 
between human beings, are all too obvious requirements for a social theory of 
knowledge. If these assumptions were not met, then the resultant theory could not, by 
definition, be a social theory; rather, it would be a subjectivistic-solipsistic theory of 
knowledge.
This minimal realist position can also be used to counter another objection often 
raised against relativism: the so-called 'bridgehead' argument. Stephen Lukes 
characterises the bridgehead argument as follows:
in the very identification o f beliefs and ... of belief systems we must 
presuppose commonly shared standards of truth and of inference, and ... 
we must further presuppose a commonly shared core of beliefs whose 
content or meaning is fixed by application o f the standards . 10
If this bridgehead is denied, then it is asserted that relativism is incoherent. This
argument is crucially dependent upon what is considered necessary to be in the
bridgehead, and what not. It seems to me that the minimal realism outlined above
provides an adequate bridgehead for the process of understanding and communication to
proceed. But the type of bridgehead envisaged by Lukes and others is o f a far greater
scope and substantiality. Thus Barnes and Bloor deny the existence of a bridgehead, in
the sense of the above quote, but as we saw, they support the idea of veridical sense
perception as a precondition o f social existence. What Barnes and Bloor want to
emphasise is that ''although we may well all share the same unverbalized environment,
9 D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edition, pp. 33-4.
10 S. Lukes, "Relativism in its Place", in M. Hollis, and S. Lukes (eds) Rationality and Relativism, p. 
262. See also the papers by Hollis, "The Social Destruction of Reality", who believes that the nature of 
the bridgehead can be ascertained a priori. And Newton-Smith, "Relativism and the Possibility of 
Interpretation", who believes that the nature of the bridgehead is ascertained a posteriori. Both papers in 
the volume above.
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there are any number of equally reasonable ways of speaking o f it."11 This idea, that even 
though we may all receive the same sense perceptions, we may nevertheless construct 
different, equally reasonable, interpretations of that experience, is labelled by Lukes "a 
thoroughgoing relativism of truth and of reason ... applied to the practical beliefs of 
primary theory no less than to all other beliefs".12 But this is completely unfair and leads 
to a dangerously broad conception of what a bridgehead is meant to supply. On this 
conception, a bridgehead between cultures or forms of life must provide a unique and 
totally true interpretation o f sense experience. Expressed in this way, I'm sure that even 
Lukes would not accept that requirement. Barnes and Bloor want to say that the Karam 
people, who classify birds and bats, but not the Cassowary, as 'Yakts', do so for reasons 
which are not obviously confuted by perceptual experience.13 Our scientific classification 
of animals is not something given to us by raw experience, rather, it is the result of 
centuries o f biological research and carries with it huge amounts of theoretical 
machinery .14 All that we need to begin the process of understanding and communication 
is the idea that sense perception is common to all people, any more than that is 
unnecessary baggage which may hinder the process in question.
It may be replied that this relativistic thesis does not yet escape the charge of 
incoherency, the relativistic thesis is not a low-level empirical fact, it is a high level 
theoretical construct, and, as such, is itself a relative truth. This is a valid response, but I 
will leave further discussion o f this point until a later section. Suffice it to say that 
Feyerabend believes relativism to be an empirical hypothesis: an hypothesis which it is 
possible to refute. "It is a matter of research and not o f philosophical fiat to decide 
whether the world we inhabit resembles a duck-rabbit picture." (FTR, p. 81.) Be that as 
it may, it seems that a coherent argument can be presented in support o f the compatibility 
o f realism and relativism.
11 B. Barnes, and D. Bloor, "Relativism, Rationality and the Sociology of Knowledge" in Hollis and 
Lukes, Rationality and Relativism, p. 40.
12 Lukes, "Relativism in its Place", p. 266.
13 Barnes and Bloor, "Relativism ...", pp. 38-40.
14 Who, on sense perception alone, would have conceived that whales and dolphins are more closely 
related to humans than are birds and reptiles?
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4.3 FeverabencTs Changing Attitudes Towards Relativism.
4.3.1 Science in a Free Society.
Relativism, of some sort, could never be denied of Feyerabend's philosophy, but 
it is not usually the simplistic relativism of the sort which falls victim to charges of 
incoherence. In fact, Feyerabend is a realist in many respects and a relativist in others.15 
Relativism is not an overarching presupposition of his philosophy. That being said, if we 
look over his career we find radical realism defended in his early papers, followed by 
radical agnosticism,16 followed by radical relativism, and finally, some sort o f in-between 
realism/relativism mix. Thus Feyerabend's position on the relativism issue has seemed to 
change with every new paper he published, but there does seem to be a general trend 
which can be delineated, and which presents a coherent version o f relativism whilst 
remaining minimally realist.
Feyerabend's radical relativistic period is best represented in his book, Science in 
a Free Society. Here we find statements which cannot fail to be interpreted in the most 
extreme relativistic manner. For example, Feyerabend contends that
realism may be interpreted as a particular theory about the relation 
between man and the world, and it may be interpreted as a presupposition 
o f  science (and knowledge in general). It seems that most philosophical 
realists adopt the second alternative- they are dogmatists. But even the 
first alternative can now be criticized and shown to be incorrect. All we 
need to do is to point out how often the world changed because o f a 
change in basic theory ... we certainly cannot assume that two 
incommensurable theories deal with one and the same objective state of 
affairs (to make the assumption we would have to assume that both at 
least refer to the same objective situation. But how can we assert that 'they 
both' refer to the same situation when 'they both' never make sense 
together? .. .) Hence, unless we want to assume that they deal with 
nothing at all we must admit that they deal with different worlds and that 
the change (from one world to another) has been brought about by a 
switch from one theory to another ... Speaking in this manner we no 
longer assume an objective world that remains unaffected by our epistemic
15 See "Concluding Unphilosophical Conversation" p. 507, "I confess to be a fervent relativist in some 
senses, I am certainly not a relativist in others".
16 Actually, I don't know whether it was agnosticism, or whether it was simply silence.
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activities ... We concede that our epistemic activities may have a decisive 
influence even upon the most solid piece of cosmological furniture - they 
may make gods disappear and replace them by heaps of atoms in empty 
space. (SFS, p. 70.)
This passage, as it stands, is quite absurd, and seems to run counter to my suggestion 
that Feyerabend avoided the incoherency charge by supporting a minimal realism. It also 
quite explicitly vindicates Sankey's claim that Feyerabend believes in referential 
discontinuity between incommensurable theories. But, somewhat paradoxically, it 
contains the beginnings o f Feyerabend's more coherent account, which he developed 
over subsequent papers, and which saw him return to a realistic position sufficient to 
support the account of incommensurability presented in the last chapter. At the time of 
Science in a Free Society, however, a coherent position is very hard to find.
In this book, Feyerabend contends that a central problem to be addressed is the 
relation between reason and practice. He sees three different manners in which reason 
and practice might be supposed to interact. Firstly, Feyerabend proposes what he here 
calls 'idealism'. This position amounts to what he elsewhere calls 'Rationalism', and what 
Bernstein calls 'objectivism': "Idealism assumes that practice ... is crude material to be 
formed by Reason ... it is the conscious and systematic application of Reason to a partly 
structured, partly amorphous material that gives us Science" (SFS, p. 7). A second 
position, which Feyerabend calls 'naturalism',
assumes that history, the law, science are already as perfect as they can be 
... the attempt to rearrange science or society with some explicit theories 
o f rationality in mind would disturb the delicate balance of thought, 
emotion, imagination and the historical conditions under which they are 
applied and would create chaos, not perfection ... To understand all the 
many possibilities of Reason ... one has to see it in action, one has to 
analyse history and its temporal products. (SFS, p. 7)
Feyerabend goes on to say that both idealism and naturalism have disadvantages and that
these disadvantages can be removed by "combining naturalism and idealism and
postulating an interaction of Reason and Practice". (SFS, p. 8.)17 According to
Feyerabend, interactionism
17 Italicised in original.
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means that Reason and Practice enter history on equal terms. Reason is no 
longer an agency that directs other traditions, it is a tradition in its own 
right with as much (or as little) claim to the centre o f the stage as any 
other tradition. Being a tradition it is neither good nor bad, it simply is.
(SFS, p. 8)
I find these passages very confused. The last quote explicitly states that Reason is a 
separate, independent tradition: just one tradition among many traditions. But if the 
solution to the problem of the relation between reason and practice is an interactionism 
between reason and practice, as Feyerabend contends, then this seems to imply that 
reason is involved in all practices. Interpreted in this way, reason does seem to have 
pride of place in the centre of the stage, in that it is indispensable to the ongoing practice 
of all traditions. On the other hand, Feyerabend's comments concerning idealism and 
naturalism seem to suggest that reason is not an independent tradition in its own right, 
but that we can have an attitude towards a particular 'reason' which sees it as 
independent from the particular practice to which it is applied. There seems to be two 
different strands of thought here which Feyerabend runs together, for example, 
Feyerabend states that "reason and practice are not two different kinds o f entities but 
parts o f a single dialectical process" (SFS, p. 25), this implies that within a practice a 
process operates whereby abstract formulisations are derived from the ongoing activities 
of that practice. These abstract formulisations then act as guides to ongoing activity, but 
can still be changed and affected by the ongoing activity in a negative feed-back loop. 
But he then goes on to say that
What is called 'reason' and 'practice' are ... two different types o f practice 
the difference being that the one clearly exhibits some simple and easily 
producible formal aspects thus making us forget the complex and hardly 
understood properties that guarantee the simplicity and producibility while 
the other drowns the formal aspects under a great variety of accidental 
properties. But complex and implicit reason is still reason and a practice 
with simple formal features hovering above a pervasive but unnoticed 
background of linguistic habits is still a practice. (SFS, p. 26)
This passage assumes a difference, in contradistinction to what Feyerabend seemed to
say before, between reason and practice. Rather than a single dialectical process
connecting reason and practice, we have reason pragmatically distinguished from any
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practice; and practice, though incorporating unarticulated reason, as nevertheless distinct 
from reason. Feyerabend seems to confuse the distinction between Reason, with a capital 
R, as something universally applicable to all practices, and reason, with a lower case r, 
the reason o f a practice. It seems plausible to assume that a particular practice can arrive 
at an abstract, formulised, representation of the reason deemed to be implicit within the 
practice, while not supposing that this reason therefore constitutes an independent 
tradition.
Another instance of Feyerabend's confusion at this time can be found in his talk of 
traditions. Feyerabend presents the thesis that "Traditions are neither good nor bad, they 
simply are". (SFS, p. 27.) And a second thesis that "A tradition assumes desirable or 
undesirable properties only when compared with some tradition", (SFS, p. 27.) that is, 
objective-sounding judgements concerning the merits of traditions only arise from the 
view-point of a particular tradition which is presupposed in the judgement.
Consequently, for Feyerabend, objective-sounding judgements are not, in fact, objective, 
but are inherently subjective:
The subjectivity is noticed as soon as participants realize that different 
traditions give rise to different judgements. They will then have to revise 
the content of their value statements just as physicists revised the content 
of even the simplest statement concerning length when it was discovered 
that length depends on reference systems ... those who still cling to 
absolute lengths cannot pride themselves on forming a special school of 
especially astute physicists who have overcome relativity. They are just 
pigheaded, or badly informed, or both. (SFS, p. 28.)
It seems to me that these passages are contradictory , if it is necessary to revise value
statements once it is realised that these judgements are subjective and tradition
dependent, then there is no sense in which the judgements, for example, true and false,
can be applied at all. The revision of value statements pursuant upon the realisation that
these statements are subjective, is not a revision, in the sense of a re-ordering of value
statements, but a decision to rescind all value statements and to cease engaging in any
evaluative process whatsoever. Alternatively, the analogy with scientific decision making
directly subverts this conclusion. Granted, scientists did, in fact, revise the content o f
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their theoretical system once it was realised that length is relative to a reference frame.
But in this situation the value statement true, once predicated of the concept of absolute 
length, was replaced by the value statement false. The relativistic conception of length as 
relative to reference system, was then considered true. The revision which took place 
was a re-ordering of value statements, not a relinquishment o f evaluation itself.
If we take the analogy with scientific decision making even more concretely, then 
the situation is even worse for the prospects of a coherent account. The classical 
physicist who adheres to absolute length can be said to be upholding the traditions of 
classical physics, as such, Feyerabend's evaluation of that physicist as pig-headed is 
illegitimate: traditions are neither good or bad. The supposedly necessary revision of 
physics was not, in fact, necessary because relativistic and classical physics are different 
traditions and the evaluation of their respective merits is therefore subjective.
Feyerabend can reply to this by saying that the analogy with science was intended 
as just that, an analogy: it was meant to convey the idea that even the most basic of 
evaluations can be changed, including that most basic of evaluations, that there are 
tradition independent criteria of evaluation. In the case of the evaluation o f competing 
scientific theories, Feyerabend can say that differential evaluation is possible because the 
various scientific theories are within the tradition o f science. It is only once we attempt 
to comparatively evaluate whole forms of life that evaluation becomes inapplicable. For 
example, a comparative evaluation of western scientific culture and, say, Azande culture 
is, on this account, impossible.
That may be so, but Feyerabend needs to give an account of where the line is 
between legitimate, intra-traditional evaluation, and illegitimate extra-traditional 
evaluation. Feyerabend has often contended that classical and relativistic physics are 
incommensurable theories: they are different paradigms. But Feyerabend has also often 
contended that incommensurable theories can be legitimately comparatively evaluated. If 
incommensurable theories can be evaluated, then what distinguishes forms of life such 
that they cannot be evaluated? Feyerabend has also objected to the idea that there is 
some monolithic unitary structure called 'science': he sees science as a heterogeneous
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collection o f disparate paradigms, ideas and practices. If  there is no unity in science, then 
what constitutes the form of life of western scientific culture, as distinct from other non- 
scientific cultures and forms of life? At this stage, answers to these questions are not 
forthcoming.
A third example of the confusion evident in Science in a Free Society comes 
when we find that Feyerabend makes a personal confession as to a realist conversion, 
(SFS, p. 113.) and contends that while he defends a political relativism, where all 
traditions have equal rights, he nevertheless claims that "Philosophicalrelativism ... the 
doctrine that all traditions, theories, ideas are equally true or equally false or ... that any 
distribution of truth values over traditions is acceptable ... is nowhere defended in the 
present book". (SFS, p. 83.) However, two pages before this passage we find him stating 
that "classifying traditions as true or false ... means projecting the point o f view of other 
traditions upon them" (SFS, p. 81.) so that there is no such thing as a tradition 
independent truth: ascriptions o f truth are relative to a tradition doing the ascribing. 
Something which is true from the perspective of one tradition can be equally validly false 
from the perspective o f a different tradition. This idea is philosophical relativism, in the 
usual sense of the term, yet Feyerabend denies that he supports philosophical relativism.
It is possible that Feyerabend can avoid a charge o f contradiction in this instance by 
contending that the intuitive interpretation of terms such as true and false, are inherently 
objectivistically tainted, and that Feyerabend, therefore, rejects the usual interpretation of 
the terms and, instead, uses the terms as applicable only in relation to a particular 
tradition. From this perspective the contention that all traditions are equally true or 
equally false can be consistently denied, for it amounts to the claim that, from the 
perspective of a particular tradition, science, for example, all traditions are equally true 
or false. But from the perspective of science, all traditions are not equally true or false: 
from this perspective, science itself is seen to be true, while magic, witchcraft and 
astrology are not. Though Feyerabend can avoid the charge of contradiction, his evasion 
is not very convincing. Regardless of any such manoeuvring, Feyerabend is still left with 
a version of relativism which it is difficult to reconcile with his professed/confessed
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realism. At any rate, the lengthy passage quoted at the beginning of this section explicitly 
denied the validity of any realistic thesis.
To conclude this section, I want to say that the confusion and inconsistencies that 
are apparent in SFS, seem to stem from an as yet unsuccessful attempt by Feyerabend to 
produce a workable, coherent theory which avoids both radical realism and radical 
relativism. It is my contention that the ideas that are introduced in SFS are developed in 
subsequent articles and many deficiencies rectified.18
4.3.2 Farewell to Reason.
In Farewell to Reason, Feyerabend recast the distinction he had previously made
between idealistic and naturalistic attitudes towards traditions in terms of
theoretical/abstract traditions, on the one hand, and empirical/historical traditions on the
other. Theoretical traditions, which Feyerabend sees exemplified by Parmenides, Plato
and modem 'Rationalists' is the now familiar position where
The members of theoretical traditions identify knowledge with universality, 
regard theories as the true bearers of information and try to reason in a 
standardised or 'logical' way. They want to bring knowledge under the rule 
of universal laws. Theories, according to them, identify what is permanent 
in the flux of history and thereby make it unhistorical. (FTR, p. 118.)
The appeal, and much of the justification, of a theoretical/abstract approach, consists in 
its use o f logical proofs, that is, if we want a complete, interconnected, system of 
knowledge, then we need to be able to unambiguously demonstrate the interconnections 
between different parts o f the system, and the consequences derivable from the system. I 
think that Feyerabend is right when he stresses that in such a system abstract concepts 
are a necessity. The main attraction o f such a position is that if you follow a given
18 In fact, if  we look over Feyerabend's entire career, SFS, and other articles of that period, appear as 
anomalies in the general trend of Feyerabend's philosophy. Without this period, Feyerabend's philosophy 
is surprisingly, though not totally, consistent. It is also interesting to note that many modem day 
criticisms of Feyerabend utilise SFS as their main point of attack, then read back from SFS to his other 
writings, interpreting them from the perspective of SFS. From the above analysis in the text, it is not 
surprising to then find Feyerabend's views radically incoherent. But I believe that this is the wrong way 
of conceiving of Feyerabend's philosophy: SFS must be considered to be anomalous, and therefore, 
though not dispensible, at least secondary in the interpretation of Feyerabend's views.
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procedure, then the conclusion or end-product of this procedure will not only be rational, 
but also, hopefully, unique. Provided, of course, that the procedure followed was the 
correct procedure. But if the concepts involved in both the procedure itself and the 
subject matter to which the procedure is applied are ambivalent or ambiguous, then the 
conclusion or end-products of the procedure will be either ambiguous or multifarious. 
Different people will interpret the ambiguous concepts differently. The hoped for unique 
rational end-product will not result. Consequently, to gain better results from proof 
procedures, concepts must be unambiguously defined: the commonsense multiplicity 
must be simplified and the core meaning abstracted from the putative accidental features 
given to concepts in everyday affairs.
But Feyerabend argues that if these procedures, harmless in themselves, and, in 
fact, a welcome addition to epistemic variety, are regarded as the sole source of true 
knowledge, then this is an unfounded, question-begging, claim:
We may agree that abstract notions and principles can be connected more 
easily than practical (empirical) concepts ... But the fact that simple ideas 
can be connected in simple ways gives the resulting propositions special 
authority only if everything can be shown to consist o f simple things - 
which was precisely the point on which disagreements arose! (FTR, p. 67.)
If concepts are complex and have different meanings and significance in every different
situation in which they are applicable, then the idea of abstract concepts divests concepts
of important aspects of their meaning: it creates a situation wherein the applicability and
adaptability of concepts to varying situations is greatly curtailed.
I think it is easy to see where Feyerabend is going with this. Concepts should
never be tied down to particular definitions, this only gives the impression that they
cannot be changed. If we look at the history of any concept we would like to choose, we
will find that, in fact, concepts have continually evolved over time. For example, the
concept o f an atom is still used today, even though this concept has undergone radical
changes over the millennia of its use. Something of the infinite Parmenidean 'ones' of the
original Greek atomists survived up to Dalton, but the subsequent development of the
concept: from indivisibility, to divisibility, through the solar system analogy, to the
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current quantum-mechanical models, have left us with a concept o f the atom with few 
similarities with that of the original Greek atomists. If we had been resolved to stick with 
the concept of the atom at any one stage in history, believing that we couldn't possibly 
mean anything else by the term atom, then the evolution and adaptation of the concept of 
the atom to the changing circumstances and roles in which it was and has been placed, 
would have been delayed and obfuscated
On the other hand, according to Feyerabend, empirical traditions, or, 
equivalently, common-sense views, or practical traditions,
contain subtly articulated ontologies ... [where] each entity behaves in a 
complex and characteristic way which, though conforming to a pattern, 
constantly reveals new and surprising features and thus cannot be captured 
in a formula, it affects, and is affected by, other entities and processes 
constituting a rich and varied universe. (FTR, p. 64.)
In a tradition of this sort, knowledge is "a collection of opinions, each of them obtained
by procedures appropriate to the domain from which the opinions arose." (FTR, p. 72.)
The members of historical traditions emphasise what is particular ... They 
rely on lists, stories, and asides, reason by example, analogy, and free 
association and use 'logical' rules when it suits their purpose. They also 
emphasise the plurality and, via the plurality, the history dependence of 
logical standards. (FTR, p. 118.)19
Feyerabend sees the forms of knowledge produced by such a tradition as valid 
knowledge of a specific sort. The juxtaposition of such empirical traditions with
19 There is some confusion in Feyerabend's discussion of empirical and theoretical traditions. The 
distinctions given above seem to imply that theoretical/abstract traditions, in being opposed to historical 
traditions, are therefore ahistorical. However, Feyerabend contends that "abstract traditions are not 
alternatives of historical traditions; they are special parts of them ... The dichotomy between historical 
traditions and abstract traditions ... does not reflect a real difference: all traditions are historical 
traditions" ("Historical Background: Some Observations on the Decay of the Philosophy of Science", in 
Phil. Papers Vol.2. p. 8. Cf. also FTR pp. 126-7.) That is, all traditions are inevitably historically bound 
and infused with the psycho-social, cultural and intellectual milieu of the time. It is important to note 
that this historical relativism is no absolute obstruction to the understanding of different cultures in time 
and space: Feyerabend himself has examined Galileo and Homeric Greeks and attempted to understand 
them as they were. This historical relativism only implies that the way in which we study other cultures 
and previous times, must not be undertaken from the perspective of our own culture, or with 
preconceived notions as to what is rational and objective. Looked at in this way, apparently ahistorical, 
absolutistic perspectives are simply disguised relativistic ones where absolutist/objectivist sounding 
phrases give the impression of objectivity, but only serve to obscure the perspective from which the 
judgements are made. But this form of relativism is not a very radical one: it is not a relativism which 
cuts off communication and understanding, and it does not preclude the idea of the acceptability of a 
minimal realism.
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theoretical traditions does not derive simply from the use o f abstract concepts and 
abstract generalisations within theoretical traditions: no tradition, theoretical or 
empirical, can exist without abstractions and generalisations. Rather, it is the attempt to 
systematically organise all knowledge in the form of abstract concepts and abstract 
generalisations, and to then make the further implication that knowledge, true, real 
knowledge, is identical with such abstract structures, which Feyerabend sees as the 
objectionable feature of theoretical traditions. '"Problems of reality' arise [only] when the 
ingredients of complex worlds of . . .[the empirical, commonsense] kind are subsumed 
under abstract concepts and are then evaluated, i.e. declared to be either 'real' or 'unreal' 
on that basis" (FTR, p. 64.) Feyerabend is claiming that there are many different forms of 
knowledge, and many different aspects o f reality. Theoretical traditions deny this 
plurality: theoretical traditions are predicated upon the idea of a metaphysical dualism 
between appearance and reality. The inherent non-universalisability and multifariousness 
of sense experience, which gives rise to loose and adaptable concepts, is devalued in such 
a system and labelled merely appearance, while the universalisable and strict concepts 
derived through abstraction are considered to be indicative o f reality. Feyerabend does 
not deny that abstract/theoretical traditions produce knowledge, of a specific sort, nor 
does he deny that abstract/theoretical traditions can realistically describe aspects of the 
universe. What Feyerabend does deny is the contention that a theoretical/abstract 
approach is an exclusive approach to knowledge, and that the results o f its procedures, 
and its procedures alone, are 'real'.
In this formulation there is no 'rationality' or 'reason', conceived o f as an 
independent tradition, separate from all other traditions. As we saw, this caused trouble 
in Feyerabend's earlier formulations of the issue. What we have instead is a 
theoretical/abstract tendency o f thought which may arise in any particular tradition:
we arrive at the hypothesis that there exist many different ways o f living 
and of building up knowledge. Each of these ways may give rise to 
abstract thought which in turn may split into competing abstract theories. 
Scientific theories [for example] ... branch out in different directions, use
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different... concepts and evaluate events in different ways. (FTR, pp. 74- 
5.)
What Feyerabend is pointing out is that there can be many different knowledge systems, 
many different traditions, and that there are two basic attitudes that we can take towards 
these traditions: we can accept the abundance of facts and particulars given to us by our 
empirical experience of the world, both social and non-social, and no more, or, we can 
try to look for abstract generalisations and regularities behind the particulars, thereby 
'annihilating' the particulars, as it were.
That Feyerabend is describing tendencies o f thought with this 
theoretical/empirical dichotomy, rather than explicit traditions in themselves, can be 
illustrated with reference to Feyerabend's ideas on science. Science, as an activity, and a 
tradition, is exceedingly heterogeneous. Some scientists look for the ultimate abstract 
generalisations underpinning empirical experience, while other scientists are 
instrumentalists and are simply concerned with the outcomes of particular experimental 
situations. The distinction between theoretical and experimental physicists can be roughly 
interpreted along these lines. If we then look towards the interpretation of science as a 
whole, we find an analogous situation: philosophers have traditionally looked for the 
abstract, universal canons of rationality underpinning particular examples of scientific 
activity. On the other hand, in recent decades historians and sociologists of science have 
looked towards the idiosyncrasies of particular scientific episodes and denied that a 
universal abstract characterisation o f science can be found. But the point to be 
emphasised is that science, as a tradition, is neither theoretical or empirical, it contains 
aspects of both sorts of tendencies of thought, in participants and observers.
Feyerabend, o f course, has championed the second type of interpretation of science.
Even though Feyerabend applauds Aristotle because "Aristotle ... attempted a synthesis 
of historical and theoretical (abstract) thought",20 implying that this is the way to go, he 
nevertheless believes that the fact that science is neither theoretical or empirical, but 
both, is ultimately a meta-argument in favour o f the empirical approach. We can make an
20 'Historical Background p. 12.
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Aristotelian analogy here: theoretical/abstract and empirical attitudes towards traditions, 
in their most extreme formulations, constitute the vices to be avoided, virtue is 
somewhere in between. However, in practical judgement of the right course o f action, it 
is better to lean towards the less pernicious vice.
Given this analysis, what then, for Feyerabend, is real? It would seem that he 
would want to deny the reality of abstract ordering schemes in favour of the multiplicity 
of ideas and concepts associated with an empirical attitude towards traditions and 
experience. The local, practical knowledge intimately tied to sense experience, though 
multitudinous, as the only reality. This position would seem to place Feyerabend much 
closer to his traditional logical empiricist opponents than anyone, including Feyerabend, 
would have thought imaginable. But I don't think that this is the conclusion we should 
draw. Recall that Feyerabend applauded Aristotle for what he thought was an admirable 
synthesis of theoretical and empirical tendencies If Feyerabend were to deny reality to all 
abstract/theoretical thought, then it would seem that Feyerabend would be making the 
same mistake he criticised the 'Rationalists' for making when they denied reality to 
appearances: he would simply be inverting the argument and the same criticism of 
question-begging could be levelled at the inverted position. Consequently, the position 
Feyerabend ultimately defends is one in which "Nature herself can be approached in 
many ways ... and responds accordingly" (FTR, p. 76.) and that "we either call quarks 
and Gods equally real, but tied to different circumstances, or we altogether cease talking 
about the 'reality' of things and we use more complex ordering schemes instead." (FTR, 
p. 89.)21 Feyerabend goes on to say that
This world is not a static entity populated by thinking ants who, crawling 
all over its crevices, gradually discover its features without affecting them 
in any way. It is a dynamic and multifaceted entity which affects and 
reflects the activity o f its explorers. It was once a world full o f gods; it 
then became a drab material world and it will, hopefully, change further 
into a more peaceful world where matter and life, thought and feelings, 
innovation and tradition collaborate for the benefit o f all. (FTR, p. 89.)
21 Cf. also FTR, p. 125.
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All this seems to be returning Feyerabend to the radical relativism that he fell victim to in 
SFS, but there is a subtle difference here: "Note that such an interpretation does not deny 
the effectiveness of science as a provider of technologies and basic myths, it only denies 
that scientific objects and they alone are 'real'". (FTR, p. 126.) That is, scientific objects 
are real in their own domain, but in different domains, other, non-scientific, theories and 
ideas, may be just as real. In order to stem the plausible, though false, assumption that 
Feyerabend is a radical idealist, contending that our thoughts literally create and shape 
the world, I will now go off on what seems to be a tangent, but which is essential for 
understanding Feyerabend's position, and dispelling lingering doubts of madness.
4.4 Quantum Physics and Complementarity.
After initially being critical of what has been called the Copenhagen 
Interpretation of quantum physics, Feyerabend came to believe that the Copenhagen 
Interpretation, or more specifically, Bohr's interpretation o f quantum physics, was a 
physically, mathematically and philosophically coherent account of the micro-physical 
domain.22 Though Feyerabend does not present complementarity as a central tenet of his 
philosophy, Bohr's position occurs again and again as an illustrative example of the 
points that Feyerabend argues for.23 It is my contention that a full understanding of 
Feyerabend's conception of quantum physics is necessary in order to focus Feyerabend's 
philosophy. Quantum physics and complementarity appears to loom large in the 
background of much of Feyerabend's philosophy.
22 Feyerabend's defense of Bohr's interpretation of quantum physics can be found in "On a Recent 
Critique of Complementarity: Parts I and II" in Philosophy o f Science 1968-1969. Reprinted as "Bohr's 
Philosophy of Science" in Feyerabend's Phil. Papers Vol. 1. Feyerabend's initial criticisms of the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics mainly revolved around the contention that the 
Copenhagen interpretation was beyond question; that it was turning into a dogmatic assertion rather 
than a critically assessed factual/empirical theory. The dangers of such a dogmatism remained foremost 
in Feyerabend's thought notwithstanding Feyerabend's re-evaluation of Bohr's interpretation of quantum 
physics.
23 For example, in the passage from which the lengthy quote from SFS, in which I adduced that 
Feyerabend, in that book, was supporting a radical, incoherent relativism, there is included a passage, 
which I left out, where Feyerabend supports his claim with an analogy: "since Bohr's analysis of the case 
of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen we know that there are changes which are not the results of a causal 
interaction between object and observer but of a change of the very conditions that permit us to speak of 
objects, situations, events. We appeal to changes of the latter kind when saying that a change of 
universal principles brings about a change of the entire world." p. 70.
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It has been said that Niels Bohr's principle of complementarity provides a 
universal epistemological lesson. Bohr himself states that complementarity should be 
seen as a contribution to the "general philosophical clarification of the presuppositions 
underlying human knowledge." 24 To fully understand the import of complementarity, it is 
essential to juxtapose complementarity with the notions of reality, objectivity and 
knowledge, underlying the classical physical framework.
Within the classical framework the physical world is considered to have its 
attributes and existence independently o f human observers. We come to know this world 
via observation and measurement, the results of which are directly predicable of the 
independent reality. Any effects which observation and measurement may produce are 
calculable and controllable, so that the theories thus arrived at are ideally a 'mirror' image 
of the world, where "every relevant element of reality and every relevant physical 
attribute of these elements has a corresponding counterpart in the theory" 25 Moreover, 
not only does the theory contain counterparts o f all relevant elements o f reality, it also 
exhaustively characterises these elements for all attributes and for all temporal instants.
This last point is crucial, for it is these two conceptions: completeness of 
description and spatio-temporal continuity, which quantum physics has called into 
question. The postulation of continuity is especially important in that it is a notion which 
holds together the entire classical framework and underpins the classical conception of 
objectivity: if a physical system always has determinate attributes, then, in an interaction 
of observation or measurement, it is always theoretically possible to distinguish between 
the observed object and the observing instrument. This is a necessary condition of 
classical objectivity: we must be able to distinguish between what the object is 
independently o f observation, and what we contribute to the situation when observing an 
object. If this was not the case, then it is possible that physical systems have determinate 
attributes only when we interact with them, so that, in a sense, the physical systems
24 N. Bohr, "Causality and Complementarity", Philosophy o f Science, 1937. p. 290. Quoted in H. Folse, 
The Philosophy o f  Niels Bohr: The Framework o f Complementarity, p. 12.
25 C.A. Hooker, "The Nature of Quantum Mechanical Reality: Einstein Versus Bohr", in RG. Colodny 
(ed) Paradigms and Paradoxes, p. 70.
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would not be independent of human observations: we would 'create' the attributes by 
observing. This possible situation is avoided by postulating continuity of state: if all 
physical systems are in a well defined determinate state at all times, then we can say that 
the physical systems possess the attributes which we ascribe to them, whether we are 
interacting with the physical system or not.
Thus, classical objectivity relies upon two postulates: that there is an 
unambiguous distinction between subject and object, and that physical systems possess 
all their attributes at all times. Bohr denies the validity and applicability of these two 
postulates. He does so because of his acceptance of the quantum of action in atomic 
processes, thereby denying the classical ideal of continuity of state: atomic processes are 
discontinuous processes. This discontinuity of atomic processes implies that an atomic 
system does not have determinate values of ail of its attributes at all times. As we saw 
previously, the postulation o f continuity of state was the reason we could separate 
subject from object in an interaction: objects are considered to be in a determinate state 
at all times and are therefore theoretically distinguishable. However, in an interaction of 
observation or measurement in the atomic domain, it is impossible, because of the 
quantum of action, to draw a sharp distinction between the object and the observing or 
measuring instrument. In Bohr's words,
The logical comprehension of hitherto unsuspected fundamental 
regularities governing atomic phenomena has demanded the recognition 
that no sharp separation can be made between an independent behaviour of 
the objects and their interaction with the measuring instruments which 
define the reference frame.26
Consequently, the interaction must be considered as a whole, as an indivisible individual 
process.
For Bohr, and for Feyerabend, the ultimate source of all o f the information we 
have concerning the nature of the world is phenomenal, sensory experience. This sensory 
experience, at least in the macro-world of everyday objects, gives us information 
whereby we can distinguish objects from each other and from ourselves. When we come
26 N. Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, p. 52.
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to the investigation of the atomic domain our sensory information is of an experimental 
arrangement, which includes both observed object and observing instrument. 
Consequently, the object from which we derive empirical generalisations is the entire 
macro-experimental arrangement. This demand of Bohr's to consider the experimental 
arrangement as a whole produces the famous consequences o f complementarity: the 
contention that 'wave' and 'particle' pictures and kinematic and dynamic properties of 
atomic systems are complementary aspects of reality.27 This is because the "experimental 
arrangement required to realize one of the two alternatives rules out, renders 
undefinable, the classical concept appropriate to the description of the other 
alternative" .28 Both are essential for a classically complete description o f atomic 
phenomena, but they are not simultaneously applicable.
We can see here another instance of the divergence from the classical ideal, that 
is, not all the attributes classically associated with objects are determinable at the one 
time. There are, in fact, two mutually exclusive classes of concepts which cannot be 
determined at the same time. If  you are a classical realist, then this is an especially 
difficult concept to accept, surely, if atomic reality is particulate, then the particles must 
simultaneously possess, for example, both position and momentum. The fact that 
quantum physics does not allow simultaneous determination of all physical attributes can 
only be an inadequacy of the theory, not a reflection of the objective situation. On this 
view quantum physics expresses our ignorance of physical factors and our inability to 
determine what is in fact determinate.
Bohr's reply is to say that the properties are not determinate at all, in fact, "we 
are here dealing with the mutually exclusive conditions for the unambiguous use of the 
very concepts of space and time on the one hand, and of dynamical conservation laws on 
the other" ,29 such that if, for example, we wish to precisely determine the position of a 
sub-atomic particle, then, in doing so, we are excluding the conditions necessary for the
27 For a discussion of the difference between these two complementary relationships, see D. Murdoch, 
Niels Bohr's Philosophy o f Physics, ch's. 4 and 5.
28 Hooker, "The Nature of Quantum Mechanical Reality" p. 145.
29 Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, pp. 72-3.
determination of the particles precise momentum: the concept of momentum is just not 
applicable to the situation. Feyerabend uses the example of the Moh's scale of hardness:
the concept of hardness as defined by the Moh's scale ceases to be 
applicable when the temperatures become too high and the same is true of 
surface tension at low temperatures. There is no need to continue this list 
which shows quite clearly the existence of nonprobabilistic concepts which 
characterize experimental setups, are applicable only in certain physical 
conditions, and change abruptly when the conditions change. Bohr 
assumes that position, momentum, etc. are concepts o f exactly this kind 
and he specifies the conditions under which they are applicable, and to 
what degree of precision.30
Feyerabend goes on say that "A block of ice may have a certain hardness on the Moh's 
scale; but when it melts ... its hardness simply ceases to exist" .31 Similarly, once position 
is determined precisely, the physical situation and conditions preclude the determination 
of momentum, because it does not exist.
At this point it must be remembered that although much of Bohr's philosophy of 
complementarity is concerned with the conditions for the applicability o f concepts and is, 
therefore, very much a conceptual issue, this does not mean that complementarity is 
derived from an a priori use of a philosophical theory, and that it has no physical 
underpinning.32 This could not be further from the truth: the whole structure of 
complementarity is based upon the physical discovery of the quantum of action, it is not 
therefore a purely conceptual theory. Rather, complementarity "is a discovery of the 
factual absence of the conditions required for the joint applicability of certain classical 
concepts" .33 Not only that, but, as Feyerabend states, "the hypothesis o f the relational 
character of all dynamical states is a physical hypothesis as it is an attempt to account for 
a long series of interesting conjectures and refutations." 34 That is, many classical realist
30 "On a Recent Critique of Complementarity. Part II" pp. 93-4.
31 IbioL P- 95.
32 Some philosophers have believed that the philosophy of complementarity incorporates a purely 
philosophical theory which has illegitimately risen to prominence and obscured the true understanding 
of quantum physics. See, for example, Feyerabend's discussion of Popper's views in his "On a Recent 
Critique of Complementarity", and M. Bunge, "Strife About Complementarity: Pts. I and II", British 
Journal fo r the Philosophy o f  Science, 6 (1955-1956) for a particularly vitriolic attack upon 
complementarity.
33 Hooker, "On the nature of Quantum Mechanical Reality" p. 137.
34 "On a Recent Critique of Complementarity. Part II" p. 93.
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interpretations were proposed but their adequacy was refuted by experiment. We only 
need to look at the idea that atomic processes are said to exhibit characteristics of both 
waves and particles. One thing cannot be both a wave, infinitely extended in space, and a 
discrete, discontinuous particle.35 Classical realist interpretations have never been able to 
satisfactorily account for these empirically supported assertions.
Thus, we must come to the conclusion that, strictly speaking, the classical view 
of the world is false. The realistic ideals o f classical physics, derived from the world and 
designed to 'mirror' reality, do not, in fact, represent the world, and do not, in fact,
'mirror' reality. Bohr contends that "all knowledge presents itself within a conceptual 
framework adapted to account for previous experience and that any such frame may 
prove too narrow to comprehend new experience" .36 Consequently, the concepts which 
we utilise and interpret the world with were adapted to a particular circumscribed part of 
the world. The part of the world which the classical physical concepts of reality were 
meant to explain was that which was centred upon the human perceptual range o f 
experience. We might be inclined to conclude that perception is thus inherently 
misleading and provides us with distorted, false, pictures of the world. But this is not 
what is asserted by Bohr and Feyerabend. The quantum physical picture o f the world, 
incorporating complementarity, is as equally tied to sense experience as is classical 
physics. The sense experience caused by the world is the only 'reality' we have, but if we 
push and prod the world into different circumstances, we will then receive sensory 
information from the world which we would not normally receive. The epistemological 
lesson which Bohr wanted to teach revolves around the arbitrariness of the distinction 
between subject and object. If the distinction is arbitrary, then there really is no 
distinction, and the "notion of an ultimate subject as well as conceptions like realism and 
idealism find no place in objective description." 37 If  we cannot unarbitrarily make a 
distinction between subject and object, then questions like, 'is that the way the world
35 For a very good discussion of this point, see C . A  Hooker, "The Metaphysics of Science: Atoms 
Versus Plena" International Logic Review, 5, (1974), pp. 111-46.
36 Bohr, Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, p. 67.
V Ibid., p. 79.
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really is?' and 'is the world a construction o f my ideas?' are not just unanswerable, but 
meaningless. That which is objective becomes that which we can agree upon; moreover, 
that which we can agree upon is an objective description based upon sensory experience: 
questions o f essential natures are left behind.
4.5 Quantum Physics and the Theoretical/Empirical Dichotomy of Traditions.
If we now step back from quantum physics and examine the implications of 
Feyerabend's interpretation of quantum physics for his distinction between 
theoretical/abstract and empirical traditions, then we will find that Feyerabend's ideas are 
entirely coherent and give a very interesting and profound account of the inextricable 
relationship between realism and relativism.
The fact that in our investigations o f atomic phenomena we were inevitably 
drawn to the conclusion that the results o f experiments are results pertaining to the entire 
experimental arrangement, rather than to some putative independent object, gives us 
reason enough to attempt to generalise these findings to other areas of investigation. 
Firstly, let us see what implications are inherent in sciences other than physics.
Imagine a biologist studying the transport and incidence o f growth hormone in a 
particular species o f bean.38 The particular bean species is selected from among a variety 
of alternatives, for a variety of reasons: speed of growth, availability, simplicity of 
structure, possible economic applicability. The bean seed of the species selected is then 
placed into a pot, one seed per pot. The soil in every pot is carefully selected and mixed 
so that each pot, within specified limits, have the same amount and constitution of soil. 
The pots are then placed into a regulated, weather and pest controlled environment, such 
that they are all exposed to the same range of specified temperatures and sunlight. 
Watering o f the growing bean plants is done in a carefully monitored way so that each 
plant receives the same amount of moisture. After a specified period o f time the bean 
plants are removed and analysed as to the transport and incidence o f growth hormone.
38 This experiment is a crude example of an actual biological experiment told to me in personal 
communication.
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This process is repeated many times to ensure repeatability, and to even out any 
anomalies that may have escaped the diligence of the biologist. In this particular situation 
the analysis of successive batches of bean plants is performed at different times in the 
life-cycle to produce a temporal picture of the incidence and transport of growth 
hormone.
I would conjecture that this situation has, in many respects, many parallels to the 
situation found in quantum physics. In conducting this experiment we cannot interpret 
the results obtained as presenting the true, real, essential nature of the incidence and 
transport o f growth hormone in beans. The results obtained may be true and real, but 
they are true and real results o f the entire experimental arrangement, the results are 
relative to the set of circumstances in which the experiment was conducted. Slightly 
different environmental circumstances will elicit different results, and these results will 
also be true and real, relative to the slightly different experimental arrangement. The list 
o f possible experimental arrangements is, for all intents and purposes, limitless, and each 
result obtainable equally true and equally real, as long as the factors which are controlled, 
and those that are not, are known. We will never arrive at any fundamental knowledge of 
the incidence and transport of growth hormone in the bean, or any other object of 
scientific investigation: every single bean plant in the world is exposed to a different 
causal, interactive environment. Consequently, the incidence and transport of growth 
hormone will be different in every single bean plant. We cannot have a completely 
controlled experiment which gives us unadulterated knowledge of the objects as they are 
in themselves: the environment, or experimental arrangement, is a necessary concomitant 
of any experiment and the knowledge derived is always a restricted knowledge which 
must be understood in relation to the entire experimental arrangement.39
39 Thus, Feyerabend would consider the billions of dollars spent on particle acceleraters, with the 
justification that such expenditure is necessary because the fundamental constituents of matter are 
thereby discovered, as a fundamentally misguided venture. Granted, the results obtained may be true and 
real, but the results obtained are definitely not indicative of any fundamental reality: the results obtained 
are relative to the experimental arrangement, which, in this situation, are huge particle accelerators. 
Equally fundamental knowledge can be obtained by relatively cheap experimental apparatus. This leads 
us to the question, 'what do we want science to achieve?' the answer is relative to our values and 
interests. The money spent upon particle accelerators would be better off spent upon pressing problems 
of survival interest.
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These ideas are brought together by Feyerabend in a metaphysical and 
epistemological vision characterised by the relinquishment of all traditional dichotomies: 
the dichotomies of realism/idealism, relativism/absolutism, subject/object, are all seen as 
imaginary, unattainable, polar limits, where reality is always found between the two 
extremes. If we look at Feyerabend's metaphysics, we can characterise it as either a 
plentiful realism, or as a moderate idealism:
Scientists, being equipped with a complex organism and embedded in 
constantly changing physical and social surroundings, used ideas and 
actions ... to manufacture, first, metaphysical atoms, then, crude physical 
atoms, and, finally, complex systems of elementary particles out o f a 
material that did not contain these elements but could be shaped into them. 
Scientists, according to this account, are sculptors of reality - but sculptors 
in a special sense. They not merely act causally upon the world ... they 
also create semantic conditions engendering strong inferences from 
known effects to novel projections and, conversely, from the projections 
to testable effects.40
There is here no question as to the reality of elementary particles: given the experimental 
arrangement, as specified in sub-atomic experiments, and given the conceptual-semantic 
system of quantum physics, elementary particles can be justifiably posited. The world is 
manipulated so as to give specific responses. A better example is provided by the 
creation of super-conductors: super-conductors do not exist naturally, yet super­
conductors can be created under highly specific and difficult to realise conditions.
Indeed, the modem scientific conception of the genesis and evolution of the universe can 
be seen to give support to Feyerabend's ideas: various natural phenomena and natural, 
physical laws, only emerge once highly specific circumstances are realised. Stars, planets, 
life, consciousness, all form only under specific environmental boundary conditions. The 
questions Feyerabend asks are, what other phenomena and laws can we find under other 
differing circumstances and conditions? And, is there a limit to the range of possible 
unique circumstances and conditions?
40 Feyerabend, "Realism and the Historicity of Knowledge", in Journal o f Philosophy, 86, 1989, p. 404
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For some philosophers the ideas above may be highly unpalatable, in that too 
much scope is given to the creative capacities of humans to create the world: the position 
is too idealistic. Feyerabend responds by saying that
I do not assert that any combined causal-semantic action will lead to a 
well-articulated and livable world The material humans ... face must be 
approached in the right way. It offers resistance; some constructions ... 
find no point of attack in it and simply collapse. On the other hand, this 
material is more pliable than is commonly assumed. Molding it in one 
way ... we get elementary particles; proceeding in another, we get a nature 
that is alive and full o f gods 41
That is, the position Feyerabend defends is not completely idealistic: the world does 
indeed have a nature and unequivocally says 'no' to some attempts at characterising it.
The best way to understand this position is to consider the history of science as 
consisting of a treasure of examples of highly successful concepts and theories which 
proved to be, nevertheless, unsuccessful as characterisations o f the nature of the 
universe. Experimentation and manipulation of the world according to the assumptions 
of Newtonian natural science, for example, received highly positive responses: the world 
could be conceived in a Newtonian manner and empirically validated. Nevertheless, 
Newtonian science was ultimately proved to be deficient as a characterisation o f physical 
reality 42
There may yet be grave reservations about the above quote, expressed by 
scientifically-minded modems, concerning the contention that reality may be explicable in 
terms of gods. Surely, the objection runs, science has progressed to such an extant, 
giving us reliable and unequivocal knowledge of the independent world in which we live, 
such that metaphysical suppositions like those o f the Greek pantheon cannot now be
41 Ibid., p. 405.
42 Feyerabend's position has many similarities to the position of I. Hacking, Representing and 
Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy o f Natural Science, esp. pp. 220-32, where Hacking 
quite plausibly argues that scientists create phenomena. For example, Hacking contends that "Hall’s 
effect did not exist until, with great ingenuity, he had discovered how to isolate, purify it, create it in the 
laboratory." p. 226. Hacking does not then infer any idealistic conclusions form this situation: "On the 
contrary, the creation of phenomena more strongly favours a hard-headed scientific realism", p. 220 The 
created phenomena are no less real for being created: they simply show how matter acts in particular 
circumstances. Given the sort of position we find Feyerabend defending, it is interesting to conjecture 
that Feyerabend's philosophy is, in effect, a process philosophy.
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supported or entertained by rational people: the malleability o f the world has given way 
in the face of scientific success. Feyerabend responds to this with five rejoinders. Firstly, 
the fact that science is successful does not preclude the proposal of alternatives, that is, 
proliferation o f theories is always possible and of utmost value. Secondly, the scientific 
world-view is not a homogenous, seamless, and systematically interrelated body of 
knowledge: scientific entities and domains are multitudinous and have not been 
exhaustively interconnected, or reduced to a set of fundamental physical laws. Thirdly, 
on the theoretical level, there has been no consilience of the disparate fundamental 
physical laws that do exist: there has been no synthesis o f the world of the very small 
with the world of the very large. Fourthly, as I have shown, Feyerabend believes that the 
Bohrian approach to the fundamentals of quantum physics supports his conjectures: 
given the relinquishment of the subject/object dichotomy, and the realisation that 
scientific results are only predicable of the entire experimental arrangement, knowledge 
can be seen as fundamentally contextual and situational specific, therefore, given 
different conceptual-semantic schemes, and correlative specific investigatory 
frameworks, different systems of knowledge can find valid empirical support. Fifthly, 
Feyerabend argues that the specific success of science, and the means that have been 
designed to achieve that success, reflect the nature o f the subject-matter chosen for 
investigation: the methods pertaining to controlled experiments certainly provide much 
valuable knowledge; however, the types o f subject-matter that are amenable to such a 
treatment only constitute a limited, circumscribed, portion o f reality. Feyerabend 
contends that the entities and processes postulated in other, non-scientific, metaphysical 
systems are not necessarily accessible or amenable to the procedures of experimental 
science, and he further contends that this should not constitute a holistic, dismissive, 
criticism of these systems of thought. As Feyerabend states, "if Aphrodite exists, and if 
she has the properties and idiosyncrasies ascribed to her, then she certainly will not sit 
still for something as silly and demeaning as a test of reproducible effects." 43 What needs 
to be seen is that suppositions, such as that of the Homeric Greek gods, bring to the 
43 "Realism ...", p. 398. For the five points above generally, see pp. 400-3.
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world their own conceptual-causal-semantic systems, which, by way of their unique 
'experimental arrangements', often lead to empirical validation of an extensive character. 
If we accept the system, we then highlight those aspects o f the world sympathetic to 
explication by our chosen system, and then engage in creating further conditions which 
will provide us with the best possible feedback 44
4.6 Conclusion.
If true and real knowledge is as plentiful as Feyerabend believes it is, then 
dogmatic desires to push one system of thought as the true system of thought is 
dangerous and unjustified. Any system of abstract thought cannot encompass all 
particular facts of empirical experience. It is for this reason that Feyerabend supports 
proliferation of ideas, systems and ways o f life, as proposed by J.S.Mill. "According to 
Mill a plurality of views is ... needed in the sciences" for four reasons (i) "a view one 
may have reason to reject may still be true" that is, we are fallible, (ii) Such a view 
usually contains some truth, and, since received views rarely contain the whole truth, "it 
is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance 
of being supplied", (iii) An uncontested view, even if wholly true, will be held in the 
manner of a prejudice without an understanding of the rational grounds o f its acceptance. 
And (iv) "one will not even understand its meaning ... unless a contrast with other 
opinions shows wherein this meaning consists." Feyerabend adds a fifth reason, allied to 
reason two:
that decisive evidence against an opinion can often be articulated and 
found only with the help o f an alternative. To forbid the use of alternatives 
until contrary evidence turns up while still demanding that theories be 
confronted with facts, therefore, means putting the cart before the horse.
And using 'science' to denigrate and perhaps even to eliminate all
44 Consider this passage from Feyerabend, in his "Problems of Empiricism" n.8. p. 220. "We are all 
aware of thoughts, impulses, feelings that run counter to our conscious intentions. Usually we disregard 
them, for they do not occur in a very coherent fashion... It is quite different with a person believing in 
the existence of demons. He would perceive a meaningful pattem in such occurrences; they would 
appear to him as the result of the attempts of some demon to corrupt him Considering the astounding 
plasticity of the human mind, this belief could even bring about a more regular display o f such alien 
occurrences ... Expectation, fantasy, fear, and mental illnesses flowing from them ... would do the rest... 
Demons would have become directly observable. And this has actually happened."
alternatives means using a well deserved reputation to sustain a dogmatism 
contrary to the spirit of those who earned it 45
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Feyerabend contends that proliferation can be evinced when we come to realise that 
"[the] complexity of real life (which is a life among particulars)... keeps our minds 
flexible and prevents them from being overly impressed by similarities and appearances of 
lawfulness" (FTR, p. 35 .) That is, one of the ways to achieve proliferation is to draw 
back from abstractions and general statements, thus to see the multifariousness o f the 
world anew. This is the situation which Feyerabend is trying to describe when he talks 
about empirical traditions: empirical traditions emphasise the particularity and 
multiplicity7 of the world. In empirical traditions we have local knowledge, adapted to 
local circumstances. Local knowledge will be true and real knowledge, but it cannot be 
applied to all circumstances everywhere in time and space.
On the other hand, the controlled experiment is an excellent example of the 
tendency of thought associated with theoretical/abstract traditions. It is believed that in 
order to know what something really is, we must separate all extraneous factors: we 
must abstract the real from the multiplicity of particulars. Feyerabend has no in-principle 
objection to this approach: it is a way to see things in new and different ways, thereby 
increasing the possibilities of knowledge. But the theoretical/abstract approach provides 
just that, an increase in the possibilities o f knowledge, not a replacement of knowledge. 
Thus, when Socrates protagonists gave many responses to questions such as 'What is 
virtue?' they were expressing the idea that virtue can be different things in different 
circumstances. The Platonic Socrates search for the one true meaning, will, following the 
above analysis, only result in one more answer to the question, applicable in certain 
circumstances, not applicable in others. If  the search is continued relentlessly, the 
resulting ideas run the risk of becoming empty truisms , true o f all circumstances, only 
because they are true of none.46
45 This quote, and the previous quotes in this paragraph, all at FTR, p. 34.
46 With these ideas in mind, we can now see why there has often been obstinate resistance to the 
application of the methods of natural science, conceived of as abstraction and control, to the social and 
human sciences: the idea just doesn't make sense. We can agree with Feyerabend when he says that "in 
the human sciences it would not only be unwise but also immoral and tyrannical to 'annihilate' 
individual points of view because they do not fit into general frameworks of 'increasing explanatory
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These ideas of proliferation are not intended to be confined to science, they are 
intended as a completely general attitude to life on all levels. Consequently, cultural 
variety follows from these ideas: we need to be able to juxtapose our conceptions of, for 
example, justice, with other conceptions of justice, so as to see the underlying 
abstractions built into our system. Feyerabend believes that such a procedure will lead us 
to a broader, more comprehensive, picture of reality. Moreover, such a proliferation is 
not consistent with a radical relativism. Feyerabend denies that "whatever one says is 
valid only 'within a certain system'" 47 Firstly, because no system is unambiguous. And 
secondly, and more importantly, because one can learn new ways of life; "For if one can, 
then one system is potentially all systems and the restriction 'relative to system A' while 
useful fo r  special purposes, loses its power as a general characterisation o f  
knowledge ."48 The learning process leads people away from particular systems which, 
for example, they may have been brought up with. As long as people are exposed to 
different traditions they will inevitably absorb aspects of traditions other than the ones 
that they have been brought up with. As long as a society is not a completely closed 
society, if there are such things, then the transformation of traditions and ideas is 
happening with every new generation: "traditions, by there very nature try to reach 
beyond their boundaries" 49 In Feyerabend's system, the possibility that we can gather 
greater and greater amounts o f knowledge is never denied: the more we see how matter, 
animals, people, and so on, act in varying circumstances, the more knowledge we will 
attain. Consequently, we can understand why Feyerabend urges that the proliferation of
power'" (FTR, p. 35.) but we can also go much further in our criticism. It is of the nature of history, 
social analysis, or psychology, that the attempt to separate out certain factors, thereby supposedly 
coming to a more fundamental knowledge of the actors, movements and so forth thus separated, does 
not give us knowledge o f the actual circumstances that obtain. History, for example, is the sum total of 
all the various movements and tendencies involved at a particular time, and it is the interactions between 
them which is of the essence of the situation. True knowledge in such a situation is, ideally, the sum 
total of influences and interactions: neglect any factors and the history is not complete. If, contrary to 
possibility, all variables could be 'controlled', in, for example, an analysis of a social movement, then we 
would not find the true nature of that social movement. Rather, the social movement would vanish: its 
very nature is relational.
47 "Third Dialogue", in Three Dialogues on Knowledge, p. 151. See also "Concluding Unphilosophical 
Conversation" p. 503.
48 "Third Dialogue" p. 152.
49 "Concluding Unphilosophical Conversation", pp. 508-9.
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theories, methods, and traditions is essential for intellectual, scientific, personal, and 
moral development; and why it is sometimes necessary to break even the most time 
tested methods and rules to ensure progress. Feyerabend wants free thinkers, people 
exposed to many traditions, many viewpoints, so that the individual can make a relatively 
free, informed and unbiased choice as to their life goals and plans. He quotes with 
approval Kant's definition of enlightenment: "enlightenment is man's release from his self- 
incurred immaturity. Immaturity is man's inability to make use o f his understanding 
without direction from another."50
How exactly all this is achieved, how Feyerabend can delineate between crack­
pot theories and interesting theories, between theories and ideas that aren't true, even 
relative to special circumstances, will have to wait until the following chapters. At the 
moment we can conclude that Feyerabend's position, though a plentiful realism, is still a 
realism, and that it seems to successfully incorporate the most striking features of 
relativistic thought, whilst remaining immune to the charges o f incoherence. I finish with 
a final word from Feyerabend:
In A M and S.F.S I asserted that science was one form of knowledge 
among many. That can mean at least two things. One: there is a reality 
which encourages many approaches, science among them. Two: 
knowledge (truth) are relative notions. In S.F.S I occasionally conflated 
both versions, in Farewell to Reason I used the first and rejected the 
second. This I still do .51
50 Kant., "What is Enlightenment?" p. 11. quoted in Feyerabend, FTR, p. 12. 
5 * "Concluding Unphilosophical Conversation", p. 519.
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5 Feverabend and Kuhn On Epistemic Values.
5.1 Introduction,
John Preston has recently claimed that to understand Feyerabend's philosophy we 
must place him in the context of a, possibly idiosyncratic, but nonetheless identifiable 
Popperian framework. According to this account the Feyerabend of the fifties and sixties 
is ultimately Popperian; the Feyerabend of the seventies and after, with his 'anarchism' 
and 'relativism', is understandable in terms of a disappointed Popperian. 1
I want to say that this claim of Preston's, though partially true, is ultimately false.
I don't think it can be denied that the early Feyerabend was deeply influenced by Popper: 
that much of Preston's interpretation is true. However, the further claim concerning the 
later Feyerabend, that he was a disappointed Popperian, and that this disappointment led 
him to eschew the possibility of rationality and to embrace relativism and literal 
anarchism, does not stand up to analysis. Specifically, I will argue that Feyerabend, in his 
later philosophy, relentlessly pursues some Popperian theses, thereby highlighting 
internal inconsistencies in Popper's philosophy.
As I will show in the section to follow, Feyerabend's philosophy should be 
understood in relation to Popper's assertion that methodological norms and standards are 
ultimately decisions to conduct inquiry in a particular manner. These decisions are 
arrived at via the normative/ethical desideratum of'achieving the best', or aiming at 'the 
good'. Feyerabend follows this program of understanding methodology in an 
ethical/axiological sense, and arrived at conclusions which ultimately indicted Popper's 
philosophy, despite its rhetoric of openness, as defending a closed, authoritarian, system 
of value-judgments.2
Despite Feyerabend's implicit support for what can be called values-based 
rationality, Feyerabend never provided a systematic, clear, and unambiguous account of
1 J. Preston, Feyerabend: Philosophy, Science and Society, passim, Cf. also the very similar account 
given in J. G. McEvoy, MA 'Revolutionary' Philosophy of Science ..."
2 Preston emphasises the importance of ethical/normative considerations in understanding Feyerabend's 
philosophy, see Feyerabend p. 16. and pp. 20-2. But Preston nowhere links this with Feyerabend's later 
philosophy; a linkage which is, moreover, of utmost interpretative importance.
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such a position. Consequently, in section 5.3 I discuss the views of Kuhn concerning 
values in science, in order to move towards a clearer conception of what a values-based 
rationality could be.
5.2 Feverabend and Popper on the ’Good* Science.
5.2.1 Popper's Ethical Normativitv.
Karl Popper's philosophy of science crucially revolves around the contention that 
there must be a criterion of demarcation separating science from pseudo-science, non­
science and metaphysics. Popper's answer to the question of demarcation: that "the 
falsifiability o f a system is to be taken as a criterion o f demarcation", (LSD, p. 40.) or, in 
other words, that "it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by 
experience", (LSD, p. 4L )3 contains, along with his anti-foundationalism and fallibilism, 
the basis of Popper's entire philosophy. Other specific aspects o f Popper's position, for 
example, the exhortation to avoid ad hoc hypotheses, to be parsimonious in the proposal 
of auxiliary hypotheses, and to propose theories of ever greater generality and 
universality, all follow from Popper's falsifiability criterion of demarcation.
If we now ask of Popper, what reasons do you have for supporting your 
demarcation criterion? We get the very honest and straightforward reply that
my criterion of demarcation w ill... have to be regarded as a proposal for  
an agreement or convention. As to the suitability o f any such conventions 
opinions differ, and a reasonable discussion o f these questions is only 
possible between parties having some purpose in common. The choice of 
that purpose must, o f course, be ultimately a matter o f decision, going 
beyond rational argument. (LSD, p. 37.)
Popper goes on to say that "I freely admit that in arriving at my proposals I have been 
guided, in the last analysis, by value judgments and predilections." (LSD, p. 38.) If we 
keep in mind the idea that Popper grounds his more specific methodological rules: avoid 
ad hoc hypotheses, be parsimonious in the proposal o f auxiliary hypotheses, propose
3 Italicised in original.
144
theories of ever greater generality, and so on, upon their ability to enhance the aim of 
science, as given in his demarcation criterion, then we come to the conclusion that 
Popper's entire system of philosophy is based upon a conventional decision. What reason 
is their to support such a position?
Popper has explicitly acknowledged that we can conceive o f science, and do 
science, according to the standards of conventionalism. These standards Popper 
characterises as "the principle of selecting the simplest system - the simplest system of 
implicit definitions, which of course means in practice the 'classical' system of the day." 
(LSD, p. 81.) Popper goes on to say that "I regard conventionalism as a system which is 
self-contained and defensible. Attempts to detect inconsistencies in it are not likely to 
succeed." (LSD, p. 80.) If  both conventionalism and falsificationism, and presumably 
other conceptions o f science, are possible ways of conducting the business of science, 
and the adoption o f any one of these incompatible alternatives is simply a choice, a 
decision to follow the methodological rules compatible with the preferred aim of science, 
then the question o f which conception o f science to choose among the alternatives 
requires some sort o f reasoned answer.
Popper's reply is to say that "My only reason for proposing my criterion of 
demarcation is that it is fruitful: that a great many points can be clarified and explained 
with its help." (LSD, p. 55.) Popper goes on to say that "It is only from the 
consequences of my definition o f empirical science, and from the methodological 
decisions which depend upon this definition, that a scientist will be able to see how far it 
conforms to his intuitive idea of the goal of his endeavours." (LSD, p. 55.) That is, the 
decision to prefer one way of conceiving of, and doing, science, is based upon the 
pragmatic, and ultimately ethical consideration, that the science that would result from 
following Popper's falsificationism will be better than the science that would be produced 
by following the rules o f conventionalism, or instrumentalism. According to Popper, 
though conventionalism is philosophically incontestable, it would result in the retention 
of the 'classical' theory o f the day, despite empirical difficulties: "Whenever the 'classical' 
system of the day is threatened by the results of new experiments which might be
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interpreted as falsifications according to my point of view, the system will appear 
unshaken to the conventionalist." (LSD, p. 80.) On the other hand, Popper sees his 
falsificationism as anti-dogmatic, open, and 'better', because o f its putative ability to 
ensure scientific progress through the proposal o f ever more general bold conjectures 
incompatible with their predecessors:
we shall take the greatest interest in the falsifying experiment. We shall hail 
it as a success, for it has opened up new vistas into a world of new 
experiences. And we shall hail it even if these new experiences should 
furnish us with new arguments against our own most recent theories.
(LSD, p. 80.)
Popper's argument for falsificationism is not dependent upon refuting alternatives such as 
conventionalism, or instrumentalism, by showing that they are inconsistent with science, 
or internally contradictory. And there is no contention that a scientist who was, for 
example, consciously conventionalist, would not be able to produce good science. 
Rather, Popper argues that if scientists conducted science according to the standards of 
falsificationism, then they would, in the long run, produce better science than that which 
would follow from adopting the standards of its rivals Popper's philosophy is inherently 
value-driven.
5.2.2 Feierabends Ethical Normativitv.
It can't be denied that Feyerabend's early career can be characterised as following 
Popper. However, the manner in which Feyerabend appropriated Popper's philosophy 
should be understood in terms o f an acceptance o f Popper's ethical normativism, as 
presented in the previous section. Originally, this was manifested with an acceptance of 
Popper's more specific doctrines: those pertaining to falsificationism. As we follow 
Feyerabend through his development, we find that Feyerabend dropped his allegiance to 
falsificationism, but, I would contend, Feyerabend never relinquished his adherence to 
an ethical normativism . ethical normativism can be predicated of Feyerabend's 
philosophy throughout his career. Thus, Feyerabend, far from being a disappointed 
Popperian, was, rather, systematically pursuing the implications of the ethical
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normativism found in Popper. This led Feyerabend to indict Popper's specific 
methodological theories as dogmatic. Strict adherence to Popper's notions did not 
necessarily produce the best science, a desideratum crucial, according to Popper himself, 
for opting for falsificationism. Consequently, if the norms of falsificationism did not 
necessarily produce the best science, then it is beholden upon the ethical normativist to 
search for that norm, or set of norms, which will produce the best science. In this 
situation, refusal to adjust methodological prescriptions in the face of difficulties amounts 
to dogmatism.
One way of approaching this issue is through what Bartley has called 
'comprehensively critical rationalism' (CCR) 4 Bartley sees CCR as the theory o f 
rationality Popper espouses. In this conception of rationality "the rationahst identity 
might be characterised as that o f one who holds all his beliefs, including his standards 
and his basic philosophical position itself, open to criticism''. Bartley goes on to say that
The new rationahst identity satisfies its own requirements; without any 
contradiction or other difficultly the practice of critical argument can be 
criticized ... a comprehensively critical rationahst, who is not committed to 
the view that his position is the correct one, could be argued out o f 
rationalism by himself or someone else.5
It could be argued that Popper does not support CCR; however, whether Bartley's 
contention that CCR captures Popper's intentions is correct, does not matter for our 
purposes. The question raised by Bartley's interpretation of Popper, and embraced by 
Bartley himself, is the question o f the possibility of criticism of Popper's falsificationism. 
How do we criticise a theory which sees itself as criticism?
The early Feyerabend was famous for his espousal of a pluralistic methodology. 
Though the value of alternatives can be drawn out o f Popper's principles, no one 
emphasised the value o f pluralism as much as Feyerabend. Thus, Feyerabend exhorted 
scientists to work with sets o f incompatible general theories, so as to maximise criticism, 
falsification, and progress: to produce the best science. Moreover, Feyerabend contended
4 W.W. Bartley ID, "Rationality Versus the Theory of Rationality" in M. Bunge (ed) The Critical 
Approach to Science and Philosophy, pp. 3-31.
5 Both 76/^.. p. 30.
147
that some potential falsifiers of any one theory could only be found with the help of 
incompatible alternatives. Once a pluralistic methodology of this sort is in place, it is not 
hard to make a further step into methodological pluralism, especially if we are 
confronted with the question, as we were in the last paragraph, of the criticism of 
criticisms. And, indeed, this is the move that Feyerabend makes, and this is what needs to 
be understood when considering Feyerabend's diatribes against Method, and for 
epistemological anarchism.
Recall that Popper did not deny, for example, that science could be conducted 
according to the standards o f conventionalism. What Popper denied was that 
conventionalism will produce the best' science. If we look at some of Feyerabend's 
writings from the sixties, we see a gradual drift away from his initial Popperian position, 
towards a position critical o f Popper, whilst still guided by the idea o f the best' science.
In his 1964 article "Realism and Instrumentalism: Comments on the Logic of 
Factual Support,"6 Feyerabend produces powerful arguments to the effect that local 
instrumentalism is an unobjectionable move in science. The proposal by Osiander to treat 
the Copemican hypothesis instrumentalistically enabled the Copemican hypothesis to 
survive. If the Copemican hypothesis had been treated realistically, then, according to the 
accepted science of the time, it should have been rejected as utterly falsified. However, 
treating the Copemican hypothesis as an instrument o f prediction saves it from rejection. 
Similarly, interpreting certain aspects of quantum physics realistically leads to 
contradictions and absurdities; therefore, quantum physics should be rejected as falsified. 
However, interpreting those aspects instrumentalistically preserves the impressive 
empirical power of the theory. In both these cases, according to Feyerabend, there were 
powerful physical and empirical arguments which militated against realistic 
interpretations, and for instrumentalistic interpretations. Of course, in this article 
Feyerabend nevertheless argues that realism is the better option, but this should not blind 
us to the importance of Feyerabend's arguments for local instrumentalism. In the 
particular circumstances surrounding the introduction o f the Copemican hypothesis, and
6 In Bunge, The Critical Approach, pp. 280-308.
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in the acceptance of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, the 'best' 
scientific move to be made may not follow the Popperian model, the 1)651' scientific move 
to be made may be antithetical to the spirit o f Popper's falsificationism.
By the time we get to Feyerabend's 1968-69 article, "On a Recent Critique of 
Complementarity: Pts. I and II", the support for local instrumentalism is not tempered by 
any vestigial support for realism-as-the-best-no-matter-what. Feyerabend has moved to a 
position, best exemplified by his later philosophy, wherein the best' science, what the 
best scientific move to make is in any given situation, is not governed by any 
preconceived notion of the best.
One way of interpreting these conceptions of Feyerabend's is to see the proposed 
universal norms of science as, instead, defeasible rules-of-thumb: as having legitimate 
applicability in some circumstances; the applicability being ascertained in the situation 
and determined by the situation. Thus, Feyerabend contends that Popper's method of 
conjecture and refutation can be interpreted in two ways: "as useful hints for the scientist 
[and no more, o r ] ... as necessary conditions o f a rational approach".7 Feyerabend goes 
on to say that we must "modify the stem rules o f falsification ... [and] use them as rules 
of thumb, or as temporary ingredients o f rationality, not as necessary conditions of 
scientific procedure."8 In the first sense o f useful hint, or rule-of-thumb, Feyerabend finds 
Popper's conjectures and refutations unobjectionable. However, in the second sense, the 
sense in which Popper wants his method to be known, Feyerabend finds the idea 
objectionable and unrealistic. In science, situations requiring decision are highly complex, 
most often there are conflicting, incompatible courses of action available for 
consideration by the scientist. In such situations of conflict and divided rational loyalty, 
the best course of action will only be ascertainable in the particular situation at hand. To 
say, as Popper does, that we must always take falsifications seriously, and not engage in 
any conventionalist or instrumentalist thinking, removes from the situation requiring 
decision options which may be the best thing to do in that particular situation.
7 "Historical Background ...", p. 22.
* Ibid., p. 24.
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However, in one very important sense the example of Popper's conjectures and 
refutations, and the whole idea o f rules-of-thumb, can be a misleading one for a complete 
interpretation of Feyerabend's thought. Consider this quote:
Separating facts, values and rationality is o f course an artifice. Facts are 
constituted by procedures that contain values, values change under the 
impact of facts and principles of reasoning assume a certain world order 
(the law of non-contradiction is absurd in an absurd world ). (FTR, n.6. p.
25.)
If we add to this Feyerabend's idea that world-views, in part, constitute the facts, then 
the circle of facts, values, rationality and metaphysics is complete. These ideas follow 
from Feyerabend's conception of the relation between theory and observation: there is no 
boundary dividing statements into two mutually exclusive categories, the theoretical and 
the observational. The distinction between the theoretical and the observational is a 
temporary distinction, made within particular experiential contexts. In these contexts,
Nobody will deny that the sentences o f science can be classified into long 
sentences and short sentences, or that its statements can be classified into 
those which are intuitively obvious and others which are not. Nobody will 
deny that such distinctions can be made. But nobody will put great weight 
on them. (AM, p. 168)
This is because the distinction is only one which is applicable within the situation in
which the distinction was made: it is not an absolute distinction. What was once
theoretical and problematic can become the observational and unproblematic, and vice
versa.9 When a scientist is working with a universal theory, such as Newton's theory, the
facts of the world are explicable in terms o f the metaphysical world-order implicit and
explicit in Newtonian theory. The way that the scientist reasons will assume the existence
of the Newtonian world. The values that the scientist employs will be related to possible
solutions of problems within the spirit o f Newtonian ideals. Subsequent facts may bring
9 Feyerabend continues the quote above by saying that nobody will put great weight on them "for they do 
not now play any decisive role in the business of science". (AM, p. 168, italicised in the original) I do 
not think that this is correct, even though the distinction between theoretical and observational is not an 
absolute, but a pragmatic distinction, this is still an important distinction within the context of scientific 
theorising and experimentation. When scientists said that they observed the centre of the sun via 
neutrino experiments, the observational was identified with the unproblematic, the theoretical was 
identified with that which was still problematic and hypothetical. It seems to me that this is the role of 
the observational and the theoretical, but more of this in the next chapter. For the observation of the 
centre of the sun, see Shapere, Reason and the Search for Knowledge, pp. 215-17. And Ch. 16.
150
the values of Newtonian science in question, and may even lead to the questioning of the 
Newtonian world-view itself. In this sort of situation, there is nothing inherently external 
to the metaphysical, theoretical, factual circumstances within which the scientist works, 
and from which the values and principles of reasoning are obtained. The idea of rules-of- 
thumb may give the impression that these rules-of-thumb, though defeasible, and 
legitimately applicable only according to the particular circumstances of a problematic 
situation, are nevertheless external in their content, that is, their content is not connected 
with any particular world-view. Thus, falsification, even as a rule-of-thumb, may be 
considered as a possible guide in any situation requiring rational deliberation. This is not 
how Feyerabend sees the situation: there is not a grab-bag of assorted rules-of-thumb, 
which may be applicable to a particular problematic situation. The rules-of-thumb are 
inherently related to the particular world-view, and the particular corpus of 
unproblematic background information. The impression that some principles have a 
status which is genuinely universal, even in a contextual, defeasible manner, is a product 
of the level of entrenchment o f a particular world-view.
The sorts o f criteria, rules-of-thumb, that Feyerabend sees as being more deeply 
entrenched in the scientific world-view, and therefore appearing to be more 'universal', 
are many and varied:
There are formal criteria, a linear theory is preferable to a non linear one 
... Or: a 'coherent' theory is preferable to a non coherent one ... A theory 
using many and daring approximations ... may be less likeable than a 
theory that uses only a few, and safe approximations. Number of facts 
predicted may be another criteria. Nonformal criteria usually demand 
conformity with basic theory ... or with metaphysical principles. (SFS, 
f i l l  19.)
This list can be extended to encompass more traditional criteria such as simplicity, 
empirical adequacy, explanatory power, and fruitfulness. But the point to be made about 
such criteria is that
these 'other m ethods'... though reasonable ... are arbitrary, or 'subjective', 
in the sense that it is very difficult to find wish-independent arguments for 
their acceptability. Also, these 'other methods' most of the time give 
conflicting results: a theory may be preferable because it makes numerous
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predictions, but the predictions may be based on rather daring 
approximations. On the other hand a theory may seem attractive because 
of its coherence but this 'inner harmony' may make it impossible to apply it 
to results in widely different domains. (SFS, pp. 68-9.)
The wish dependent nature of these criteria is another way of saying that they are ends,
or goals, to be attained: they function in a teleological manner and constitute the values
of science. The fact that these values provide differing results, which lead to different
prospective courses of action, is indicative of the fact that they are only definitively, or
exclusively applicable within the confines o f a particular problematic situation. As we
saw above, once the various values are given specific content, derived from the
problematic situation and the substantive theories under consideration, pertinent
deliberation can begin and be brought to a tentative solution: a solution involving action
as to what is to be done.
Given these ideas, we must object when Stove, for example, contends that 
Feyerabend ”reject[s] the distinction between description and prescription”.10 
Feyerabend was always looking for ways in which the 1)681' science could be achieved: 
Feyerabend's philosophy was always prescriptive and normative, but this normativity 
became contextualised. Feyerabend states that
we must o f course make sure that our prescriptions have a point o f  attack 
in the historical material, and we must also make sure that their determined 
application leads to desirable results. We make sure by considering 
(historical, sociological, physical, psychological, etc.) tendencies and laws 
which tell us what is possible and what is not possible under the given 
circumstances and thus separate feasible prescriptions from those which 
are going to lead into dead ends ... progress can be made only if the 
distinction between the ought and the is is regarded as a temporary device 
rather than as a fundamental boundary line. (AM, p. 167)
That is, there are no fundamental, unchanging oughts. The ought/is distinction is
temporarily created according to the exigencies o f the situation. Once the situation has
passed, the same oughts may never be assembled in the same manner again. An example
will make Feyerabend's point clearer. Imagine a Newtonian scientist around the turn o f
the century who is confronted with a problematic situation. In this particular situation the
10 Stove, Popper and After, p. 4.
scientist will make a distinction between the is o f the situation and the ought. The 
descriptive 'is', the facts of the situation - that which must be taken into account and 
treated as the given - will consist of, for example, Newton's three laws of motion and law 
of gravitation, that body of unproblematic science specifically relevant in the problematic 
situation at hand, and so on. What the scientist ought to do will be constructed out of the 
given facts o f the situation, in this example, the scientist cannot transgress Newton's 
laws. And the scientist must take into account the specific nature of the problematic 
situation. The resultant ought will constitute a possible solution to the problem at hand.
If the prescribed course o f action led to success, then that result may then become the 'is' 
o f a new problematic situation. If the prescribed course of action did not lead to success, 
then the situation must be reconsidered, with, at least, some more negative information 
as to the given, and a new 'ought' constructed.11
Feyerabend does not reject the distinction between the descriptive and the 
prescriptive, he does not want to say, 'this is science, this is how it goes, therefore, it is 
as it should be'. Prescriptive accounts of science are necessary, but for Feyerabend, 
prescription is something limited and constrained to the actual problematic, historical 
situation in which a scientist is obliged to make decisions. These decisions are plans for 
action: they are possible resolutions of the problematic situation. The prescriptivity 
which Feyerabend objects to is the notion o f norms which are explicated independently 
of any particular problem situation, but which are intended to universally apply, ceteris 
paribus, to all problematic situations. Thus, someone defending a more traditional 
account o f the normativity o f science, may accept that in the past there have been cases 
o f good science which have not adhered to the norms their theories of scientific 
rationality recommended, just as in the future such cases may well occur again. But the 
defender o f traditional accounts of the normativity of science will not take this admission 
as in any way impugning the ongoing applicability of the norms in question: the norms 
are, as it were, the default mode of scientific reasoning, exceptional circumstances may
11 Lakatos's hypothetical Newtonian history, in his "Falsification ..." pp. 100-1, provides a very good 
example of the process I have in mind.
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engender a temporary relaxing of the norms, but this relaxation is only for the duration of 
the exceptional circumstances, once these circumstances have passed, the norms again 
assume pride o f place.
It is as evidence against this traditional interpretation that Feyerabend's case 
studies achieve their greatest importance. That is, the importance of Feyerabend's 
historical case studies is not simply that they provide counter-examples to prominent 
'Rationalist' accounts of science, or that the adoption o f the norms of'Rationalist' 
philosophies within the historical episodes in question would have retarded the rational 
progress o f science. Though these considerations do raise serious questions, the aspect 
of greatest importance in Feyerabend's case studies consists in the idea that the 
examination o f the moves made in the debates at the time indicates that they were 
responses inherently related to the problematic situation present at that time. Careful 
examination o f protagonists normative schemes, between different research groups, and 
across time, discipline, and theoretical upheaval, provides evidence that the ought 
structures of science change with research group, time, discipline and theoretical 
upheaval.
Though we can bring forth these ideas from Feyerabend's philosophy, and say 
that Feyerabend is proposing that we consider rationality in terms of a contextual, ethical 
normativity, Feyerabend never systematically explored the implications o f such an 
approach to rationality. For example, the remarks quoted above concerning the many 
criteria of rational decision-making, which I interpreted as being a presentation of a 
values-based approach, were given by Feyerabend in a decidedly off-hand manner. There 
are many statements o f Feyerabend's which cry out for a grounding within a values-based 
conception o f rationality, but which are left dangling in obscurity and ambiguity. For 
example, we saw in the last chapter that Feyerabend believes that abstract, generalised 
thought has no intrinsic advantage over what he called empirical thought. Thus, the 
move to work with ideal abstraction and generalisation is a decision, which is then 
objectivised by saying that this procedure leads to reality, whilst practical-empirical 
concepts are illusory and unreal:
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rational standards and arguments supporting them are visible parts of 
special traditions consisting of clear and explicit principles and an 
unnoticed and largely unknown but absolutely necessary background of 
dispositions for action and judgem ent... we have further seen that there 
are other traditions that also lead to judgements though not on the basis of 
explicit standards and principles. These value judgements have a more 
'immediate' character, but they are still evaluations, just like those of the 
rationalist. (SFS, p. 27.)
That is, the preference for abstract, universalised thought constitutes a value, and, for 
Feyerabend, "Speaking of values is a roundabout way of describing the kind of life one 
wants to lead or thinks one should lead" (FTR, p. 24.) Feyerabend has also contended 
that "values affect not only the application o f knowledge but are essential ingredients of 
knowledge i ts e l f ; (FTR, p. 28 .) that "important changes of abstract thought are 
qualitative changes", (FTR, p. 154.) and that "the qualitative elements of the sciences ... 
[are equivalent to] the fundamental ideas of a certain branch o f knowledge" (FTR, p.
156.) We see here that there is a series o f identifications and implications: fundamental 
ideas-qualitative elements-abstract thought-values-the life one thinks one should lead, 
which are all brought together in a manner in great need of explication and clarification. 
But the answers to these doubts concerning details will not be found in Feyerabend's 
writings and, as such, Feyerabend's philosophy is lacking in systematic, detailed 
explication. Therefore, Feyerabend's philosophy is incomplete. This is not to say that 
Feyerabend's philosophy should therefore be ignored, rather, the task before us is to take 
Feyerabend's philosophy, with the many clues scattered throughout it, and try to provide 
those aspects which would constitute a completion o f his philosophy: a completion 
which is consistent with the ideas thus far presented in chapters 1-4.12
In order to do this, I will leave explicit discussion o f Feyerabend to introduce and 
critically discuss the idea of values in rationality: its place, its role, its relation to other 
aspects of epistemic activity, and so on. There have been, at least, three prominent 
figures in philosophy who have defended the idea that values are essential for
12 This is not to say that Feyerabend would have agreed that what is to follow is consistent with his 
philosophy, or in the spirit of his philosophy. It sometimes appears that any more systematic philosophy 
would come under Feyerabend's critical gaze: his general sceptical and fallibilist position seems to lead 
him to abhor any settled theoretical structure, especially if he was in a dadaist mood.
understanding science and rationality in general: Kuhn, Laudan and Dewey. In the 
remainder o f this chapter I will discuss Kuhn and Laudan. In the next chapter I will 
continue the discussion of values with particular reference to John Dewey.
5.3 Kuhn on Paradigms and Values
5.3.1 The Trouble with Paradigms.
At this point in the discussion I would like to bring in some aspects of the debate 
surrounding the philosophy o f Thomas Kuhn and his book, The Structure o f Scientific 
Revolutions (SSR). Originally, Kuhn proposed that science is characterised by the 
adoption of a paradigm by a community of scientists. Paradigms are complex structures 
of cognitive commitment. They are comprised of symbolic generalisations, metaphysical 
models, and exemplary scientific achievements. Kuhn contends that paradigms structure 
the conceptual world in which scientists work and give them heuristic guidance as to 
their current, and future, research programs. Paradigms provide the standards of 
acceptable scientific activity; they delineate what sorts of objects exist in the world; how 
scientists are to investigate the nature and behaviour o f those objects; and the criteria of 
whether any one scientific result is successful or unsuccessful. Even more than this, 
paradigms provide the language of science: they define the meanings of scientific terms.
The ubiquitous nature which Kuhn attributes to paradigms leads him to contend 
that, to a large extent, scientists who are committed to different paradigms live in 
different worlds. Kuhn's central argument for this is derived from his rejection of the 
theory/observation dichotomy. If a neutral observation language is rejected, then the 
theories which a person is committed to will affect the observations that that person 
performs. If we then consider the overarching nature and depth o f paradigms in 
structuring the theoretical understanding of the world o f scientists, we are led to the 
conclusion that scientists in different, sufficiently large-scale paradigms, literally see a 
different world, and act as if they lived in different worlds.
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According to Kuhn, the fact that scientists live in different worlds makes it 
difficult to account for paradigm change, or scientific revolution. Members of alternative
paradigms which are in conflict cannot directly communicate to each other. Their 
languages, the meanings of the terms they use, and their theoretical presuppositions 
differ. They often talk past each other and don't accept the claims made by the other 
party. The standards of evaluation of the different paradigms may differ markedly. In this 
situation the ideal means o f resolving the conflict would be that of appeal to an impartial 
arbiter, or objective standard, to which all paradigms could be compared. But the fact 
that there are no impartial arbiters or objective standards to which appeal can be made is 
the central claim o f Kuhn's philosophy: standards are intra-paradigmatic.
Kuhn's original formulations of how science progresses through scientific 
revolutions was laden with terms implying that the transition from paradigm to paradigm 
was ultimately mysterious. Kuhn talked of'conversion' and 'gestalt-switches': suddenly 
scientists see a duck, when they had previously seen a rabbit. These formulations led 
many philosophers to say that Kuhn conceived science as inherently irrational.131 think 
that many of the criticisms were unfair to Kuhn: Kuhn never wanted to deny that science 
was a rational enterprise, and there are many passages in SSR which attest to this. What 
Kuhn wanted to say is that conclusive proof o f one paradigm being better than another 
paradigm cannot be attained. Reasons can be adduced and powerful arguments put 
forward for the acceptance of one paradigm over another, but this is never enough to 
ensure the superiority o f the one paradigm over the other. Consequently, the empirical 
fact that scientists do change their commitment to paradigms needs to be explained on 
grounds other than proof.
However, I don't think it can be denied that Kuhn's original position is 
inadequate. I think we can grant the fact that there is something other than proof 
involved in the evaluation o f competing paradigms, but Kuhn, at that time, had not 
arrived at anything which would fill the gap in an appropriate manner. Consequently, if 
Kuhn is to preserve the insights gained by seeing science as a paradigm governed
13 See I.Lakatos and AMusgrave., Criticism and the Growth o f  Knowledge.
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activity, whilst at the same time preserving the idea that science, as a whole, is rational, 
then he must provide an alternate account of rationality applicable when paradigms are in 
conflict and a choice between paradigms is required.
5.3.2 K uhn . Values and Rationality.
The way Kuhn attempts to preserve the rationality o f scientific decision-making is 
one of the few, if not the only, alternatives open to someone who eschews 'Rationalist' 
versions of rationality. Building upon a minor theme in his SSR, Kuhn contends that 
scientific, or epistemic values, are the relatively objective and independent criteria which 
provide the stable background against which debates over paradigm commitment can be 
conducted.14 Kuhn contends that values
are more widely shared among different communities than either symbolic 
generalizations or models ...Though they function at all times, their 
particular importance emerges when the members o f a particular 
community must identify crisis or, later, choose between incompatible 
ways of practicing their discipline.15
Some of the values Kuhn sees as operative in science are: accuracy, puzzle- 
formulation and solution, consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness. As the quote 
above indicates, Kuhn sees these values as being stable across paradigms, as some sort o f 
inherited higher-order scientific commitment. However, this is not to say that values are 
concrete and fixed.
values [such] as accuracy, scope, and fruitfulness are permanent attributes 
of science. But little knowledge of history is required to suggest that both 
the application o f these values and ... the relative weights attached to them 
have varied markedly with time and also with the field of application.
14 Kuhn’s reappraisal o f his position concerning epistemic values can be found in the "postscript-1969" 
to SSR; in "Reflections on my Critics" in Lakatos and Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth o f  
Knowledge, pp. 231-78. And in "Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice" in T.Kuhn., The 
Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, pp. 320-39. The fact that Kuhn 
always considered epistemic values to be essential to scientific decision-making can be seen in SSR pp. 
152-8. And in "The Function of Measurement in Modem Physical Science", in The Essential Tension, 
pp. 178-224. (originally published 1961).
15 SSR (2nd. ed) p. 184.
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Furthermore, many o f these variations in value have been associated with 
particular changes in scientific theory.16
This last sentence may seem to obviate the putative stable and independent nature of 
values. If theory change brings with it value change, then values cannot play a role in the 
justification of theory choice. We would be back where we started. But the values which 
Kuhn proposes as being operative in science are relatively stable; for example, Kuhn 
states that
I know of no case in the development of science which exhibits a loss of 
quantitative accuracy as a consequence o f the transition from an earlier to 
a later theory ... whatever the price in redefinitions o f science, its methods, 
and its goals, scientists have shown themselves consistently unwilling to 
compromise the numerical success of their theories .17
We can see here that for Kuhn the value of quantitative accuracy has been a permanent
fixture of science. But it could not be denied that the level o f quantitative accuracy, in its
application to actual scientific episodes, has become ever more stringent as science has
progressed. What was once considered to be accurate results are now scorned as totally
inadequate. It is also apparent that the value of quantitative accuracy has become ever
more important in a continuously widening circle of disciplines: it was originally only
applicable to astronomy, but then mechanics, chemistry, electricity, heat, biology and so
on became quantitative.181 think we can grant Kuhn the contention that
for the function that I have here ascribed to values, such relative stability 
provides a sufficient basis. The existence of a feedback loop through which 
theory change affects the values which led to that change does not make 
the decision process circular in any damaging sense.19
But there is another aspect of values which makes their role in decision-making 
uncertain, that is, though values may be shared by a community of scientists, the
16 "Objectivity, Value Judgement, and Theory Choice" p. 335.
17 "The Function of Measurement in Modem Physical Science" pp. 212-13.
18 See "Objectivity..." p. 335. At this point, the question which Feyerabend would feel compelled to ask 
concerns the validity, or applicability, of quantitative accuracy itself. Far from quantitative accuracy 
being a permanent fixture of science, Feyerabend would argue that quantitative accuracy' is a recent 
phenomenon, a value which came to be of the utmost importance only with the advent of 'modem' 
science. The value of quantitative accuracy, and more generally, mathematiseability, is seen to lay in the 
opportunities which are thus presented for the control and manipulation of nature for technological 
purposes. The value of this, the form-of-life underpinning such a conception, is certainly challengeable 
from the perspective of different forms-of-life.
19 Ibid., p. 336.
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application of those values may differ from scientist to scientist. What one scientist sees 
as simplicity, for example, might not be regarded as such by another scientist. The 
Copemican hypothesis was regarded in some circles as being significantly simpler than 
the Ptolemaic astronomy. But defenders o f the Ptolemaic astronomy could point to the 
fact that acceptance of a heliocentric system brought in huge complications for the 
generally accepted cosmological world-view of Aristotelianism. Because Copemicanism 
carried implications which transgressed the narrow field o f astronomy, its simplicity 
could be validly challenged.
Another problem for values-based decision-making is that "different values, taken 
alone, would often dictate different choices. One theory may be more accurate but less 
consistent or plausible than another."20 So how does the recourse to values help us 
explicate the rationality o f paradigm choice? Individual values can be interpreted 
differently by different scientists, and different values can often come into conflict. We 
seem to be left in a situation only marginally better than before.
The way in which Kuhn tries to resolve the situation is one which, though not 
systematically developed by Kuhn, is very promising. Kuhn contends that
What one must understand ... is the manner in which a particular set of 
shared values interacts with the particular experiences shared by a 
community of specialists to ensure that most members o f a group will 
ultimately find one set o f arguments rather than another decisive.21
This is indeed what needs to be understood, but Kuhn goes on to say that "that process
is persuasion" .22 I don't think it can be denied that persuasion plays a large role in
scientific decision-making. But I think that more can be said and a clue can be found in
the passage above. Kuhn states that one of the factors involved is the "set of shared
values", it is this which I feel is the important point. It doesn't need to be denied that
individual values can be interpreted differently by individual scientists, or that judgements
made on the basis of individual values may conflict with judgements made on the basis
20 "Postscript", p. 185.
21 Ibid., p. 200.
22 Ibid.,
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of other values. Those points can be accepted without qualms. But what can be denied is 
that scientific conflict is ever decided on the basis of one or two values alone. If the 
whole set of shared scientific values is brought into the decision-making process, then it 
may be hoped that this more complicated situation will lead to greater perspicuity in 
paradigm comparison.
The set o f shared values can alleviate the problems of individual interpretation of 
values, and conflict between values, by supposing that the set o f shared values are ranked 
hierarchically. Some values would be more highly prized, while others would be of lesser 
importance. For example, predictive accuracy seems to carry much more weight than 
simplicity in evaluating theories. This position seems to be one which Kuhn implicitly 
supported, we saw in the quote earlier that Kuhn regards quantitative accuracy as 
something prized by scientists above many other considerations. Kuhn also contends that 
"the demonstrated ability to set up and to solve puzzles presented by nature is, in case of 
value conflict, the dominant criterion for most members o f a scientific group" .23
The idea that the set o f shared values are usually ranked hierarchically can be 
linked to the central Kuhnian notion o f the exemplary scientific achievement. That is, 
though Kuhn has said that "The paradigm as shared example is the central element of 
what I now take to be the most novel and least understood aspect o f this book" ,24 it 
seems that Kuhn has not seen the full significance of the idea o f the scientific exemplar. It 
is plausible to assume that it is the concrete scientific achievement which gives the 
scientist indications as to what the current hierarchy o f values is, and how the various 
values should be interpreted. The values are inherent within the concrete scientific 
achievement, and the concrete scientific achievement functions as a temporary 
crystallisation o f the hierarchy o f values. For example, when Newton first proposed his 
theory, Cartesians found the postulation of action at a distance mysterious and occult: it 
was directly contrary to the ideal of mechanistic explanation. As it turned out, the
23 Ibid., p. 205. This passage seems to imply that puzzle-formulation and puzzle-resolution is something 
different from values. But in other passages Kuhn implies that puzzle formulation and solution is an 
epistemic value. Puzzle-formulation and resolution would have to be considered to be a value, which, of 
course strengthens the argument for the existence of a hierarchy of values.
24 SSR, p. 187.
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explanatory power, and the empirical, predictive and quantitative accuracy of Newton's 
theory won the day. The importance, the value, of mechanistic explanation was eroded 
with the advent of Newtonianism. Though mechanistic explanation was still of utmost 
importance, as is evident in Newton's three laws of motion, mechanistic explanation 
could be waived if explanatory power and accuracy could be demonstrated, as is evident 
in Newton's law of gravitation. Scientists were thus guided in the construction of new 
theories by the values inherent in the Newtonian exemplar.
In cases of theory conflict within paradigms, the exemplary scientific achievement 
provides the scientists with implicit guidance as to theory preference. Suppose, for 
example, that the exemplary achievement exhibits great explanatory power, but is quite 
complex. In this situation, the scientific community would place greater importance upon 
the value of explanatory power: it would be higher in the hierarchy than the value of 
simplicity. Suppose also that there are two competing theories vying for the allegiance of 
the scientific community. One theory has great explanatory power but is very complex. 
The other theory has great simplicity but little explanatory power. Then, in this situation, 
if all other values are equal, the theory which will be adopted is the theory which exhibits 
the greatest explanatory power.
For Kuhn, this temporarily fixed hierarchy of values is one of the defining 
features of normal science. We can now see that the defining feature of'crisis', of 
extraodinary science, is the relinquishment o f commitment to any particular, agreed 
upon, hierarchy of values. In times of crisis, not only do scientists propose theories with 
different metaphysics and models, these theories also exhibit value structures at odds 
with the previous paradigmatic value hierarchy. The important point to keep in mind is 
that even though in times o f crisis there is no agreed upon hierarchy of values, the set of 
values remain. Kuhn's resolution of the problems associated with paradigm choice in his 
early formulations consists in the idea that the debate over paradigm succession can be 
conducted according to known epistemic values. For example, explanatory power has 
often been presented, along with predictive accuracy, as the prime scientific value, but it 
can be argued that with the crisis in modem physics associated with the advent of
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quantum physics, explanatory power took a back seat to empirical and predictive 
accuracy. And as we saw in Section 4.4 above, many other values of science, such as 
objectivity and coherence, were radically reconceptualised at the same time. It has been 
contended that it is precisely this aspect of quantum physics which Einstein found to be 
objectionable.25 But the famous debates between Einstein and Bohr were conducted with 
the tacit agreement that certain sets of considerations were relevant. What was contested 
was the relative weights and importance given to the various values: what was contested 
was the hierarchy of values deemed appropriate for the running o f science.
Kuhn contends that the variability associated with the application of values, once 
crisis has commenced and the previously fixed value-hierarchy is relinquished, constitutes 
a positive contribution to science:
The points at which values must be applied are invariably also those at 
which risks must be taken ... In matters like these the resort to shared 
values rather than to shared rules governing individual choice may be the 
community's way of distributing risk and assuring the long-term success of 
its enterprise.26
This is very reminiscent of Feyerabend's position vis a vis empirical traditions and 
proliferation. That is, Kuhn is saying that the unencumbered application o f values 
produces a proliferation of theories. This is seen as good because a wide range of 
alternatives are proposed which subsequently ensures that one o f them will be successful 
and be chosen as the next paradigm. This situation highlights one of the few major 
differences between Feyerabend and Kuhn. Feyerabend would like to see a proliferation 
of theories at all times, not just in times o f crisis. Kuhn, on the other hand, sees 
proliferation as anathema to the normal running o f science: proliferation is needed only in 
times o f crisis where the existing paradigm has run into trouble and an alternative is 
needed.
25 See, for example, C. A  Hooker, "The Nature of Quantum Mechanical Reality" and his "Projection, 
Physical Intelligibility, Objectivity and Completeness: The Divergent Ideals of Bohr and Einstein" 
British Journal fo r  the Philosophy o f  Science, 42, (1991) pp. 491-511.
26 SSR, p. 186.
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5.3.3 Kuhn Versus Laudan on Values.
Larry Laudan has criticised Kuhn's theory of values on two points: (i) Laudan 
sees Kuhn as commiting what Laudan calls the 'covariance fallacy', and (ii) Laudan 
contends that Kuhn supports 'cognitive egalitarianism'. I argue below that both Laudan's 
claims are false. In the course of these rebuttals the character of Kuhn's value theory, as 
presented in the previous section, will become clearer.
Firstly, to the charge that Kuhn commits the 'covariance fallacy': the claim that 
theoretical/ontological claims are necessarily covariant with axiological/cognitive goals. 
"Each form of the fallacy assumes that the presence or absence of consensus with respect 
to factual claims can be used to infer the existence of agreement or disagreement with 
respect to cognitive aims".27 Thus disagreements over cognitive goals cannot be 
rationally adjudicated for there is no higher court of appeal, any appeal to theory or 
ontology is also out of consideration because question-begging and self-referring. 
Kuhnian paradigms are assumed by Laudan to be covariant structures o f just this type: 
they are all-or-nothing in character. "So far as I [Laudan] know, Kuhn never imagines 
that there might be fundamental ontological or theoretical differences between scientists 
who share the same cognitive goals".28
In reply to this objection of Laudan's, consider this quote from Kuhn:
I have implicitly assumed that, whatever their initial source, the criteria or 
values deployed in theory choice are fixed once and for all, unaffected by 
their participation in transitions from one theory to another. Roughly 
speaking, but only very roughly, I take that to be the case. If the list of 
relevant values is kept sh o rt... and if their specification is left vague, then 
such values as accuracy, scope, and fruitfulness are permanent attributes of 
science.29
Here Kuhn does not take differences at the level of basic theory as evidence for 
fundamental differences o f aim or value. Rather, for Kuhn, differences at the basic
27 L. Laudan, Science and Values: The Aims o f  Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate, p. 43.
28 Ibid., p. 44.
29 Kuhn, "Objectivity ..." p. 335. More correctly, I feel, Kuhn should have said modem science, rather 
than the unqualified 'science'. It can be contended that pre-Galilean science did not have a place for 
fruitfulness in their value inventory; especially if  fruitfulness is conceived in its association with content 
increase and novelty. See the discussion in chapter 2 above.
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theoretical level will indicate some sort of difference in aims, goals or values, but the 
basic categories of valuation: puzzle-solving capability, accuracy, consistency, 
coherence, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness, survive as permanent fixtures of science. 
Thus, for Kuhn, scientists who do indeed support and share the same cognitive aims, 
values and goals, may yet differ in supporting fundamentally different theories. For 
example, the value structures of Newtonians and Einsteinians did not differ markedly, 
except possibly in greater emphasis being placed upon theoretical and mathematical 
coherence.
Kuhn has emphasised that theory change can evince value change, consequently, 
a further point against the idea that Kuhn commits the covariance fallacy can be gathered 
from the following passage:
i f ... value changes had occurred as rapidly or been as complete as the 
theory changes to which they related, then theory choice would be value 
choice, and neither could provide justification for the other. But, 
historically, value change is ordinarily a belated and largely unconscious 
concomitant of theory choice, and the former's magnitude is regularly 
smaller than the latter's. For the function I have here ascribed to values, 
such relative stability provides a sufficient basis.30
Obviously, if value change, according to Kuhn, is a belated change, then the putative
attribution to Kuhn of the covariance thesis is false. Laudan takes great pains to show
that value change does not necessarily covary with theoretical/ontological change by
presenting the example o f the shift from the explicit value o f pure observation, to the
explicit acceptance of the idea o f the postulation of unobservables in a hypothetico-
deductive manner.31 Even though scientists had, in fact, been working with unobservable,
hypothetical entities for a considerable period of time, it was only in the 1830's that
recognition of this fact was made explicit in the 'official' axiology o f science. Laudan thus
concludes that axiological standards do not covary with theory and ontology. It is
obvious that this situation is exactly what Kuhn had in mind when he said that value
30 Ibid., p. 336. my emphasis
31 Laudan, Science and Values, pp. 55-60.
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change is ordinarily a belated change with respect to the factual/theoretical changes 
which drive it.32
Laudan's second objection to Kuhn is the charge that Kuhn supports 'cognitive 
egalitarianism': "the thesis that all beliefs are epistemically or evidentially equal in terms 
of their support" .33 Laudan tries to temper the charge by saying that Kuhn presents the 
thesis in "a less extreme and more carefully articulated form" ,34 but, nevertheless, Laudan 
contends that
He [Kuhn] says ... that because we have no rules that would 
unambiguously pick out a single theory to the exclusion o f all other 
possible theories about the relevant domain, it is inevitable that the choice 
between any two theories could always go one way or the other, given any 
set of values or norms about what we expect our theories to achieve. Kuhn 
is not denying that rules play a role in the choice o f scientific theories, but 
he is insisting that their intrinsic ambiguity precludes the possibility of 
decisive preferences ever being justified on the basis of shared 
methodological rules.35
Laudan goes on to give examples o f theoretical situations where specific values would 
have given unambiguous preference for one theory over another: Newton's theory was 
empirically more accurate then Aristotle's; Newton's theory was of greater generality 
than Kepler's, and he concludes that "neither Kuhn nor anyone else has shown that most 
(let alone all) theory choice situations exhibit the impotence of 'shared criteria' to 
determine a preference" .36 What Laudan plays upon is a shifting in the use of the term 
'theory'. Kuhn, in his article "Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice", uses the 
term 'theory' throughout the article, where it is plain in the context that it is not theory
32 The whole question of the dubiousness of covariance is belied by Laudan's own admission and 
delineation of the explicit/implicit dichotomy of axiological/value commitment. It can be argued that 
Galileo's theories were indelibly suffused with the postulation of unobserv able processes: Galileo's 
analytic method, which was taken up enthusiastically by Hobbes and Descartes, sees observable 
processes as composed out of unobservable processes. Once this method is seen as presenting 
metaphysical insights, the road to atomism and the postulation of other unobservable entities is clearly 
indicated Consequently, covariance, in fact, happened. The fact that the explicit admission of 
unobservable entities and processes took much longer to arrive does not impugn the fact that covariance 
was in operation. At that time the stress upon empirical values can be explained as part of the rhetoric of 
modem science, begun with Galileo, in order to stymie the objections of empirically minded 
Aristotelians.
33 Laudan, Science and Values p. 30.
34 Ibid..
35 Ibid., p. 31. my emphasis.
36Ibid., p. 32.
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choice which Kuhn is addressing, but paradigm choice. As Kuhn has stated in a different 
article, "though they [values] function at all times, their particular importance emerges 
when the members o f a particular community must identify crisis or, later, choose 
between incompatible ways of practicing their discipline" .37 That is, the situation where 
the shared values of a community of scientists exhibit underdetermination of 
interpretation and weighting, are situations of paradigm choice. For Kuhn, theory choice 
within paradigms is relatively unproblematic, hence the entire structure of normal 
science. It is normal science because the moves to be made in the ongoing puzzle-solving 
and articulation o f the paradigm, and the assessment of what is appropriate and what is 
not appropriate research, is settled and unproblematic, and this is so because o f the 
settled and unproblematic temporary interpretation and weighting o f the shared value 
hierarchy.
Laudan's examples are also highly misleading. Kuhn stated that it was in times of 
crisis and paradigm choice that values became especially important and where value 
interpretation and weighting becomes ambiguous Consequently, to give the 
unambiguous preference o f Newton's theory over Aristotle's by the late seventeenth 
century as an example o f unambiguous value determination o f preference, is neither here 
nor there in relation to Kuhn's theory o f values. O f course it is the case that eventually 
paradigm choice via fulfilment o f shared values is unambiguously determinable. The 
questions and issues that Kuhn wants to highlight are those surrounding the preference 
for Aristotle or Galileo, at the time of Galileo; exactly the time when the new paradigm 
was in its fledgling stage. This is an especially important time in that it was the 
interpretation of empirical accuracy, qualitative versus quantitative, which was one o f the 
central issues over which the debates were conducted. By the time o f Newton, empirical 
accuracy was deemed to be quantitative accuracy, rather than qualitative accuracy, so it 
is not very surprising that Newton's theory was better than Aristotle's in this area. If we 
turn to the preference for Newton's theory over Kepler's in relation to generality, then 
the ready assent as to Newton's preferability over Kepler's is highly uncontroversial for
37 Kuhn, "Postscript" in SSR, pp. 184-5.
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two reasons. Firstly, Kuhn could contend that both Kepler and Newton were working 
within the paradigmatic tradition started by Galileo, hence Newton's theory could be 
considered to be normal science, where the interpretation and weighting of values had 
been settled. Secondly, nowhere in Kuhn's system is it denied that, all other values being 
equal, the theory which has, in this instance, greater generality, should be preferred 
unambiguously. The situations Kuhn has in mind are situations where different theories 
have strengths and weaknesses in relation to different values, or where it is the 
interpretation o f the value in question which is in debate. For example,
The oxygen theory ... was universally acknowledged to account for 
observed weight relations in chemical reactions, something the phlogiston 
theory had previously scarcely attempted to do. But the phlogiston theory, 
unlike its rival, could account for the metals being much more alike than 
the ores from which they were formed. One theory thus matched 
experience better in one area, the other in another. To choose between 
them on the basis of accuracy, a scientist would need to decide the area in 
which accuracy was more significant.38
Or consider the situation with respect to Galileo and the Aristotelian world-view. 
Galileo's ideas could certainly be seen as having advantages in many areas, but the 
Aristotelian world-view, as just that, a world-view, had advantages in different areas 
such as generality. In both these situations competing theories had competing strengths, 
and that is all that Kuhn wanted to point out in saying that theory choice, in being value- 
driven, is not algorithmic.
Even in situations o f paradigm choice, Kuhn's values are not completely impotent 
in helping scientists to come to a preference. Specifically, it is not the situation, contra 
Laudan, that Kuhn's values cannot lead to preferences amongst the set o f all possible 
theories. Kuhn states that
Values like accuracy, consistency, and scope may prove ambiguous in 
application, both individually and collectively, they may, that is, be an 
insufficient basis for a shared algorithm of choice. But they do specify a 
great deal: what each scientist must consider in reaching a decision, what 
he may and may not consider relevant, and what he can legitimately be 
required to report as the basis for the choice he has made. Change the list, 
for example by adding social utility as a criterion, and some particular
38 Kuhn, "Objectivity ... " p. 323.
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choices will be different, more like those one expects from an engineer.
Subtract accuracy of fit to nature from the list, and the enterprise that 
results may not resemble science at all, but perhaps philosophy instead .39
That is, even in the case of paradigm choice, the set o f possible candidates will be heavily
circumscribed in their nature. Of course, within those limits their may be considerable
scope for theoretical variation, and within that variation, unambiguous choice will not be
immediately attainable, but that certainly does not lead to the conclusion o f cognitive
egalitarianism.
Laudan presents what he calls the reticulated model of scientific rationality and 
justification, as opposed to the hierarchical model.
Where the reticulational picture differs most fundamentally from the 
hierarchical one is in the insistence that there is a complex process of 
mutual adjustment and mutual justification going on among all three levels 
of scientific commitment. Justification flows upward as well as downward 
in the hierarchy, linking aims, methods, and factual claims. No longer 
should we regard any one of these levels as privileged or primary or more 
fundamental than the others. Axiology, methodology, and factual claims 
are inevitably intertwined in relations of mutual dependency.40
The fact of the matter is that Kuhn, far from advocating the hierarchical model, as
Laudan insinuates, is advocating just such a model as Laudan presents. It is quite plain
that Kuhn advocates the idea that theory/paradigm change can alter the structure and
interpretation o f the individual values, and the value hierarchy as a whole. It is equally
obvious that ongoing research in normal science is governed and informed by the value
structure. For Kuhn, values and theories are involved in a complex feedback loop of
mutual adjustment and refinement.
5.4 Conclusion: Problems and Projects.
If we bring to Feyerabend's rather sketchy account of the details o f values-based 
rationality, the sort of explication that we find in Kuhn, then the prospects of producing a 
coherent and plausible notion o f rationality, based upon values, becomes ever more 
possible. However, there are, as yet, a number o f problems facing an approach such as
39 Ibid., p. 331.
40 Laudan, Science and Values, pp. 62-3.
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this. Firstly, the mechanism which triggers a rearrangement of the value hierarchy cannot 
itself be based upon values. Kuhn suggested that paradigms and values are involved in a 
feedback loop; values may shape the structure and the adoption of theories, but theories, 
as exemplars, define the status of values. This seems plausible enough, but some o f the 
big questions are not adequately answered in this way. The deepest, most far reaching 
scientific revolutions involve the radical upheaval of the value system of science. In fact, 
it could be said that the degree of upheaval in the value system is directly correlated with 
the depth o f the revolution.41 For example, it has been said by a number o f commentators 
that the scientific revolution associated with Copernicus et al, The Scientific Revolution, 
can be identified as the then unprecedented marriage o f explanatory power and 
predictive, quantitative accuracy .42 The Aristotelian system, including the values inherent 
in that system, had no place for such a union. The transition from Aristotelian science to 
modem science did not constitute a change in the hierarchy of values; rather, the 
transition constituted a change in the set of values itself. The idea that theory change can 
elicit value change seems to be an adequate account when considering small scale value 
change, and, conversely, the idea that values shape the direction of theory change is also 
plausible when considering theory change within paradigms. But when such large-scale 
theoretical and value disruptions such as that of the Copemican revolution are 
considered, it becomes a problematic account. It can be convincingly argued that Galileo 
was working within the new value system before he proposed his theories, and that it 
was necessary for Galileo to do this so as to make it possible for the new system to arise. 
How is this notion possible according to the idea that exemplars and values are indelibly 
linked?
A second problem arises out of the first and brings us back to questions raised by 
Feyerabend. If  it could be argued that, apart from minor qualifications, changes in 
application, and reshuffling, science as a whole has shown a great stability in its value
41 This point has been made by E. McMullin, "Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science" in P. 
Horwich (ed) World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature o f Science.
42 See McMullin Ibid., and S. Amsterdamski, Between History and Method: Disputes About the 
Rationality o f  Science. Amsterdamski probably captures the marriage better when he characterises it as 
the marriage of episteme and techne.
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system, then it becomes plausible to assume that science itself is a tradition. But if 
science as a whole is a tradition, then the whole question o f rationality can be asked 
again. The particular structure o f values-based rationality may be something only 
applicable to science: like all traditions, rationality is an intra-traditional notion. We are 
left with three options here: we can say that science has its own rationality, other large- 
scale traditions have their own rationality, and never the twain shall meet. Or, we could 
contend that we would have to repeat the process all over again, identifying supra- 
traditional values on a very large scale. Or, we could say that there is an identifiable 
continuity in values between large-scale traditions of various sorts.
If there is continuity o f values between large-scale traditions of various sorts, 
how is this continuity characterised? What is it, in the fine-textured structure of the 
process o f valuation, which could be the key to understanding rationality, wherever and 
whenever it is, without becoming embroiled anew in 'Rationalistic' philosophies? These 
questions will be addressed in the next two chapters.
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6 Dewey’s Pragmatic Naturalism and Values-Based Rationality
6.1 Introduction,
We have seen that Feyerabend seems to be supporting a values-based conception 
of rationality as an alternative to 'Rationahst' accounts of rationality. Moreover, we have 
also seen that Kuhn explicitly proposed a conception o f scientific rationality revolving 
around the idea of epistemic values. But, as we saw in section 5.4, there remain doubts 
as to the general applicability of a values-based conception o f rationality. Most important 
among these doubts concerns the worry that different, large-scale, traditions of thought, 
with their very different value-structures, may not be able to be comparatively rationally 
assessed.
It is my contention that such worries surrounding the idea of values-based 
rationality are ultimately unfounded. Specifically, if we look to the philosophy of John 
Dewey, with its very detailed treatment o f values and rationality, then we can find 
resources in the idea of values-based rationality which can overcome residual doubts. If 
Feyerabend had included within his philosophy some of the insights of Dewey's 
philosophy, then he would have been able to present a viable, alternative account of 
rationality.
Dewey was a prolific writer, both in volume and scope; consequently, systematic 
exposition of Dewey's philosophy is not possible here. In section 6.2 I will give a short 
background to Dewey's philosophy, highlighting the problematic situation which led 
Dewey to propose his ideas concerning values and rationality. This is followed, in section 
6.3, by a presentation of Dewey's ideas concerning values. In section 6.4 will be 
presented those ideas o f Dewey's which can be fruitfully appropriated so as to complete 
Feyerabend's project o f producing an alternative conception of rationality.
6.2 Dewey’s Problematic.
For Dewey, all existence is historical: it is marked by beginnings, mediation, and 
ending. All inquiry is also historical, in that it is a temporal process marked by
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problematic situations, mediation, and resolution. Moreover, anything which is historical 
is also individual and unique and cannot be made to be merely an instance of a 
generalisation:
Generalized facts, when they are taken to be individual events complete in 
themselves, lead to a picture of the universe in which occurrences are 
exactly like one another. There is repetition but no development, 
mechanical production but no cumulative movement toward an integrated 
consequence ... When, however, events are viewed in their connections ... 
nature is seen to be marked by histories. (QC, p. 247.)
This idea of the unique, historical and individual character o f existence, does not imply
that we cannot have any generalisations or abstractions. Rather, for Dewey, "Nature has
a mechanism sufficiently constant to permit of calculation, inference and foresight." (QC,
p. 248.) But this mechanism, this physical lawfulness, is always of the nature of statistical
generalisations, they express possibilities. As such, "They are not descriptions of the
exact structure and behavior of any individual thing". (QC, p. 248.) This leads Dewey to
contend that "No mechanically exact science o f an individual is possible. An individual is
a history unique in character." (QC, p. 249.) Existence is always individual and unique: it
has its own non-repeating quality. Abstractions and generalisations are tools which
inform us of the range o f possible outcomes o f these unique temporal processes. Once
we know what outcomes are possible, we can then manipulate and control existence so
as to bring about those states of affairs which we would prefer to have happen.
"Standardizations, formulae, generalizations, principles, universals, have their place, but
the place is that o f being instrumental to better approximation to what is unique and
unrepeatable." (EN, p. 117.) These unrepeatable states or ends must, o f course, be of
some sort or kind, but they will nevertheless bring with them unique aspects and
qualities. Moreover, these unique aspects and qualities, once attained, may show the way
to new end-objects, new historical culminations, o f a kind not previously attained.
In science, for example, if we want to know some particular fact, say, why certain 
rocks exist in a particular mountain range, we bring to bear generalised facts, principles 
and laws: tectonic plate movements, the distinctions associated with rock formation such
as sedimentary, metamorphic, and so on. These generalisations do not provide us with 
the knowledge of the particular rocks from the particular mountain range in question. 
Rather, these generalisations function as boundary conditions as to the range o f possible 
influences and histories: they are tools and instruments and their purpose is to place the 
particular rocks within a context of limited possibility. The identification of the 
particularity o f the rocks under scrutiny involves a further process of determination and 
limitation of possibilities. Moreover, this further limitation will produce a unique set of 
circumstances inapplicable as a description of any other geological feature in other 
mountain ranges.
This conception of existence as temporal and historical in character, and therefore 
as constantly unique and non-repeatable, is seen by Dewey as a characterisation of all 
existence, at whatever level we care to think about, physical, social, ethical, aesthetic, 
and so on. It is meant to be constitutive of existence qua existence; consequently, all 
aspects o f human endeavour is to be understood as falling within the scope of temporal- 
historical understanding. Most especially, Dewey sees the process of inquiry, and 
therefore o f rationality, as being essentially temporal and historical. Consequently, we 
can conclude that, for Dewey, all rational, right-thinking must be contextual. All rational 
thinking must be contextual because each moment in time, each time-slice o f a multitude 
of interacting and non-interacting histories, is ultimately individual, unique and novel. If 
we are to know what the rational thing to do in any situation is, then we must be aware 
of the peculiarities o f the specific situation at hand.
However, the contention of historicality and contextuality creates a double-edged 
situation: context "gives point to everything said ... Context is incorporated in what is 
said and forms the arbiter of the value of every utterance" . 1 That is, nothing can be said, 
by anyone, and be completely understood, without a knowledge of the presuppositions 
built into the context within which a speaker speaks.
A background is implicit in some form and to some degree in all thinking,
although as background it does not come into explicit purview; that is, it
1 Dewey, "Context and Thought", in Bernstein (ed) On Experience, Nature and Freedom, p. 92.
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does not form a portion of the subject matter which is consciously 
attended to ... Surrounding, bathing, saturating, the things of which we are 
explicitly aware is some inclusive situation which does not enter into the 
direct material of reflection ... There is always that which continues to be 
taken for granted, which is tacit, being 'understood'2
That is, we are always immersed within a context which provides the implicit, unstated,
meanings o f which we are at most times unaware. The background, the context, provides
the superstructure around which explicit meanings are contoured. This context is seen by
Dewey as all pervasive: it affects everything from the highest culture and art, to the
mundane everyday activities of normal existence.
There exists at any period a body of beliefs and o f institutions and 
practices allied to them. In these beliefs there are implicit broad 
interpretations of life and the world. These interpretations have 
consequences, often profoundly important. In their actual currency, 
however, the implications of origin, nature, and consequences are not 
examined and formulated ... this cultural context o f beliefs and allied 
institutions is irretrievably there; reference to it is taken for granted and 
not made explicit.3
We have here an admission by Dewey of the deeply contextual, implicit, nature of much 
of our behaviour and thought. But if this is the case, how are we able to transcend the 
constraints embodied in our practices and institutions? If  the context is implicit, tacit, 
'understood', then how are we able to step back from the context in which we are 
immersed and explicitly examine and test the presuppositions involved?
This is an especially important question for Dewey to answer; Dewey's entire 
philosophy revolved around the ways and means by which we can avoid the spurious 
quest for certainty:
exaltation of pure intellect and its activity above practical affairs is 
fundamentally connected with the quest for certainty which shall be 
absolute and unshakeable ... Through thought... it has seemed that men 
might escape from the perils of uncertainty ... The intellect... according to 
the traditional doctrine, may grasp universal Being, and Being which is 
universal is fixed and immutable. (QC, pp. 6-7.)
Moreover, this quest for certainty has resulted in the notion that reason
2 Ibid., pp. 98-9.
* Ibid.. D. 106.
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designates both an inherent immutable order of nature, superempirical in 
character, and the organ of mind by which this universal order is grasped.
In both respects, reason is with respect to changing things the ultimate 
fixed standard - the law physical phenomena obey, the norm human action 
should obey. For the marks of'reason' in its traditional sense are necessity, 
universality, superiority to change, domination of the occurrence and the 
understanding of change. (QC, p. 212.)
In contrast, Dewey sees practical activity, doing, as the area to which we must direct our 
attentions. It is practical activity which highlights the need for adaptive response to 
unique situations.
Intelligence ... is associated with judgment; that is, with selection and 
arrangement of means to effect consequences and with choice of what we 
take as our ends. A man is intelligent not in virtue o f having reason which 
grasps first and indemonstrable truths about fixed principles, in order to 
reason deductively from them to the particulars which they govern, but in 
virtue of his capacity to estimate the possibilities of a situation and to act 
in accordance with his estimate ... Whenever intelligence operates, things 
are judged in their capacity of signs of other things. (QC, p. 213 )4
Consequently, if we are to be intelligently adaptable and responsive to the demands of
ever new unique, non-repeatable, situations, and not simply responding to new situations
as we have done before in mechanical, habitual fashion, or in manners which presuppose
an immutable fixed reality, then the context within which we find ourselves, no matter
how entrenched, must be available for revaluation and revision. Consider this quote from
Dewey:
Our life has no background of sanctified categories upon which we may 
fall back; we rely upon precedent as authority only to our own undoing - 
for with us there is such a continuously novel situation that final reliance 
upon precedent entails some class interest guiding us by the nose whither it 
will.5
Thus, the inescapable context o f thought and behaviour, which must always be kept in 
mind if fallacious conclusions are to be avoided, is also something which must be 
constantly transcended so that illegitimate a priorisms and class, power interests are to be 
avoided: context is both the "arbiter of the value of every utterance" and that which must 
be transcended. The question must be asked, how is this balance, this 'essential tension'
4 Cf. LTI,pp. 9-10.
5 Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy" in Bernstein (ed) On Experience, Nature and 
Freedom, p. 68.
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between tradition and innovation, to be achieved? What processes can ensure that we are 
always open to criticism of even the most deeply entrenched conceptions of life and the 
world?
6.3 Values and Rationality.
6.3.1 The Process o f Valuation.
As will become clearer as we proceed, the idea of values is a crucial notion for 
understanding Dewey's philosophy: valuation is inquiry; valuation is criticism.
we suppose that when we are reflecting upon or inquiring in to the good 
or value o f some act or object, we are dealing with something as simple, as 
self-inclosed, as the simple act of immediate prizing or welcoming or 
cherishing performed without rhyme or reason, from instinct or habit. In 
truth ... tobe good means precisely ceasing to look at it as a direct, self- 
sufficient thing and considering it in its consequences ... a man may not 
only enjoy a thing, but he may judge the thing enjoyed to be good, to be a 
value. But in so doing he is going beyond the thing immediately present 
and making an inference to other things, which, he implies, are connected 
with it (EEL, pp 356-7 )
The act o f valuation is an act o f inquiry and criticism: to say something is better than 
other things, apart from expressing immediate enjoyment, is to have discriminated, 
weighed and judged the alternatives as to their efficacy in producing consequences which 
will in the future be appreciated and enjoyed.6
This position implies that valuation is not an arbitrary, subjective expression of 
preference. I f  valuation is simply an expression of liking and disliking, then there is no 
sense in the contention that values are involved in discriminating judgment, rather, they 
just are.
They exist; they are given. But as given they are not determinate values.
They are not objects o f  valuation; they are data for a valuation ... were 
they already definite values, they would not be estimated, they would be 
stimuli to direct response ... A value ... means a consideration, and a
6 This conception is identical to Kuhn's response to criticisms imputing subjectivity to his idea of values 
in science, see his "Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice" pp. 336-8.
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consideration does not mean an existence merely, but an existence having 
a claim upon judgment. (EEL, pp. 363-4.)
Nor is valuation an alignment o f ourselves to, or a realisation of, a pre-existing 
independent value structure. Thus,
it is frequently assumed ... that valuation is a process o f applying some 
fixed or determinate value to the various competing goods o f a situation, 
that valuation implies a prior standard of value and consists in comparing 
various goods with the standard as the supreme value. (EEL, p. 370.)
This situation is unacceptable for Dewey, for it implies that ends can be discriminated
from means in a categorical manner. Dewey does not accept any inherent separateness
between means and ends: "only by a judgment o f means - things having value in the
carrying of an indeterminate situation to a completion - is the end determinately made
out in judgment." (EEL, p. 371.) To conceive of means as isolated from intelligent
choice o f ends to be reached, is to see the world as completely deterministic. But, for
Dewey, this conclusion is belied by the empirical facts of experience: in formulating ends
and acting upon them, we actively control and manipulate existence so as to bring about
states of affairs which would not have existed if we had not actively striven to bring them
into existence.
The subject-matter [of practical judgment] implies that it makes a 
difference how the given is terminated: that one outcome is better than 
another, and that the proposition is to be a factor in securing (as far as may 
be) the better. In other words, there is something objectively at stake in the 
forming of the proposition. (EEL, p. 339.)
The subject-matter o f practical judgment concerns a particular problematic situation; a 
formulation of an end to be attained which will be better than the original situation, and 
which, moreover, it is possible to achieve, and which, in addition, would not be achieved 
without the formulation o f the practical judgment in question. Practical judgments imply 
active participation to bring the desired end product to fruition. Thus practical judgments 
are existentially formative and constructive: when acted upon they change the external 
world so as to produce, in experience, a better world.
A practical proposition is binary. It is a judgment that the given is to be 
treated in a specified way, it is also a judgment that the given admits of 
such treatment, that it admits o f a specified objective termination. It is a
judgment, at the same stroke, of end - the result to be brought about - and 
of means. (EEL, p. 340 .)
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The utopian, romantic, idealistic conception, which sees ends as pre-existing ends-in- 
themselves, also takes away from human endeavour the active, constructive aspects 
which Dewey sees as necessary to have in a changing universe. A fixed and final 
structure of ends will only retard ongoing valuation and judgment: pre-existing values, 
designed for particular purposes, will act as constraints to possible solutions o f 
problematic situations. Action will thus be forced into the pre-given moulds and 
adequate, adaptive response consequently ruled out. Allegiance to such a pre-given end- 
value structure, in the face of problematic situations requiring revaluation, will bespeak 
of an authoritarian attitude advanced in the interests of a privileged class, or culture. 
Moreover, if values were determinate and pre-given, then situations would not require 
valuation, they would simply be stimulus for response according to the dictates o f the 
value system. Thus, for Dewey, whenever we truly value, we are reconstructing our 
values according to the exigencies of the particular problematic situation at hand: "to 
judge value is to engage in instituting a determinate value where none is given." (EEL, p. 
368.)
Some may find this position of Dewey's untenable, surely, they may say, the value 
of honesty, for example, is something which can be supported and upheld as a pre-given, 
sufficiently determinate value, such as to guide conduct in situations requiring valuation. 
Dewey's reply would be to say that values such as honesty are not determinate with 
respect to particular problematic situations. Every problematic situation requiring 
valuation is unique and individual; the fact that the situation is problematic implies that if 
honesty is a consideration, then it is not known how it is applicable. Different situations 
require individual responses, and these responses are dependent upon the details of the 
particular situation: there are as many permutations of being honest as there are
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problematic situations 7 Of course, it is obvious that values such as honesty are often 
involved in valuation, but
the more completely the notions o f the model is formed outside and 
irrespective o f the specific conditions which the situation o f  action 
presents, the less intelligent is the act. Most men have their ideals o f  the 
model changed somewhat in the face o f the actual offering ... The man 
who is not accessible to such change ... [has] become a reacting machine.
In short, the standard o f valuation is formed in the process o f  practical 
judgment or valuation. It is not something taken from outside and applied 
within it - such application means there is no judgment. (EEL, pp. 373-4.)8
That is, "if the standard is already given, all that remains is its mechanical application to
the case in hand." (EEL, p. 374.)9 It is also obvious that there are many situations in
which honesty is not the best policy. Consequently, to uphold honesty as something to be
followed in all situations is either to stymie adaptive response because o f  a too rigid
interpretation o f  what honesty is, or to leave one with an empty and vacuous maxim,
irrelevant to successful conduct because it can give no concrete, practical guidance as to
purpose and action.10
In contradistinction to the views that valuation is liking or disliking, or reference 
to pre-existing value structures, Dewey's position implies that
7 Thus, Dewey contends that we must "abandon the notion of a predetermined limited number of ends 
inherently arranged in an order of increasing comprehensiveness and finality... [for] natural termini are 
as infinitely numerous and varied as are the individual systems of action they delimit" EN, p. 395.
8 We have here an example of Dewey's anticipation of post-positivist philosophy. Specifically, this quote 
mirrors the sentiments and contentions of H.I.Brown, in his Perception, Theory and Commitment and 
Rationality, wherein he criticises the algorithmic, classical model of rationality. Cf, my discussion of 
these points in chapter 1.
9 Thus, Dewey does not deny that we often have and utilise pre-existing, ordered, value systems. Since 
situations often overlap, without being identical, this is often unequivocally justifiable. But their status as 
pre-existing values is always hypothetical and revisable. See, for example, LTI, p. 168. Moreover, in 
these situations the value system does not function as values, rather, they function as facts. Values only 
exist in those situations wherein an as yet indeterminate situation needs to be resolved and determined 
through valuation and judgment. Confusions regarding the through and through functional nature of all 
distinctions in Dewey's philosophy has retarded understanding of his philosophy. Thus, the idea that a 
particular statement could function as a value in one problematic situation, and as a fact in another, has 
been thought to be an impossibility. See, for example, K. Neilsen, "Dewey's Concept of Philosophy" in 
Tiles (ed) John Dewey: Critical Assessments Vol. IV. Nature, Knowledge and Naturalism esp. Section. 
IV. And M. White, "Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis" in Tiles (ed) John Dewey: Critical 
Assessments Vol.IlI. Value, Conduct and Art. Without going into detail, it seems to me that these writers 
haven't fully appreciated the functional nature of Dewey's philosophy; consequently, they have implicitly 
relied upon theories of value which exclusively dichotomise values and facts.
10 Cf. QC, pp. 265-6.
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a judgment of value is simply a case of a practical judgment, a judgment 
about the doing of something ... It asserts that value-objects mean simply 
objects as judged to possess a certain force within a situation temporally 
developing toward a determinate result. To find  a thing good is ... to 
attribute or impute nothing to i t ... But to consider whether it is good and 
how good it is, is to ask how it, as i f  acted upon, will operate in 
promoting a course o f action. (EEL, 358-9.)
Thus, judgment is valuation,
as long as I judge, value is indeterminate. The question is not what a thing 
will do - 1 may be quite clear about that: it is whether to perform the act 
which will actualize its potentiality. What will I have the situation become 
as between alternatives? And that means what force shall the thing as 
means be given? ... When its status in these respects is determined, its 
value is determined; judgment ceases, action goes on. (EEL, p. 361.)
Dewey offers the process of buying a suit as an example of valuation and
judgment. When buying a suit, we have a particular purpose in mind for which the suit is
required, various aspects o f suits can then be delineated as being value-objects:
Relative, or comparative, durability, cheapness, suitability, style, aesthetic 
attractiveness constitute value traits [of suits]. They are traits o f objects 
not per se, but as entering into a possible and foreseen completing o f the 
situation. Their value is their force in precisely this function. The decision 
of better and worse is the determination of their respective capacities and 
intensities in this regard. Apart from their status in this office, they have 
no traits of value for knowledge. (EEL, p. 362.)
Moreover,
Value is not determined by comparing various suits with an ideal model, 
but by comparing various suits with respect to cheapness, durability, 
adaptability with one another - involving, o f course, reference also to 
length o f purse, suits already possessed, etc., and other specific elements in 
the situation which demands that something be done. (EEL, p. 373.)
That is, in every situation requiring valuation and judgment we are creating new values
pertaining to the specific circumstances at hand, we are not relying upon pre-existent
ideals or values.
It is essential that we are clear as to what Dewey is saying here. Dewey's stress 
upon means-ends relationships is not meant to be understood in terms o f rational choice, 
decision theory type analyses o f means-ends relationships. The idea that rationality 
consists in the best choice o f means to procure a given end is anathema to Dewey's
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analysis. Rather, rationality and valuation is indelibly linked to the idea that the end is not 
something given, such that we only have to decide which means will best achieve that 
end. The end is itself determined in valuation amongst a set of alternative ends, and it is 
determined in association with the means available to achieve the various competing 
ends, and in relation to sets o f possible consequences perceived as resulting from the 
adoption of any one end as the conclusion of judgment. The chosen end is then 
additionally valued because o f its perceived superiority, if attained, of being a means to 
the end of resolving the problematic situation which evoked the necessity for judgment 
and valuation. For Dewey, valuation is essentially linked to possibility:
the relation between objects as known and objects with respect to value is 
that between the actual and the possible. 'The actual' consists of given 
conditions, 'the possible' denotes ends or consequences not now existing 
but which the actual may through its use bring into existence. (QC, p.
299.)
In as much as rational decision theory sees calculation of means as involving the selection 
of action from amongst sets o f possibilities, Dewey would agree that some rationality is 
involved. But the idea that ends are not involved in the calculation of possibilities, that 
ends are simply what they are, given, means that Dewey would reject rational decision 
theory approaches as lacking an essential component o f what it is to be rational .11
6.3.2 Science. Kuhn and Dewey.
The example of buying a suit, being as it were an example of practical reasoning, 
may not be considered relevant to the theoretical reasoning which we find in science. 
This is completely contrary to Dewey's conception of inquiry: all inquiry can be 
conceptualised in the same manner.
evaluative judgments ... enter into the formation of all final judgments ...
The scientific worker has continually to appraise the information he 
gathers ... he has to appraise its bearing upon what problems to undertake 
and what activities o f observation, experimentation and calculation to 
carry out. While he 'know s'... systems o f conceptual materials, including
11 For a discussion of some of the problems associated with rational decision theory, see B. Hindess, 
Choice, Rationality, and Social Theory.
laws, he has to estimate their relevancy and force as conditions of the 
particular inquiry undertaken. (LTI, p. 174.)
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Whenever a scientist must make a choice, that scientist is engaged in valuation and 
judgment.
We can see here that the values which, for example, Kuhn proposes as those 
which are operative in science: empirical quantitative accuracy, simplicity, fruitfulness, 
comprehensiveness, and so on, fulfil the role of value traits in science, just as the value 
traits above were those applicable to suits. Problematic situations arise in science, 
various alternatives are proposed, these alternatives are then considered and weighed 
with respect to the various value traits considered relevant in the case at hand. The 
alternatives are not compared to some pre-existing model of what should be the case, nor 
are they compared and adjudged according to some fixed antecedent maxim of 
rationality. Rather, the alternatives are compared with each other in respect to the 
various value traits deemed to be relevant in producing a resolution of the problematic 
situation.
If we compare Dewey with Kuhn, we can see why Kuhn could contend both that 
scientific values have remained stable over the history o f science, and that the content of 
these values has evolved over the history o f science. We can also see how values may 
differ according to the requirements of differing, particular situations. As an example, 
consider quantitative accuracy, which, as we saw, was considered by Kuhn to be a 
necessary concomitant o f scientific advance. In Dewey's conception, quantitative 
accuracy may function as a value trait in scientific research, but as such, there is no prior 
model, o f any specificity or determinateness, as to what quantitative accuracy will be in 
any particular research-inquiry situation, apart from  what is present in the concrete 
scientific alternatives at hand. Thus, in a particular research situation, all other relevant 
factors being equal, the theory, concept or technique which possesses, or potentially 
possesses, the greater quantitative accuracy over the other alternatives will be preferred 
in that situation. It is not hard to then imagine a hypothetical history o f science, which 
would mirror the actual history o f science, wherein the level o f quantitative accuracy is
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always preserved or bettered in ongoing research. A particular theory, concept or 
technique becomes an exemplar of what it means to possess quantitative accuracy; there 
is thus produced a constantly evolving value, being redetermined and revalued at 
intermittent intervals.
It is also easy to see that values will be interpreted differently according to the 
specific nature o f the research situation. Quantitative accuracy may be a value ubiquitous 
in science, but even within one research field the precise level of quantitative accuracy 
may radically vary, for example, certain problems in physics may require accuracy of a 
very high order, but in other physical problems, possibly less developed, or indicative of 
the nature of the subject matter, accuracy may be of a significantly lesser degree. 
Quantitative accuracy may also be indispensable for, say, meteorology, but a physicist 
may find the level of accuracy laughable. What matters is that the level of quantitative 
accuracy, in whatever field it is relevant, is discriminatory for that field.
Striking examples o f the culmination of the change in value systems provide us 
with the best examples of Kuhnian normal science. It is interesting to note that Dewey 
would have agreed with Feyerabend's criticisms o f normal science. For Dewey, the fact 
that we may arrive at a point wherein science becomes paradigm governed, 'normal' 
science, is an indication that valuation, and therefore criticism, is absent from the deeper 
levels o f science. The exemplary scientific achievement, and the value hierarchy 
encapsulated within it, instead of being treated as provisional and hypothetical, are being 
treated as facts and presuppositions. This Dewey sees as the greatest danger to science:
directing conceptions tend to be taken for granted after they have once 
come into general currency ... Failure to examine the conceptual structures 
and frames of reference which are unconsciously implicated in even the 
seemingly most innocent factual inquiries is the greatest single defect that 
can be found in any field of inquiry ... Failure to encourage fertility and 
flexibility in formation o f hypotheses as frames of reference is closer to a 
death warrant o f a science than any other one thing. (LTI, pp. 507-8.)12
Of course, Dewey would also agree that the full explication and the drawing out of the
consequences and implications of any particular idea is o f the greatest importance in
12 Cf. also EEL, p. 439.
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localising the strengths and weaknesses of that idea. But this articulation of a paradigm 
should not blind scientists to alternative possibilities not present within the conceptual 
structure of particular paradigms, to the extent that only those alternatives offered within 
a paradigm are considered worthy of pursuit.
At the end of the last chapter I raised the question of whether Kuhn's conception 
of the role of values in science could account for large-scale paradigm change. 
Specifically, Kuhn sees theory and value as involved in a feedback loop: theory change, 
of a sufficiently large kind, can evince value change, and values then direct theory 
formulation. Thus, important scientific achievements become the concrete exemplars of 
the values to be followed in subsequent research. However, it can be argued, for 
example, that Galileo must have been working within a new value system before he 
produced his concrete scientific results. This problem can be partly alleviated if we work 
with the concept of valuation which Dewey espouses. Because valuation must always be 
related to an individual problematic situation, initial small adjustments in the existing 
value system may be introduced in relation to the resolution of a specific problem. The 
implications, consequences and possible comprehensiveness of this initial exemplar are 
then explored. Each successive step in attempting to resolve the burgeoning problems 
and tensions involved in the new ideas proposed, being the result of further re-valuations, 
will push more and more adjustments to the pre-existing value system. Consequently, we 
must suppose that paradigm change is necessarily an extended historical process. If we 
identify paradigm change with the striking syntheses, the consummatory fulfilments, of 
the historical process, such as that given by Newton, then we will miss the crucially 
important formative genesis o f the ideas involved. To say that Galileo was working 
within a new value system before he produced his results has aspects o f both truth and 
falsity. Certainly some aspects were in place before Galileo's research: mathematical 
knowledge had advanced, the Reformation had changed the culture with respect to 
attitudes towards authority, and Copernicus had proposed his heliocentric system. But 
other aspects o f the new value system only developed along with Galileo's ongoing 
research.
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This idea of paradigmatic drift, though only implicit in Dewey, has been explicitly 
defended by Laudan under the rubric of the 'evolution of research traditions'.13 Laudan 
contends that
There is much continuity in an evolving research tradition. From one stage 
to the next, there is a preservation o f most o f the crucial assumptions of 
the research traditions ... But the emphasis here must be on relative 
continuity between successive stages in the evolutionary process. If a 
research tradition has undergone numerous evolutions in the course of 
time, there will probably be many discrepancies between the methodology 
and ontology of its earliest and its latest formulation.14
For example, what was called Newtonian physics in the late 1800's was a very different
science to that o f its namesake of two hundred years before. Given this evolution of
traditions/paradigms, it is easy to see that continual evolution can result in the
formulation o f a new tradition/paradigm. Just as in biological evolution genetic drift can
eventually produce different species from a common ancestral gene pool, so too new
paradigms can evolve out o f old paradigms, notwithstanding radical departures in deep-
level assumptions.
Nevertheless, there still remain some residual uncertainties with such a view: 
though the idea of paradigmatic drift can explain much of the history of science, there 
still remains, in the largest paradigm changes, such as that of the Copemican revolution, 
leaps in paradigmatic structure. These leaps are much smaller than that which was 
suggested by the early Kuhn, but, nevertheless, they can be quite dramatic. For example, 
through hindsight we can see that there had been much evolution in Aristotelian thought 
towards ideas encapsulated within the scientific revolution; nevertheless, the work of 
Galileo constituted a dramatic leap contrary to many of the basic Aristotelian 
assumptions. In situations such as this, defenders o f the old regime can simply dig their 
heels in and contend that the new ideas are just not rational: there has been a punctuation 
in the continual evolution o f ideas big enough to create ideological division.
13 Laudan, Progress and its Problems, pp. 95-100.
14 Ibid., DP 98-9.
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This uncertainty is not a problem for Dewey's concept of valuation, for Dewey 
has resources which can cope with this last hitch. Specifically, all the processes of 
valuation discussed in this section are meant to be understood in the context of what may 
be called general values o f inquiry. These general values o f inquiry can be seen to form a 
bridge between the support of values given by Feyerabend and Kuhn, and the 
presentation o f a viable, alternative, concept of rationality.
6.4 Four General Values of Inquiry.
6.4.1 Introduction.
In Dewey's philosophical system we can identify four overarching values of 
inquiry: (i) the necessity of empirical experience (ii) the idea of fruitfulness (iii) the drive 
for comprehensiveness, and (iv) the necessity for experimental testing. These four ideas 
are, in Deweyan philosophy, general values of all inquiry. This is a very important point: 
all knowledge, wherever it is to be found, if it is to be valid and rational knowledge, must 
be characterised by these four values. If a claimant to knowledge cannot be connected to 
empirical experience, then it does not qualify as a knowledge claim. If claimants to 
knowledge cannot act as guides to action and resolution o f problematic situations, then 
they are worthless. If  claimants to knowledge are only ever fragmentary and isolated, 
then they are not knowledge, they do not go beyond immediate experience to that which 
is not immediately present. If  claimants to knowledge are not experimentally testable, 
whether by decision or internal structure, then they are again worthless as knowledge 
claims until we decide to subject them to test, or until they are construed such as to 
admit of test.
These four general values of inquiry are the means by which debate across 
paradigmatic gaps, in any one historical process, can proceed. They are the means 
whereby alternate claims to rational allegiance; for example, Western medical science and 
Chinese traditional medicine, can be brought together and the beginnings o f rational 
comparison can proceed.
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6.4.2 Experience.
As outlined in Section 6.2 above, Dewey sees all existence as inherently historical 
and temporal; this is no less the case when we analyse empirical, perceptual experience.
In fact, Dewey sees our perceptual experience as the source of all our notions of 
temporality: perception is identified with the 'now' of history, and it exposes us to the 
unique and non-repeatable aspects of ongoing temporal existence. However, in a similar 
fashion to the discussion in Section 6.2, perception also carries with it the residues of 
previous lived experience: presuppositions concerning the nature o f the world fused into 
the structure of empirical experience. It is this recurrent tension in experience which 
leads Dewey to his ideas concerning value, as discussed in Section 6.3 above, and which 
ultimately leads to the importance which Dewey places upon testability and 
experimentation, to be discussed in the following section.
Dewey conceives of experience as primarily non-cognitive, non-reflective and 
non-intellectual. In such experience, "factors and qualities hang together; there is a great 
variety of them but they are saturated with a pervasive quality." (EEL, p. 5) In immediate 
experience there is a non-logical unity of subject and object, person and world, which is 
taken for granted and simply lived.
It may most easily be described from a negative point o f view: it is a type 
of experience which cannot be called a knowledge experience without 
doing violence to the term 'knowledge' and to experience. It may contain 
knowledge resulting from prior inquiries; it may include thinking within 
itself; but not so that they dominate the situation and give it its peculiar 
flavor. Positively, anyone recognizes the difference between an experience 
o f quenching thirst where the perception of water is a mere incident, and 
an experience o f water where knowledge of what water is, is the 
controlling interest; or between the enjoyment o f social converse among 
friends and a study deliberately made of the character o f one of the 
participants. (EEL, p. 2.)
This idea is directly contrary to the idea that experience is a primarily cognitive affair: 
where our everyday interactions with the world are characterised by relations of knower 
and known. A person who believes that experience is through and through cognitive in 
character
188
generally forms a habit of supposing that no qualities or things at all are 
present in experience except as objects of some kind of apprehension or 
awareness. Overlooking ... that things and qualities are present to most 
men most of the time as things and qualities in situations o f prizing and 
aversion, o f seeking and finding, of converse, enjoyment and suffering, o f 
production and employment, o f manipulation and destruction, he thinks of 
things as either totally absent from experience or else there as objects o f 
'consciousness' or knowing. (EEL, p. 3 .)
We see here that Dewey identifies consciousness with knowing, with cognition. The 
main point to be extracted from these quotes is the idea that experience is not primarily 
cognitive; rather
'Consciousness'... is only a very small and shifting portion of experience.
The scope and content of the focused apparency have immediate dynamic 
connections with portions of experience not at the time obvious. The word 
I have just written is momentarily focal; around it there shade off into 
vagueness my typewriter, the desk, the room, the building, the campus, the 
town, and so on. In  the experience, and in it in such a way as to qualify 
even what is shiningly apparent, are all the physical features of the 
environment extending out into space no one can say how far, and all the 
habits and interests extending backward and forward in time, of the 
organism which uses the typewriter and which notes the written form of 
the word only as temporary focus in a vast and changing scene. (EEL, p.
6)
In this situation consciousness and perception are indelibly linked to practice, to action. 
We focus upon, become conscious of, perceive, those aspects of our multifarious 
experience which are relevant to the actions and deeds currently being undertaken.
Dewey focuses upon the words on the paper in his typewriter so as to successfully 
complete the task he has before him. He knows what the words are that he is typing 
because he has selectively emphasised those aspects of his experience. He does not know 
that the light in his study is changing gradually, because this aspect o f his experience is 
not the focus o f his perception. The changing fight could become the focus of his 
perception and he would then know, for example, that the fight was fading.
reflection ... arises because of the appearance of incompatible factors 
within the empirical situation just pointed to ... Then opposed responses 
are provoked which cannot be taken simultaneously in overt action, and 
which accordingly can be dealt with ... only after they have been brought 
into a plan o f organized action by means of analytic resolution and 
synthetic imaginative conspectus ... In other words, reflection appears as a
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dominant trait of a situation when there is something seriously the matter, 
some trouble, due to active discordance, dissentiency, conflict among the 
factors of a prior non-intellectual experience; when a situation becomes 
tensional. (EEL, pp. 9-11)
That is, in everyday situations cognition is usually a secondary, fleeting phenomenon; 
however, in conflicting situations reflection and cognition become the dominant factors. 
Dewey is typing away, something is wrong, amiss. At this point reflection begins and 
possible solutions are proffered. The factors in these solutions are then analytically 
separated from the general context of experience and adjudged as to their capability of 
resolving the problematic situation: there has been a typographical error; a word has 
been omitted; words have been incorrectly transposed, the light is fading such that the 
words on the paper are becoming hard to read, and so on. Eventually, Dewey judges the 
light to be too dim and engages in overt actions to rectify the situation. In this situation, 
all aspects of the proposed solutions were in experience, but they were not known to be 
in experience until they were made the focus of consciousness and perception. As each 
alternative is considered the relevant factors in each alternative are discriminated, 
analysed, out of experience and judged as to their problem solving capacity.
Some may not find the above example convincing: in situations as described 
above a person does not seem to explicitly and methodically go through the various 
alternative solutions; prognosis and action are often virtually instantaneous. But for 
Dewey this is a case o f illusion brought about by familiarity and consequent habit: in 
normal perceptual situations the significance and meaning o f various aspects o f 
experience are well entrenched in relation to everyday actions and activities.
In the situation which follows upon reflection, meanings are intrinsic; they 
have no instrumental or subservient office, because they have no office at 
all. They are as much qualities o f the objects in the situation as are red and 
black, hard and soft, square and round. And every reflective experience 
adds new shades of such intrinsic qualities. In other words, while reflective 
knowing is instrumental to gaining control in a troubled situation (and thus 
has a practical or utilitarian force), it is also instrumental to the enrichment 
o f the immediate significance of subsequent experiences. (EEL, p. 17)
Proposed solutions are often habitual: in previous experience it has been found that
various problematic situations o f certain types have certain circumscribed standard
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solutions. Consequently, the process of inquiry is thereby truncated and automatic: we 
simply 'see' the problem and solution and act accordingly. However, if the usual, habitual 
solutions do not resolve the problematic situation, the process of inquiry becomes overt 
and explicit.
This idea o f Dewey's o f the incorporation, the 'funding', o f the results of previous 
reflection and inquiry into the structure of experience, explains his assertion that Dewey's 
experience whilst sitting in his study typing extends indefinitely outwards in time and 
space. Our experience has enfolded within it the results, the residues, the accumulated 
inferential reflections of our life experience. All the implications and inferences we have 
available to us are potentially present in our ongoing experience. All that is needed to call 
out this latent potentiality is a problematic situation requiring reflection and inquiry. If 
something new is arrived at via the process of inquiry, this new signification, or meaning, 
is subsequently incorporated into our experience as an additional, possible, means to the 
future resolution of problematic situations: "these logical fixations become of the greatest 
assistance to subsequent inquiries; they are its working means. In such further uses, they 
get further tested, defined, and elaborated" (EEL, p. 19)
Empirical, perceptual experience is thus not only our access to an independent, 
evolving, inherently historical world, but it also constitutes our own evolving identity; 
our own being in the world. Consequently, returning to the particularity of empirical 
experience is a necessary condition of rationality. Given Feyerabend's historical- 
contextual approach to philosophy, and the importance which he places upon empirical 
experience, as shown in chapter's 3 and 4 above, this is a conclusion to which 
Feyerabend should readily give consent.
6.4.3 Experiment and Testability.
In situations where reflection and inference are the dominant factor, the usually 
non-cognitive nature of experience is transformed into an explicitly cognitive, intellectual 
affair: "the material is entering into a new environment, and has been subjected to 
changes which will make it useful and effective in that environment." (EEL, p. 40) That
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is, the data o f inference has to be extracted and analysed out o f non-reflective experience 
before it can fulfil its role in valid inference and inquiry. This abstraction is governed by 
the demands o f the particular problematic situation, and always involves a previous 
generalisation: "A generalization in the form of a hypothesis is a prerequisite condition 
of selection and ordering of material as facts." (LTI, p. 498.)
In inquiry it is indeed the case that we make distinctions between fact and idea, 
data and theory, and so on. But these distinctions should not lead us to conclude that the 
'facts' of a particular inquiry are indubitable: an unquestionable foundation o f knowledge 
from which to procure more indubitable facts. Rather,
The conflicting situation inevitably polarizes or dichotomizes itself. There 
is somewhat which is untouched in the contention o f incompatibles. There 
is something which remains secure, unquestioned. On the other hand, there 
are elements which are doubtful and precarious. This gives the framework 
of the general distribution of the field into 'facts,' the given, the presented, 
the Datum; and ideas, the Ouaesitum, the conceived, the Inferential. (EEL, 
p. 137.)
Dewey goes on, commenting upon the unquestioned in any problematic situation, "this 
very element may be precarious, the ideal, and possibly fanciful of some other situation". 
(EEL, f il l . p. 137.) That is, the polarisation, the dichotomisation, of experience into fact 
and theory is a contextual, pragmatic distinction, valid within the particular problematic 
situation where the distinctions are made, but not valid as an ontological characterisation 
of the universe.
In the logical process, the datum is not just external existence, and the idea 
mere psychical existence. Both are modes o f existence- one o f given 
existence, the other o f possible, o f inferred existence. And if the later is 
regarded, from the standpoint o f the unified experience aimed at, as having 
only possible existence, the datum also is regarded as incomplete and 
unassured ... datum and ideatum are divisions o f labor, co-operative 
instrumentalities, for economical dealing with the problem of the 
maintenance of the integrity of experience. (EEL pp. 139-40.)
The ideational, the theoretical, is that which is to be constructed, to be arrived at, it is
inherently future oriented, and as such, because it is as yet not actualised, it is only
possible, tentative, that which is not obvious or assured. Once some inference is
validated or corroborated, through experimental testing, as being capable of returning
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fractured experience into a unified whole, it functions in further explicit inquiry as the 
factual, the unproblematic. O f course, this provides no guarantee that the inference will 
remain as part of the unproblematic, a new situation may arise in which it may become 
questioned as capable of resolving some particular problem, it is then ideational and 
theoretical once again. Time may also place once bed-rock concepts into the pile of 
illusory concepts; for example, the apparent movement of the sun across the sky was 
once thought of as the unquestioned fact of the movement of the sun around the earth. 
With the advent of heliocentric models of the solar system this unproblematic fact was 
transformed into a theoretical, problematic idea, one in which the status of its validity 
was to be ascertained by experimental adjudication. After the acceptance of the 
heliocentric model of the solar system, the 'fact' of the movement o f the sun across the 
sky still remained, but it was now a fact of the illusory affects that relative motion can 
produce in observers.15
This characterisation o f the nature of, and the relation between, theory and fact, 
is reminiscent of Feyerabend's pragmatic theory of observation which was discussed in 
chapter 3. For Feyerabend, observation statements are those statements which an 
observer would unhesitatingly make in a situation: they are the unproblematic. 
Theoretical statements are those statements which are not obvious or apparent in the 
immediate situation. Thus it can be seen that Feyerabend's 'pragmatic' theory of 
observation is pragmatic in more than one sense. Dewey's account o f theory and fact is 
also one which anticipates Shapere's account o f observation.16 Shapere contends that 
when scientists reported that they had observed the centre o f the sun via neutrino 
experiments, they were using 'observed' in a functional sense, as that which was 
unproblematic in their experiments, as opposed to the interpretation o f the their results 
which were as yet 'theoretical', that is, problematic and under debate. It is obvious that 
this account is identical to Dewey's account. Post-positivist philosophy of science, 
instead o f being new and original, is thus seen as being a return to ideas which were a
15 For the ideas in this section, see also LTI, pp. 105-111.
16 See his Reason and the Search for Knowledge. For the solar neutrino experiments, see pp. 215-17, 
andCh. 16.
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common-place in pragmatic circles. Dewey supports what came to be known as the 
thesis o f the theory-ladenness o f observation; while taking the implications further in that 
knowledge, given the theory-ladenness o f observation, becomes a product of mediated 
judgment: it is the end-product of inquiry rather than that with which we begin the 
inquiry.
The functional dichotomisation o f non-cognitive experience, in situations where 
the inferential, reflective factors are dominant, into fact and theory, is not brought to a 
conclusion until action has taken place. One of the major themes of pragmatism is that 
ideas and theories must be connected to practice: ideas and theories have no import 
unless they are direct guides to action. Thus Dewey sees pragmatism as being a 
philosophy modelled around the idea of the experimental method: every action 
undertaken to achieve an end is conceived as an experiment as to the validity of the 
particular end chosen.
If by acting in accordance with the experimental definition of facts, viz., as 
obstacles and conditions, and the experimental definition o f the end or 
intent, viz., as plan and method of action, a harmonized situation 
effectually presents itself, we have the adequate and the only conceivable 
verification of the intellectual factors. If the action indicated be carried out 
and the disordered or disturbed situation persists, then we have not merely 
confuted the tentative positions of intelligence, but we have in the very 
process o f acting introduced new data and eliminated some o f the old 
ones, and thus afforded an opportunity for the resurvey of the facts and the 
revision of the plan of action ... the rectification o f intellectual content 
through acting upon it in good faith is the 'absolute' o f knowledge, loyalty 
to which is the religion of intellect. (EEL, p. 241.)
We can see that the structure of inquiry which Dewey describes indelibly links 
experience, value, and experimentation. Ideas, concepts, theories, all act as conditions to 
be attained; they act as directives to action, goals to be achieved, and as such they 
possess a normative, purposive, teleological status. Concepts and theories are values, 
and are valued, because o f their prospective, action-guiding nature as possible 
resolutions of problematic situations. Moreover, all proposed solutions must be tested in 
practice, action must follow, ends-in-view must be striven for. A possible solution is
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worthless unless it guides concrete activity, and unless action to actualise the potential 
resolution is successful (or unsuccessful).
6.4.4 Fruitfulness.
Recall that for Dewey inquiry is an inherently future oriented enterprise: 
alternative courses o f action are proposed, they are then valued and judged and a 
particular end-in-view settled upon with respect to its comparative prospective ability to 
resolve the problematic situation. Thus, amongst other values, there is the overarching 
idea that a possible solution is just that, a possible solution: something which is as yet 
indeterminate as to its concrete ability to resolve the problematic situation, but which it is 
considered to be the best out of the alternatives available for guiding action, inference 
and research. That is, the end-in-view selected is selected upon the basis of its 
fruitfulness.17 "The justification o f ... [scientific] hypotheses has lain in their power to 
direct new orders o f experimental observation and to open up new problems and new 
fields of subject-matter." (LTI, p. 519.)
This is not to say that science alone furnishes us with knowledge; that science 
alone is experimentally testable and fruitful.
There is no kind of inquiry which has a monopoly o f the honorable title of 
knowledge. The engineer, the artist, the historian, the man of affairs attain 
knowledge in the degree they employ methods that enable them to solve 
the problems which develop in the subject-matter they are concerned with 
... philosophy framed upon the pattem of experimental inquiry ... 
eliminates all invidious monopolies o f the idea o f science. (QC, p. 220.)
There are no invidious monopolies in that if our ideas and theories are put to test, and if
our ideas and theories fruitfully go beyond that which is immediately present to that
which is not immediately present, which for Dewey is the definition o f inference, then the
result attained is valid knowledge in the same manner in which science gives us
knowledge.
17 With respect to this contention, Dewey would certainly applaud the sentiment of Chalmers position 
vis a vis his support of 'fertility'. See A.F. Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science?, 2nd ed, pp. 
125-32.
195
What distinguishes, for example, common-sense from science, is not that there is 
a different type of knowledge to be found in the two areas. Rather, what distinguishes 
common-sense from science is the relative fruitfulness o f the ideas and concepts 
involved. Perceptual experience provides us with a large array o f qualitatively dissimilar 
existents. In common-sense activities we abstract and generalise the perceptual, 
qualitative, dissimilarities into the everyday concepts of tables and chairs and so on. In so 
doing we are going beyond that which is immediately present, this unique perceptual 
experience, and inferring that which is not present, the general concept of'table'. When 
we see dark clouds on the horizon, we may validly infer that there is a high probability of 
rain in the near future. We have moved inferentially from that which is given, the clouds 
on the horizon, to that which is not given, rain in the near future. Dewey would see such 
inference as bemg of a type identical to that of the scientist; however, the fruitfulness of 
these common-sense inferences are usually very weak. In common-sense inference the 
inferential chains are usually quite short, and, therefore, usually quite isolated. Science, 
on the other hand, is seen by Dewey as an exemplification of the abstraction from the 
immediately given, to a position where existence can be related in an ever more 
homogeneous and comprehensive manner. Water remains water in our qualitative 
experience, but the number of inferences we can draw from water, once the transition to 
H20  has been effected, is enormous. As H20 , the substance we know, qualitatively, as 
water, is brought into systematic relationships with all other substances via the chemical 
table of elements and sub-atomic theory. (QC, pp. 158-9.) We can see that with modem 
science we have moved further away from drawing distinctions upon the basis o f 
qualitative differences. If a relatively small number of ideas can fruitfully be applied to 
the point where every substance can be connected to all other substances, then we can 
make a dizzying multitude o f inferences as to action and behaviour, and thus further 
manipulate and control existence according to our values. Moreover, this fruitfulness of 
inference makes the possible testability o f our ideas more and more ubiquitous.
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6.4.5 Comprehensiveness.
Dewey believes that reflection and inferential activity are dominant in problematic 
situations. These problematic situations are resolved by effecting a unified, 
unproblematic situation. As we saw in the previous section, pursuant upon this unity is 
the natural and inevitable extrapolation of successful unification to other situations. The 
ability o f some particular result to be transferable, and successful, in other problematic 
situations is a constant driving force behind all inquiry. This is the defining characteristic 
which Dewey sees as exemplified in modem science: the heterogeneous and inherently 
unique, individual, nature of lived qualitative experience, is transformed in physical 
science, through mathematical analysis, into homogenous measures and instruments 
whereby inter-translatability o f physical phenomena is effected. The qualitative aspects of 
water are replaced in science by the chemical formula of H20 , thus water, instead of 
being unique, unlike any other thing, becomes connected with all other physical 
phenomena by way of the chemical table of elements and the quantum theory.
Dewey adds to this idea o f fruitfulness by pushing the idea o f fruitfulness to its 
furthest extent: the ultimate fruitfulness of an idea or theory is that it can be developed 
into a comprehensive account o f the universe, it can be developed into a fully-fledged 
world-view. For example, if we have two conceptions o f ethics and human conduct, 
equally adequate as an account o f ethics and behaviour, then the way in which we can 
test these ideas is to extrapolate the ideas in question into other areas o f inquiry, that is, 
what consequences are produced when the ideas are applied to questions of justice, or of 
society in general? If the ideas in question can provide adequate accounts of these other 
areas of inquiry, or if they lead to problems when so extrapolated, we are then provided 
with additional information as to the worth of the ideas under investigation. This idea 
Dewey sees as exhaustively applicable: there are no boundaries where we stop the 
inferential processes, for example,
Just as the validity o f a proposition in discourse, or of conceptual material 
generally, cannot be determined short o f the consequences to which its 
functional use gives rise, so the sufficient warrant o f a judgment as a 
claimant to knowledge ... cannot be determined apart from connection
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with a widening circle o f consequences ... The point involved comes out 
clearly when the social consequences of scientific conclusions invoke 
intensification of social conflicts. For these conflicts provide presumptive 
evidence of the insufficiency, or partiality, and incompleteness of 
conclusions as they stand. (LTI, p. 490.)
That is, if there is no ontological gulf between physical and social subject-matters, and all 
knowledge is concerned with consequences, then the fact that physical science produces 
social consequences is not some accidental by-product having no real connection with 
the subject-matter of physical science. The potential comprehensiveness o f any 
intellectual tool cannot be known in thought: it must be continually applied to ever new 
circumstances so as to test its generality and define its valid scope and limitations.
in order that he [the scientist] keep his own balance, it is needed that his 
findings be everywhere applied. The more their application is confined 
within his own special calling, the less meaning do the conceptions 
possess, and the more exposed they are to error. The widest possible range 
of application is the means of the deepest verification. (EEL, pp. 441-2.)
And, one might add, of the deepest falsification and realisation of limitations.
Consequently, the social consequences of scientific theories constitutes a further
indication of the suitability o f the conceptions involved: they are a further test o f the
validity, the comprehensiveness, of the conceptions involved in the physical sciences.
Dewey sees knowledge as coming in many guises and forms: physical science has
no monopoly on knowledge, and if it does contain knowledge, then it is justifiably
testable and examinable via the consequences which it produces in ethical, social, legal,
common-sense and any other spheres o f existence experienceable and experienced by
human beings. Conversely, knowledge derived from areas of human existence and
experience, other than that o f physical science, can be validly extrapolated into physical
science, where it is tested according to the consequences which it implies for physical
existence. A hypothetical example may make this point clearer. It can be cogently argued
that the modem world-view arose as just that, an interconnected vision of the universe,
man, and man's place in the universe. The atomic, corpuscular, and analytic science o f
Galileo and Newton was mirrored by the emergence of the modem liberal conception of
the individual, and the subsequent conception of society commensurate with the nature
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of liberal individuality. It is possible that someone at the time, dissatisfied with the 
individualist conception of society, and believing that humans are inherently 
interconnected, may have consequently considered the atomic conception of physical 
existence, providing as it does implicit support to liberal conceptions o f the individual, a 
defective conception of physical reality. Instead, this individual may have been led to 
suppose, given their support for social interconnectedness, that physical existence is also 
inherently interconnected. The proposal of a wave theory of existence may have provided 
just such a basis for an alternative conception of existence commensurable with a social 
theory of interconnectedness, and antithetical to the individualist presuppositions of 
modem liberalism.18
In saying that we are always driven towards attempting to produce a 
comprehensive conception o f the universe, Dewey does not believe that we will, in fact, 
arrive at such a conception. Complete comprehensiveness of world-view, and exhaustive 
translatability and transferability of results between situations, is something which Dewey 
considers to be inherently impossible. The temporal, developing, transforming nature of 
the world, and the inexpugnable individuality of qualitative lived experience, cannot be 
overcome.
in any object of primary experience there are always potentialities which 
are not explicit; any object that is overt is changed with possible 
consequences that are hidden; the most overt act has factors which are not 
explicit. Strain thought as far as we may and not all consequences can be 
foreseen or made an express or known part of reflection and decision.
(EN, pp. 20-1.)
In this we can see an agreement with Kuhn. Kuhn contended that the articulation o f a 
paradigm, produced via normal science, is the process whereby the limitations and 
weaknesses o f a paradigm are able to be brought to light. I believe that Dewey would 
have agreed with this: it is only by searching out and testing the various consequences o f
18 Personally, I wonder whether something like this was indeed the case: where did the idea of a wave 
theory come from? It is interesting to speculate that the wave conception evolved from a residual 
Aristotelianism which survived the scientific revolution. In this respect, not only is Aristotle's physics 
different from that of modem science, Aristotle's conceptions of the individual and society is radically at 
odds with the modem liberal conception.
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an idea that enables us to ascertain the scope and limitation of that idea, thereby 
indicating where we can validly use those ideas in our ongoing inferential activities. The 
push for comprehensive world-views enables the widest possible testability, and, if 
successful, produces ideas and theories of the widest possible inferential validity.
6.5 Conclusion.
In saying that in all inquiry these four aspects should be present, Dewey is not 
thereby endorsing a pre-existing value system. It is easy to see that these values need to 
be explicated in terms of a particular discipline before they can be validly applied. For 
example, the idea that all knowledge, to be valid knowledge, must, o f necessity, be 
experimentally testable, differs in meaning according to discipline. The idea of 
experiment and test in physics is different to that which we find in economics, which 
differs again from the idea o f test and experiment o f moral/ethical ideas. Deliberately 
controlled experiments, of necessity in physical science, are evaluated in a wholly 
different manner in moral-ethical-social spheres: they are often unethical, immoral and 
socially destructive. What Dewey has in mind when he proposes that ethical phenomena 
should be experimentally testable, is simply the idea that ethical maxims should be 
considered to be hypotheses and judged, revised and revalued according to the 
consequences which ensue, rather than proposing some a priori ethical system. 19 
Moreover, the overarching values are filled out by the discipline specific values that arise 
through specialised inquiry. In science, for example, the value of quantitative accuracy 
holds a position of great importance within the general value of testability, which it does 
not possess in other fields o f inquiry: there is no place for quantitative accuracy in ethical 
inquiry. What the discipline specific values are will be dictated by the nature o f the 
subject matter of the discipline in question, and by the results o f ongoing inquiry.
For Dewey, it is a part of what it is to be rational for us to be led by pre-existing, 
accepted and successful ideas and conceptions, embodied in the traditions and forms-of- 
life in which we are located. It is also a part of what it is to be rational to be constantly
19 Cf. QC, pp. 277-8.
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aware of the plethora of possibilities around us which may, if pursued, provide successful 
inference, prove fruitful and possibly comprehensive in application, and pass tests which 
such application engenders. The rationality of any assertion or position is only 
ascertainable within the context in which it is made: is the assertion given wide collateral 
support through connected ideas within the disciplinary matrix or practice o f which it is 
part? Or, is the assertion capable of being developed into a far-ranging conception of 
reality? In both cases the assertion is to be checked against the specific experiential basis 
from which it is derived.
We have seen that Feyerabend can be interpreted as presenting a values-based, 
alternative, account of rationality, in contradistinction to what he saw as the dominant 
'Rationalist' account of rationality. Feyerabend will have nothing to do with universalised, 
atemporal, context-independent, rules, methods or procedures. It is inherent in every 
situation requiring rational response that the response has, and should have, its own 
unique character. Consequently, Feyerabend sees science as "a complex medium 
containing surprising and unforeseen developments" and as such "demands complex 
procedures and defies analysis on the basis of rules which have been set up in advance 
and without regard to the ever-changing conditions of history". (AM, p. 18) According 
to Feyerabend an examination of the history o f science shows us that
the business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with 
the results of historical research. We find then, that there is not a single 
rule, however plausible, and however firmly grounded in epistemology, 
that is not violated at some time or other. (AM, p. 23)
Points like this are not meant as absolute denials of method, but simply as denials of
absolute method: no simple universal formula can do justice to actual science. One needs
instead to look for better, more complex and historically informed accounts.
Feyerabend's alternative account is one in which the 'oughts' o f scientific activity are
derived from the particular situation in which a scientist is working: there are no
universal, trans-situational prescriptions for the conduct o f science. Every situation is a
new situation where norms are not taken for granted, they are examined anew and
decided upon according to the exigencies o f the particular situation. Moreover, this
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situation should be interpreted in terms of reflective equilibrium achieved amongst a set 
of, often conflicting, values.
It is my contention that if Feyerabend had followed this insight, then he should 
have supported a conception o f general, overarching values of inquiry, like that which 
Dewey proposed. That Feyerabend did not present such an account can only be 
explained by supposing that Feyerabend felt any general account of rationality ran the 
danger of becoming yet another version of'Rationalism'. But it seems to me that such 
fears are unwarranted. We saw above that these general values only receive specific 
content within the ongoing context of inquiry. But, more importantly, these overarching 
values can also be in conflict with each other; for example, if we reconstruct 
Feyerabend's Galilean case-study with an eye to Dewey's general values, then we can see 
that the fruitfulness of the concepts associated with the scientific revolution overrode the 
Aristotelian, comprehensive, considerations. Also, the testability of many of the 
assumptions o f the new science were also in question: the general particulate cosmology 
was in many ways only testable in a promissory sense. All this is contrary to Popper's 
notions o f the supreme importance of testability. Though Popper emphasised the 
importance o f proposing highly general theories, which bring with them high degrees of 
falsifiability, this requirement was always subordinate to the dictates o f testability. Ad  
hoc and auxiliary hypotheses were denigrated by Popper as reducing the testability of 
theories. But, as we saw, it was ad hoc hypotheses that preserved the potential 
comprehensiveness of the new science from being precipitously rejected. Therefore, 
questions o f fruitfulness and comprehensiveness can, given the details o f the specific 
problematic situation, override the value o f testability. This is the sort o f situation which 
was alluded to in section 5.2 concerning Feyerabend's values-based rationality, 
consequently, I think we can conclude that the overarching value structure implicit in 
Dewey's idea o f inquiry and rationality, is, nevertheless, contextual and non­
authoritarian, and should, therefore, be acceptable to Feyerabend.
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7 Conclusion: Feverabend and Values-Based Rationality.
7.1 Introduction.
After this detour through some of the philosophy of Dewey, it is time to return to 
Feyerabend and bring together the various strands of positive philosophy which we can 
find in Feyerabend. The project which follows is programmatic and sketchy, rather than 
completed and systematic, but there are three reasons for not regarding this as a 
weakness of the project. Firstly, this sketchiness reflects the nature of the philosophy in 
question: what systematicity I give to Feyerabend's ideas already goes beyond that which 
we find in Feyerabend. This is not to say that we cannot find most of these ideas in 
Feyerabend's writings: there are scattered here and there throughout his writings a 
number of references to metaphysical/cosmological assumptions, values and forms-of- 
life. However, these scattered references, along with lengthy passages concerning 
traditions and empirical experience, are not brought together by Feyerabend in any 
coherent manner. For example, Feyerabend's conception of'traditions' is highly 
ambiguous, in that 'traditions' is used by Feyerabend as a generic term: it is applicable to 
any ongoing practice; the highest level explication being forms-of-life. Consequently, at 
one extreme, we have high level traditions, and on the other extreme, we have empirical 
experience. In Feyerabend's writings, the middle ground which connects these extremes 
is left obscure and ambiguously explicated. Thus, the concept o f values and valuation fills 
this middle ground and brings the extremes together. I would want to go further than this 
and say that Dewey's high-level values of inquiry: the necessity to connect our ideas to 
empirical experience, fruitfulness, comprehensiveness and empirical testability, would 
give further credence and detail to Feyerabend's conceptions. The empirical thesis and 
testability, I believe, would have been acceptable to Feyerabend; however, fruitfulness 
and comprehensiveness may have seen him balk, in that they seem to encourage the 
abstract/theoretical attitude towards traditions, in preference to the empirical attitude.11
1 It may also be said that acceptance of Dewey's values is leading us back to conceptions of novelty and 
content increase as proposed by Popper, Lakatos and others. But an important difference here is that
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would want to say that this is not the case, and that Dewey's values can be seen as 
providing the synthesis of abstract/theoretical and historical/empirical attitudes which 
Feyerabend finds so agreeable about Aristotle. Nevertheless, I would not want to impute 
to Feyerabend more than was necessary to give his alternative conception of rationality 
credence and plausibility. Thus, the emphasis I place upon values, imported from Kuhn 
and Dewey, is not to be found in Feyerabend. But I think that this interpolation can be 
justified in that Feyerabend did make reference to values. Moreover, I think that this 
interpolation is the minimum necessary addition to Feyerabend's philosophy in order to 
present a plausible conception o f rationality.
The second reason for the sketchiness of the positive account is that it is of the 
nature of this contextual approach that details cannot be given independently of the 
particularities of individual disciplines, practices and histories. This approach constitutes 
a framework from which to embark on extensive case studies of rationality, wherever 
and whenever rationality is thought to play a part.* 2 It is thus a prospective research 
program, and too many details may rigidify it prematurely; any further explication should 
only be given with the results o f in-depth case studies.
The third reason for the sketchiness of the positive account is that it is all that is 
necessary for the purposes o f this thesis: my thesis is that Feyerabend is not an 
irrationalist. Rather, Feyerabend can be seen as moving towards an alternative 
conception o f rationality. To achieve this purpose, I have tried to show that the 
alternative conception of rationality which we can find in his writings is feasible and 
plausible, I have not tried to give an exhaustive account of this alternative conception, or 
tried to answer all possible objections and criticisms.
Dewey would have had no time for the semi-technical explication that these terms acquired in 
Popperianism, and which skewed the interpretation of the terms in a particular direction.
2 It thus bears a family resemblance to the program Toulmin extolled in his Uses o f Argument.
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7.2 The Values-Based Alternative.
Recall that the general project of Feyerabend's philosophy was to move away 
from what Feyerabend called 'Rationalist' philosophy: positions which look for 
atemporal, universal, necessary, objective, rules of reason, which only need to be 
correctly applied to ensure that whatever we do or think is rational. Feyerabend believes 
that any such position can be reduced to absurdity, in that episodes in the history of 
science which 'Rationalists' label as rational, do not, in fact, exhibit a structure 
commensurate with the dictates of their own 'Rationalist' theses. Furthermore, 
Feyerabend argues that following the precepts o f 'Rationahst' philosophies, in the 
scientific episodes in question, would have hindered the acceptance of important 
scientific theories, if not completely smothered their development. In this respect, much 
of Feyerabend's language of irrationalism, propaganda, subjective wishes, and the like, is 
of a purely rhetorical nature: this language forms part of the reductio o f 'Rationahst' 
philosophies.3 'Rationahst' philosophies set up an either/or dichotomy: either science is 
rational and objective, or it is irrational and subjective Given that Feyerabend believes 
that he has shown the inadequacy o f 'Rationahst' theses to account for the rationality of 
seminal scientific episodes, the 'Rationahst' must accept that science is therefore 
irrational.4
If  we can conclude that Feyerabend was not, in fact, supporting any form of 
irrationalism, then it can be further concluded that Feyerabend was proposing that the 
idea of what it is to be rational must be reconceptuahsed. I think this conclusion can be 
upheld; specifically, the vision o f rationality which Feyerabend is led to is one which 
revolves around the idea of values.5
3 If one looks up 'rhetoric' in the index of AM, you will find that, along with the usual page references, 
the main reference is to pp. 1-309. That is, the entire book is referred to as rhetoric!
4 The details of Feyerabend's reductio are given in chapters 1 and 2.
5 1 discussed Feyerabend on values in chapter 5. The further implications of what a values-based 
rationality requires was discussed in connection with Dewey's conception of values and valuation in 
chapter 6.
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Fig. 7.1 Feyerabend's Rationality I: Values
The above diagram is meant to show that all situations requiring rational decision 
involve the application, balancing and re-valuation of values: a problematic situation 
arises,, one which needs to be resolved, various alternative future resolutions of the 
problematic situation are proposed and these possible solutions are valuated against each 
other, and with respect to a set of value traits deemed relevant to the situation at hand. 
The solution judged to be the best in the situation, the solution which it is believed will 
remove the tensions involved in the problematic situation, then acts as the goal to be 
achieved in the situation. If successful resolution o f tensions and problems follows, then 
it is these ongoing exemplary achievements in any discipline or practice which, in their 
internal structure, embody and give content to the current values of that discipline or 
practice.
There are a number o f factors which recommend such an approach to 
Feyerabend. Firstly, there are no independent, fixed values: values arise in contexts and 
have no application outside those contexts. Values are indelibly linked with the concrete 
exemplifications in which they are embodied. This does not mean that values are 
inherently transitory: various values can survive over lengthy periods of time. But it also 
does not mean that values remain the same: values are constantly evolving and can and 
do change with changing circumstances. Thus at any one time a hierarchy of values may
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be delineable, but this hierarchy is not fixed and is adaptable in three ways. Firstly, 
specific circumstances may indicate that a temporary adjustment of the hierarchy may be 
necessary, without giving grounds for permanent adjustment. Secondly, a particular 
resolution of a problematic situation may give grounds for the permanent re-valuation of 
the value-system hierarchy. And thirdly, a particular resolution of a problematic situation 
may introduce wholly new values and/or drop other values from the value-system 
hierarchy. Consequently, a values-based approach to rationality is an inherently 
contextual, historical and dynamic vision of what it is to be rational. It alerts us to the 
situational specific character of rational decision-making, but also highlights the 
constantly moving, overcoming and transcending character o f those decision-making 
processes.
But there remain some highly important factors which have to be taken into 
account. Feyerabend believes that it is imperative to take into account, in any theory of 
rationality, the metaphysical/cosmological background which informs the rules, principles 
and values to be found in such theories.
7.3 The Metaphvsical/Cosmological Background.
We saw in chapter 3 that Feyerabend's concept of incommensurability crucially 
revolves around the notion of a universal, non-instantial, or cosmological theory. Such a 
theory is one which contains a set o f fundamental assumptions which (i) cannot be 
derived from any other assumptions in the theory. And (ii) says something about 
'everything there is'. This second point emphasises that at the centre of the highest level 
scientific theories there lies a metaphysical world-view: a deep and far-ranging 
metaphysical picture of the nature of all existence.
In chapter 2 I also briefly discussed the idea that the rules and principles which 
we find in any particular theory of rationality are invariably based upon 
metaphysical/cosmological assumptions. In particular, the rational principles which we 
find in Lakatos's MSRP: content increase and the associated concept o f novelty, are 
supportable given the metaphysical assumption of an infinite universe. Conversely,
content increase and novelty are not found among the rational principles of 
Aristotelianism: these ideas had no place within the finite metaphysical structure of the 
Aristotelian world-view. This idea Feyerabend sees as generally applicable:
every methodological rule is associated with cosmological assumptions, so 
that using the rule we take it for granted that the assumptions are correct.
Naive falsificationism takes it for granted that the laws o f nature are 
manifest and not hidden beneath disturbances of considerable magnitude. 
Empiricism takes it for granted that sense experience is a better mirror of 
the world than pure thought. Praise of argument takes it for granted that 
the artifices of Reason give better results than the unchecked play o f our 
emotions. (AM, pp. 295-6.)
I think that this is a plausible position; for example, if we look at the values suggested as 
being operative in science: simplicity, quantitative accuracy, comprehensiveness and so 
on, there is certainly the metaphysical/cosmological assumption that these ideas are 
applicable to reality, because the world itself has such attributes. I don't think that 
Feyerabend is here denying that these values are supported because of their empirical 
success. But whatever empirical success they may have garnered, it is never enough to 
prove that the world is indeed as the values portray it to be. The status of simplicity is a 
case in point: why should the deep structure of the world be governed by as few laws 
and principles as possible? Granted, there have been many striking instances of 
parsimonious scientific theories; but there has also been just as many highly complex and 
profligate scientific theories. It could be argued that the simplicity of a scientific theory in 
one domain is balanced by the complexity of linking this theory with theories in other 
scientific domains. Be that as it may, the point to be made is that the empirical success of 
the value o f simplicity is a moot point, and, consequently, the acceptability of simplicity 
can be questioned. We can see here why values such as simplicity are values: they are 
heuristic, prospective promises of success; they are the goals to be attained. As such they 
are only forceful if scientists are committed to them and guide their research accordingly; 
regardless o f setbacks and difficulties.
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Feyerabend's position can be schematically summarised as follows:
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Fig. 7.2 Feyerabend's Rationality II: Metaphysics
Thus we can see that it is the largely tacit, covert, metaphysical/cosmological 
assumptions which ultimately give context to values and which connect the values of any 
one discipline or practice with the values of other disciplines and practices. In saying this 
I am not contradicting what was said before concerning the idea that values have no 
independent existence outside of the concrete embodiment of those same values in 
exemplary achievements. Metaphysical/cosmological assumptions are just as much 
embodied in concrete exemplary achievements as are the lower level values. In fact, the 
best way to conceive of these assumptions is as the highest level, most deeply entrenched 
values: they are the most stable and enduring aspects o f the system. As such, they do not 
escape the feedback loop and can be transformed by significant exemplary achievements, 
as the arrow from the value-system to the metaphysical/cosmological assumptions 
signifies in the diagram.
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7.4 Realism, Observation and Rationality.
At this point in the discussion I want to reintroduce some of the conclusions 
reached in chapters 3 and 4 concerning Feyerabend's pragmatic theory o f observation 
and his attitude towards experience and perception. Feyerabend believes that in all 
situations we take the world to be as our theoretical commitments and beliefs say it is: 
we do not question this assumption, we simply live it. Our perceptions are thus theory­
laden, in that we take our perceptions as being caused by, and as indications of, the 
world as we conceive it: conception and perception are inextricably intertwined. In this 
situation, given that all statements are theoretical, the distinction between observation 
statements and theoretical statements is a pragmatic distinction. Observation statements 
are those statements we are disposed to utter in direct response to perceptual stimuli; 
they are delineated in terms of possible ostensive reference. I concluded in chapter 3 that 
this pragmatic theory o f observation is, at least, minimally realist: the world has a nature 
and it would have a nature even if humans were not there to perceive it. In addition, I 
concluded that Feyerabend's pragmatic theory of observation implies that there is, at 
least, a minimal connectivity between humans and the world via perception: the world, or 
parts of the world, are the cause and source of the perceptions which we have.
The importance o f the preceding discussion can be brought out if we consider 
figure 7.3 below. There are two points to be gathered from the diagram. Firstly, the 
'theory' involved in the theory-ladenness o f observation is comprised o f the entire system 
of commitment and belief. Secondly, and more importantly, experience and perception 
are the driving force behind Feyerabend's conceptions o f belief change and rationality. It 
is by attending to the multiplicity of experience and perception, which thus places our 
preconceptions and theories in juxtaposition to experience, that forces conflict and 
problematic situations, which itself drives the engine o f valuation, judgment and 
reflection.
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Fig. 7.3 Feyerabend's Rationality DI: Realism and Perception.
In chapter 4 we saw that Feyerabend criticised what he called theoretical/abstract 
traditions and extolled the virtues of what he called empirical traditions. Empirical 
traditions emphasise the particularity, multiplicity and situational dependent character of 
experience and knowledge; whilst theoretical/abstract traditions are engaged in the 
attempt to reduce this abundance of empirical perspectives in favour o f generalised, 
universalised, accounts of reality-as-a-whole. Recall that Feyerabend has no in-principle 
objection to abstract traditions: the results obtained in such traditions give valid 
knowledge. But the knowledge obtained in such traditions is not universal knowledge: it 
is knowledge of particular circumstances, just as the knowledge derived through 
empirical traditions is knowledge of particular circumstances. Now the question may be
asked, if we are to turn to the particularity of experience and perception, so as to provide 
us with more knowledge, are we then returning to the idea that observation is not 
theory-laden and that unadulterated perception is the source and ground of all our 
knowledge? And is this then a contradiction in Feyerabend's writings? I think we can 
conclude that Feyerabend is indeed an empiricist: perception is the source of all 
knowledge. But there is no denial here that observation is always theory-laden, we 
cannot break out of that particular circle, and we cannot see things from a neutral, pure 
position. But the fact that we cannot do so in no way implies that we cannot see 
discrepancies, disparities and differences. Feyerabend's point is that it is by attending to 
the situational specific characteristics of our experience and perception, that enables us 
to uncover the discrepancies, disparities and differences denied in abstract, generalised 
notions. Feyerabend, in his later writings, is not moving away from the idea of the 
theory-ladenness of observation, rather, Feyerabend is reinforcing the idea o f realism. 
The world is indeed independent, and its independence is manifested in the fact that the 
abundance, multiplicity and profusion of our experience and perception contain 
indications of the multitudinous aspects of the world.
7.5 The Widening Circle of Rationality.
In chapter 1 1 discussed Feyerabend's reductio o f 'Rationahst' philosophies in 
terms of his analysis o f Copernicus and Galileo. We saw there that one o f the major 
criticisms o f 'Rationahst' interpretations of the Copemican revolution, according to 
Feyerabend, is the illegitimate selective emphasis given by these philosophies to 
particular aspects of the problematic situation at the time, at the expense of other 
relevant considerations. Thus, the accepted Aristotelian world-view was just that, a 
world-view: it provided a more or less systematic and interrelated vision of ah 
phenomenon. In the Aristotelian system cosmology, physics, physiology, psychology, 
perception and observation, sociology, theology, ethics and any number of other 
disciplines and ideas were ah loosely interrelated and gave mutual support to each other 
as descriptions of reality. In comparison to the Aristotelian world-view, the original
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Copemican heliocentric hypothesis, though exhibiting some strengths in astronomy, 
nevertheless ran into a number o f anomalies and difficulties which showed that it was no 
better than the ptolemaic model it was supposed to supplant. Moreover, the Copemican 
hypothesis did violence to the accepted views in cosmology, physics and theology, and 
Copernicus offered no alternative conceptions in these areas which would be compatible 
with his hypothesis. When Galileo enters the fray we find that he defused some of the 
arguments against Copemicanism by proposing a new dynamical physics. But these new 
arguments themselves clashed with deep-seated Aristotelian conceptions o f perception 
and in no way redressed the other incompatibilities of the Copemican hypothesis with the 
accepted Aristotelian world-view. Even the evidence of the telescope was highly 
debatable at the time: the auxiliary sciences necessary for substantiation o f telescopic 
images did not exist, that is, no one knew how the telescope worked. Given these 
considerations pertaining to the overall evidential situation at the time, Feyerabend 
contends that empiricists, Popperians and other 'Rationalists', should have labelled the 
continued support for the new science as irrational: the new science should have been 
rejected.
Given the situation as described, how, according to Feyerabend, did the new 
science rise to dominance? The answer is that Feyerabend does not conceive science as 
being independent of non-scientific disciplines and practices: science is always part of a 
wider form-of-life, a wider world-view. The scientific revolution gained support from, 
and found receptive audiences in, a variety of individuals and groups who felt a growing 
dissatisfaction with the prevailing world-view. The work of Galileo provided a rallying 
point, a concrete achievement around which a burgeoning new world-view could gain 
leeway in which to overcome the entrenched social and political orders o f the time. The 
rising middle-class, the reformation, the discovery of America and the corresponding idea 
that there may be an 'America o f knowledge', the incessant political power struggles 
across Europe, as evidenced in the Thirty Years War, and many other factors militating 
against the prevailing world-view, created the circumstances which allowed the new 
science to flourish despite an original paucity of theoretical underpinning.
Thus, we can say that one of the main posits of Feyerabend's philosophy is a 
rejection, contra Lakatos and others, of'internal' reconstruction's o f the history of 
science and other rational disciplines. Feyerabend sees science as a complex historical 
process; therefore, attribution's of rationality to historical agents need to be informed by 
a general knowledge of the historical period in question. The historical, cultural, social, 
metaphysical and religious attitudes of the times encroach upon, and affect, the decision 
making processes of the historical agents: rational decisions are not made in an objective 
vacuum free from influence. This is not just a regrettable tendency which can be avoided 
if only we are more assiduously rational and dispel all extraneous material from rational 
debate. Rather, it is the ground and condition from which all opinions come, and from 
which mutual collateral support is gathered.
The existence of groups of anti-Aristotelians and of other enemies of 
school philosophers was necessary for turning such subjective acts [of 
Galileo's] into a more comprehensive social phenomenon and, finally, into 
the elements of a new science. Concentrating on the internal history of 
Copemicanism we notice an increase of content (Galileo's observations)...
But adding the external history'... to our information we notice that the 
agreement 'inside' science is the result o f numerous violations ’outside’ o f  
it, we realize that these violations were necessary for the transition ... and 
that they therefore belong to science itself (AWL, p. 211.)
Without the historical context, without the placing of new ideas within burgeoning
world-views, new ideas strike no responsive chord. Consequently, it is rational to
consider the life-world of an historical agent, in fact, it seems impossible for any person
to separate themselves completely from the historical context of their existence. To try
and explicate a scientific episode on purely internal desiderata is irrational.
In this respect, Feyerabend can be seen as wanting to dissolve the dichotomy of
internal and external history. In this he is following the general trend of his entire
philosophy: Feyerabend likes to destroy naive dichotomies. There is no clear and
unambiguous distinction between that which is rational in science - internal- and that
which is irrational in science -external. Putative 'external' factors are integral to the
rationality of science, while putative 'internal' factors, applied universally, would destroy
the rationality of science. Thus, it should be noted that in this dichotomy busting
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Feyerabend doesn't jettison the substantive content of these dichotomies. For example, 
when Feyerabend dissolves the theory/observation dichotomy, he still keeps the idea of 
theory and the idea of observation. But these ideas function as a pragmatic distinction; a 
distinction which, at any one time, in any one context, can be made to help conceptualise 
the situation you find yourself in, and to separate problematic from unproblematic, and 
so on. The point is that there is no actual line where theory ends and observation starts. 
Similarly, Feyerabend, in discussing the context of discovery/context o f justification 
dichotomy, itself intimately linked with the internal/external dichotomy, states that "we 
are dealing with a single uniform domain of procedures all of which are equally important 
for the growth of science". ( AM, p. 167) Justification procedures are a part of 
discovery, and discovery procedures and insights are part of justification. The situation is 
the same with respect to the rational-internal, irrational-external dichotomy: what was 
said to be rational and what was said to be irrational both still exist, it is just that they are 
indissolubly united. No unqualified judgments of rationality can be made, in that we have 
to give the context in which we are making the judgment: in different contexts one and 
the same action, or thought, may be both rational and irrational.
It would be a misunderstanding to interpret this position as supporting some sort 
of radical sociology of knowledge: that our ideas are caused by, and can be reduced to, 
the social and cultural surroundings in which we are placed. Feyerabend does not 
contend that any one aspect of existence has primacy over other aspects such that we 
must engage in reductionists exercises. Rather, all aspects o f existence should be 
considered to be on the same level. Thus, Feyerabend does not deny, for example, that 
Galileo had arguments for his position. The point Feyerabend is making is that the 
arguments of Galileo are but one part o f a complex historical context, the other aspects 
of which were just as important for the eventual triumph of the new world-view. The 
following diagram gives a schematic representation of the situation Feyerabend sees as 
operative in historical contexts.
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Fig.7.4. Feyerabend's Rationality IV: Forms-of-Life.
We see in this diagram the idea that the various discipline/value systems are 
interconnected and gain mutual support as part of wider forms-of-life and world-views. 
This happens in two ways. Firstly, the interconnectedness of the various systems can be 
seen to arise through the tacit and covert sharing of deep-seated cosmological 
assumptions. Secondly, there is overt interaction between the systems, for example, the 
existence of science, as we know it, is dependent upon political and economic factors. 
These value-systems, which it is supposed that there are an indefinite, vague number, are 
all connected with the world via the individual experiences to which they refer. It is also 
implied that the various systems are meant to provide a systematic and comprehensive 
picture o f all aspects of reality. This comprehensiveness is, however, never in fact 
accomplished: there is no axiomatic, systematic, tightness between the various systems, 
nor do the systems exhibit an exhaustiveness of explication. The constraints placed upon 
any one system, by another system, varies with the systems in question. And the 
constraints that are supplied are constraints of boundary conditions, not of any logical 
implication of content. For example, given the sort of discrete, atomistic, metaphysics, 
epistemology and psychology propounded by Hobbes, Locke and Hume, the sort of 
ethical and social theories that those thinkers see as possible fall within a certain range: 
there is no place in these conceptions of the universe for an Aristotelian ethics. But this 
then does not imply that the British empiricists are then committed, by way of logical
necessity, to supporting one particular ethical or social theory. All that they are 
committed to are ethical and social theories of a certain family resemblance 6
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7.6 Epistemological Anarchism and Forms-of-Life.
We saw in chapter 2 that Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism is not really 
anarchism at all: "The one thing he [the epistemological anarchist] opposes positively and 
absolutely are universal standards, universal laws, universal ideas such as 'Truth',
'Reason', 'Justice', 'Love' and the behaviour they bring along" (AM, p. 189.) What 
Feyerabend means by anarchism is the relatively uncontroversial idea o f not being 
guided, forced or determined by universal standards. This does not imply that there are 
no standards, or that Feyerabend's anarchism is identical to chaos and complete disorder.
Feyerabend also distinguished epistemological anarchism from scepticism. (AM, 
p. 189) Feyerabend regards scepticism as the idea that no theory is better or worse than 
any other theory. Epistemological anarchism, on the other hand, is the idea that theories 
can be better or worse. The evaluation of theories being determined according to their 
ability to enhance or hinder the aims and motives o f the epistemological anarchist. Does 
this leave us in an irredeemable subjectivistic attitude towards theories? I don't think that 
it does. That prognosis may be correct if the aims and motives could be any old arbitrary 
aims or motives. But this is not how Feyerabend approaches the matter: "it is the sceptic 
who cannot assert things positively; the anarchist can assert anything he wants and often 
will assert absurd things in the hope that this will lead to new forms of life" (SFS, fii.2. p. 
210.) That is, we see here additional support for the idea that Feyerabend wants to 
restore the idea that it is entire forms-of-life, incorporating a comprehensive account of 
man and the universe, which is the ultimate basis from which we should judge arguments, 
and which is the desired goal toward which theorising is directed. In this context 
Feyerabend contends that "happiness and the full development of the individual human
6 Cf. for example, A  MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, wherein MacIntyre argues that 
conceptions of justice are indelibly linked to conceptions of practical rationality. If the idea of values- 
based rationality is correct, then the distinction between theoretical and practical rationality cannot be 
upheld. We then have a situation wherein questions of scientific rationality have a bearing on questions 
of justice, and vice versa.
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being is now as ever the highest possible value."7 Thus, he commends J.S. Mill and 
Aristotle for creating theories which are meant to be comprehensive accounts o f man and 
the universe, including the ways in which happiness and full personal development can be 
achieved.
We see here the idea that it is not only the case that judgments of rationality must 
be made with the full historical context in mind, and that actions and thoughts must be 
placed within the form-of-life in which they happen, but there is also the further idea that 
there are always a multiplicity of actual and possible forms-of-life vying for allegiance. 
Consequently, Feyerabend applauds Mill's model of reasoning where there is a 
competition o f alternatives:
Now this competition is not only between ideas, standards, rules, but 
between fully fledged forms o f life; and it is supposed to affect not only 
ideas, but also feelings, intuitions, attitudes, actions, the imagination, in a 
word - it is supposed to affect one's whole existence ... Mill realises that 
ideas have not just logical but also psychological, sociological and other 
aspects and must be judged by all of them .8
What all this implies is that the epistemological anarchist uses theories to achieve their 
aims, and the ultimate aim and motivation is the construction or defence o f their 
preferredform-of-life. They may want to destroy some theory which they perceive as 
being destructive of their preferred form of life, and they will adopt any means at their 
disposal to achieve this goal. Particular theories and particular circumstances are not the 
sort of thing that an epistemological anarchist would think of defending: the 
epistemological anarchist's focus is on the bigger picture o f forms-of-life.
In saying this we must understand Feyerabend as saying that any aspect of 
existence can provide the launching pad for the explication o f all existence. We are not 
constrained to begin with science, or to leave science sacrosanct: there are no privileged 
bases from which to begin. Just as in previous centuries it was considered necessary for 
all ideas to be consistent with theology and religion, so too in recent centuries it has been
7 Feyerabend, "Consolations for the Specialist" p. 210.
8 Feyerabend, "In Defence of Aristotle" p. 169. That this is one of the major themes of Feyerabend's 
philosophy should be obvious to anyone who has read AM.
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considered necessary for all ideas to be consistent with the findings of science. However, 
just as the theological presuppositions were overthrown, so too the current scientific 
presuppositions may be overthrown. Consequently, Feyerabend contends that one o f the 
starting points may be the idea of the good and happy life: what it is believed constitutes 
a good life may provoke the demand for a new social, political and economic order, 
which may then produce new scientific research programs, which may then transform the 
deeply entrenched scientific world-view. For Feyerabend, it is necessary to explore as 
many different forms-of-life as possible so as to enhance our knowledge of the world.
7.7 Proliferation and the General Values of Inquiry.
We can see that one of the recurring themes in this vision o f rationality is the idea 
of proliferation and plurality of ideas, systems and forms-of-life. We saw in chapter 4 
that Feyerabend follows J.S.Mill on this and gives five reasons for supporting 
proliferation. Firstly, we are fallible creatures and, therefore, a view we may want to 
reject may in fact be true. Secondly, all views usually contain some truth, consequently, it 
is only through comparing and contrasting disparate views that we have a chance of 
integrating and finding all truths. Thirdly, uncontested views, even if wholly true, become 
dogmatically accepted without an understanding of the rational grounds of their 
acceptance. Fourthly, it is argued that meaning is something only fully grasped in terms 
of contrasts. And fifthly, in relation to the second point above, it is often only by the 
proposal o f alternative views that evidence against a dominant view can be discovered.
This idea, the so-called 'principle of proliferation', has as a logical consequence 
what Feyerabend has called the 'principle of tenacity': "[the] advice to select from a 
number o f theories the one that promises the most fruitful results, and to stick to this one 
theory even if the actual difficulties it encounters are considerable."9 That is, if we are to 
have proliferation, some people must hold onto and develop alternative theories in the 
face of counter-evidence and anomalies. These two ideas are important for understanding 
Feyerabend's conception of rationality:
9 Feyerabend, "Consolations for the Specialists" in Phil. Pap. Vol.2. p. 137.
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a science that tries to develop our ideas and that uses rational means for 
the elimination of even the most fundamental conjectures must use a 
principle of tenacity together with a principle of proliferation. It must be 
allowed to retain ideas in the face of difficulties; and it must be allowed to 
introduce new ideas even if the popular ideas should appear to be hilly 
justified and without blemish. 10
Thus, if we look at Feyerabend's conceptions, as summarised in the preceding sections, 
we find proliferation at all levels of analysis. If we step back from preconceived notions 
we find that empirical experience is characterised by multiplicity and abundance; a 
proliferation susceptible of many and varied interpretations. When we consider 
rationality as characterised by valuation and judgment, we again see that the very idea is 
characterised by plurality: it is only valuation and judgment when there are incompatible 
alternatives. We have also seen that the deep-seated metaphysical/cosmological 
assumptions underlying forms-of-life can be developed and explicated in a variety o f 
incompatible manners, indeed, this looseness can be one of the mechanisms by which 
wholly different forms-of-life develop. And finally, Feyerabend sees the proliferation of 
forms-of-life as essential to avoid dogmatism and ensure development. O f course, as a 
necessary means for achieving this proliferation, Feyerabend contends that individuals, 
groups and institutions must tenaciously hold on to their ideas and forms-of-life, despite 
apparent inconsistency with established and entrenched ideas and world-views.
This idea of Feyerabend's must not be interpreted as saying that any old crack-pot 
theory should be endorsed: the proliferation of ideas, theories and forms-of-life are 
meant to to be seriously proposed and seriously defended. Proliferation is designed to 
provide contrasts and tests, consequently,
The distinction [between 'respectable' people and cranks] does not lie in 
the fact that the former suggest what is plausible and promises success, 
whereas the latter suggest what is implausible, absurd, and bound to fail.
... the distinction between the crank and the respectable thinker lies in the 
research that is done once a certain point of view is adopted. The crank 
usually is content with defending the point o f view in its original, 
undeveloped, metaphysical form, and he is not at all prepared to test its 
usefulness in all those cases which seem to favor the opponent, or even 
admit that there exists a problem. It is this further investigation, the details
10 Ibid., p. 143.
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of it, the knowledge of the difficulties, of the general state of knowledge, 
the recognition of objections, which distinguishes the 'respectable thinker' 
from the crank. The original content of his theory does not. If he thinks 
that Aristotle should be given a further chance, let him do it and wait for 
the results. If he rests content with this assertion and does not start 
elaborating a new dynamics, if he is unfamiliar with the initial difficulties of 
his position, then the matter is of no further interest. However, if he does 
not rest content with Aristotelianism in the form in which it exists today 
but tries to adapt it to the present situation in astronomy, physics, and 
micro-physics, making new suggestions, looking at old problems from a 
new point of view, then be grateful that there is at least somebody who has 
unusual ideas and do not try to stop him in advance with irrelevant and 
misguided arguments.11
It may be objected that the sentiments expressed in this passage, coming as they do from 
an early paper, were later rejected by Feyerabend. The later Feyerabend was notorious 
for saying that witchcraft, astrology and other such ideas should be defended. However, 
the statements that we find supporting witchcraft and astrology should be understood as 
partly derived from his reductio, and partly derived from the contentions expressed in the 
above passage. These ideas probably contain some truth, and may, if developed 
seriously, provide alternative frameworks for understanding the world. For example, 
when Feyerabend defended astrology in SFS (pp. 91-6) against recent attacks, what 
abhorred Feyerabend was the uninformed nature of the criticisms. Firstly, many people 
who criticise astrology do not know astrology: they have not done the requisite in-depth 
studies into the subject-matter so as to make their criticisms pertinent and decisive. 
Commenting on a series o f papers criticising astrology, written by scientists, Feyerabend 
states that
what surprises the reader whose image of science has been formed by the 
customary eulogies which emphasize rationality, objectivity, impartiality 
and so on is the religious tone o f the document, the illiteracy of the 
'arguments' and the authoritarian manner in which the arguments are being 
presented. The learned gentlemen have strong convictions, they use their 
authority to spread these convictions ... they know a few phrases which 
sound like arguments, but they certainly do not know what they are talking 
about. (SFS p. 91.)
This is not to say that an in-depth study would vindicate astrology. But an in-depth 
study is a necessary condition for objectivity, rational comparison and impartiality.
11 Feyerabend, "Realism and Instrumentalism" p. 305.
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Secondly, the criticisms are uninformed because they usually disregard scientific 
research which seems to support general astrological concepts: "the assumption that 
celestial events such as the position of the planets, of the moon, of the sun influence 
human affairs " (SFS, p. 93 .) Feyerabend gives references to planetary plasmas and their 
effect upon solar activity, the effect of solar activity, and therefore, of planetary position, 
upon organic life; the possible effect of solar activity and planetary position upon 
chemical reactions involving water; and the sensitivity of plants and animals to the lunar 
cycle. (SFS, pp. 93-4.) These are all examples of scientific research which give tentative 
support to some of the tenets of astrology. However, these examples of scientific 
research are not intended to be vindications of astrology. They are presented by 
Feyerabend to show that there is some scientific research which makes the all too ready 
rejection of astrology at least a little gray.
Feyerabend's presentation of scientific research which could be interpreted as 
giving support to some o f the tenets of astrology should alert the reader that Feyerabend 
is not defending astrology7 as it is popularly known:
The remarks should not be interpreted as an attempt to defend astrology 
as it is practiced now by the great majority of astrologists. Modem 
astrology is in many respects similar to early mediaeval astronomy: it 
inherited interesting and profound ideas, but it distorted them, and 
replaced them by caricatures more adapted to the limited understanding of 
its practitioners. The caricatures are not used for research; there is no 
attempt to proceed into new domains and to enlarge our knowledge o f 
extra-terrestrial influences, they simply serve as a reservoir of naive rules 
and phrases suited to impress the ignorant. (SFS, p. 96.)
This is a very important passage. If we examine the ideas involved here: astrology as a
stagnant research program, as a caricature not used for research; as not expanding into
new domains, then we can clearly see that Feyerabend's principle of proliferation does
not imply that any crack-pot theory should be supported or pursued. Feyerabend places
conditions upon the pursuit o f alternatives.
We can see here that Feyerabend seems to implicitly support a conception of
rationality involving something like Dewey's general values o f inquiry. Ideas and theories
should be taken seriously if (i) they are linked to experience, (ii) They are experimentally
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testable, (iii) They can fruitfully guide further research. And (iv) They show promise as 
being comprehensively applied. If we examine astrology as it is now, then we find that it 
is very difficult to link various aspects of the theory to concrete empirical experience.
The experimental testability of the theory is highly tenuous, those aspects which do admit 
of test have not proved very successful. The fruitfulness o f popular astrology, its ability 
to explicate the multitudinous aspects o f psychology and behaviour, is rather poor. And 
the possible comprehensiveness of astrology is difficult to foresee: can it move out o f its 
professed field of application, personality and psychology, and give insights into the 
nature o f justice, ethics, history and so on? Consequently, with Feyerabend, we can 
unequivocally reject astrology, as it is now practiced, as having any rational merit.
But the important point to be made in relation to Feyerabend's principle of 
proliferation is that this judgment is a contextual one it applies to astrology as it is now 
practiced. Feyerabend does not want to reject any theory universally, or atemporally. 
Consequently, Feyerabend leaves open the, admittedly slim, possibility that some 
researcher(s) will change some of the objectionable tenets o f astrology, thereby 
dissolving the glaring internal inconsistencies, and propose additional premises which are 
testable, fruitful, and possibly comprehensively applicable. If this situation did arise, and 
this new astrology became a progressive research program, then astrology should be 
taken seriously as an alternative conception and not ruled out of consideration a priori. 
Ideas can come from anywhere and ideas can be pursued, extrapolated, and turned into 
flilly-fledged research programs, if not forms-of-life.12
12 An objection may be raised to the effect that if  astrology could be resurrected in the manner outlined, 
then it would no longer be astrology; it would be science. Therefore, it is not that alternatives to science 
must be taken seriously, for they may overthrow science; rather, alternatives are handy for providing 
ideas for science to appropriate. In one sense I don't find this to be an objection at all: 'science' is the 
honorific title we give to that body of ideas and theories which we believe to be the best, most rationally 
supportable, ideas and theories available. Consequently, if  a new astrology became accepted, then it 
would be science, by definition. It would be science in the same sense in which there was Aristotelian 
science. This last idea also brings to light the objectionable feature of the objection: a new 'science', 
wherever it may come from, may be as different from modem science as modem science is from 
Aristotelian science. Proliferation of alternatives may only provide ideas to be appropriated by science; 
but proliferation of alternatives may also throw up a radical alternative, which may change what it is to 
be science.
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Some critics may say that my emphasis upon proliferation as characterising 
Feyerabend's conception of rationality is wrong, in that Feyerabend himself denied such 
an ascription. For example, Feyerabend states that
One m ight... get the impression that I recommend a new methodology 
which replaces induction by counterinduction and uses a multiplicity of 
theories, metaphysical views, fairy-tales instead of the customary pair 
theory/observation. This impression would certainly be mistaken. My 
intention is not to replace one set of general rules by another such set: my 
intention is, rather, to convince the reader that all methodologies, even the 
most obvious ones, have their limits. (AM, 3rd ed. p. 23 .)
But I don't think that this statement goes against my interpretation of Feyerabend.
Feyerabend is here denying that the principle of proliferation should be set up as a
universal, atemporal, necessary standard of what it is to be rational; that would indeed go
against the entire push of Feyerabend's philosophy. Rather, we must interpret Feyerabend
as saying that if we want our knowledge to evolve, and if we want an ever widening
sphere of experience to become comprehensively rationally explicable, then the best
highest level conception that we currently have to achieve these goals can be found in the
idea of proliferation. This is not to say that the principle o f proliferation is necessary for
rationality, for, in agreement with Feyerabend's contention that rational standards
themselves evolve and change over time, we may find in the future that some as yet
undreamt o f rational ideal will furnish us with an even better high level concept o f what it
is to be rational. One of the strengths of this approach is its amenability to meta-
philosophical explication: the ideas involved are meant to be applicable to itself.
Proliferation of concepts incompatible with this conception o f rationality is welcome, and
the issue is to be adjudged experimentally via the plausibility and cogency of the case
studies offered. The whole conception may also be undermined by scientific research, or
by spectacular advances by some other form-of-life, in that we may come across some
one true theory o f everything which may make the plea for proliferation somewhat
weakened in strength. If we add Dewey's high level values, then, as Feyerabend has
pointed out, the one true theory o f everything may necessitate the dropping o f the value
of fruitfulness, and so on.
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7.8 Conclusion.
The content of this thesis has been mainly negative, in that the first four chapters 
dealt with rescuing Feyerabend's philosophy from misunderstandings. Specifically, it has 
it has been said that Feyerabend contends that there is no such thing as rationality; there 
is only power play, prejudice and propaganda It has also been claimed that Feyerabend's 
support for epistemological anarchism should be interpreted literally: do what you like 
and defend what you like, because no theory is better than any other. As evidence for this 
claim various philosophers have contended that (i) Feyerabend's incommensurability 
thesis implies that no two theories can be compared in any manner whatsoever. And (ii) 
The related contention that Feyerabend's ideas constitute a radical, self-refuting, 
relativism.
I have argued in chapters 1-4 that this interpretation o f Feyerabend is wrong in all 
four claims. In particular, I have argued that Feyerabend is conducting a reductio ad 
absurdum of'Rationalist' philosophies. Once we read Feyerabend with this in mind, 
attributions o f irrationality and literal anarchism cannot be supported. Feyerabend's 
incommensurability thesis should also be read with his reductio in mind, with particular 
reference to logicist conceptions of theoretical comparison. That is, Feyerabend never 
denied that theories could be compared. And though Feyerabend was a relativist in many 
respects, his relativism was not of the radical, self-refuting, kind. In fact, Feyerabend's 
philosophy was highly realistic in many respects.
In chapters 5-7 I tied together the various strands of Feyerabend's philosophy to 
produce a positive conception o f rationality. This positive conception o f rationality is a 
historical, contextual and dynamic vision, crucially revolving around the ideas of value 
and plurality. In presenting this conception of rationality, the ideas o f Kuhn and Dewey, 
with specific reference to values-based rationality, have been incorporated into 
Feyerabend's account. This was seen to be the minimum necessary addition to 
Feyerabend's ideas, producing a detailed and comprehensive heuristic program for the 
analysis and understanding o f rationality.
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